Budja Posted February 1, 2015 Posted February 1, 2015 (edited) Naravno da je neravnoteza problem, no da li je bas toliko tesko podacima porediti dva narativa? Da li je nemacki izvoz bas toliko zavisan od Grcke? Da li su Nemacka izvozi Grckoj robu za siroku potrosnju, te se moze naci veza izmedju socijalnog populizma, trgovinskog deficita Grcke (ako ga ima) i izvoza? Ili je struktura uvoza takva (masine, kapitalna dobra) da se lako moze videti koji narativ je tacan? I da li je Nemacka bas toliki neto izvoznik u juzne zemlje EU? Najveci deficit u razmeni sa Nemackom imaju SAD, pa Francuska, pa Britanija, pa Austrija. Spanija i Italija imaju deficit u razmeni od oko 7 mlrd., Grcka manje od 2 mlrd. Ali zato Nemacka ima deficit u odnosu na Holandiju. Evo tabele za 2013. https://www.destatis.de/EN/FactsFigures/NationalEconomyEnvironment/ForeignTrade/TradingPartners/Tables/OrderRankGermanyTradingPartners.pdf?__blob=publicationFile Nemacki surplus je nastao nakon 2000, sto koincidira sa evrom ali i labour reforms. Ja guglanjem nisam nasao tabelu, ali bi bilo lepo videti koji su izvori tog rasta po zemljama. Edited February 1, 2015 by Budja
MancMellow Posted February 1, 2015 Posted February 1, 2015 Oh, Nemacka apsolutno može ekonomski da izdrži čak i izlazak GR iz EU, to nije pitanje.
Bojan Posted February 1, 2015 Posted February 1, 2015 Naravno da nije. Ali je jednako neodgovorno od strane nemačkih zvaničnika da izjavljuju kako su oni opušteni. Pa ni Dojče banka nema preterano pokriće za sve što radi. Na kraju, taj dug se može preliti na nemačke građane. Mada ko zna, možda je sve ovo utvrđivanje pozicija pred predstojeće susrete (12. februar Cipras-Merkel) i pred dospeće sledeće tranše Grčkoj krajem februara. Predlog Gligorova možda nije loš da se Grčkoj na određeni rok ublaže mere štednje do nivoa održivosti javnog duga na postojećem nivou (možda i da se smanji kamata), čime bi se oslobodio deo BDPa koji bi Grčka vlada iskoristila da sprovede svoj program. To bi faktički značilo da im daju nekih 2% posto BDPa da sa time raspolažu prema sopstvenom programu. Pitanje je da li bi i ovo prošlo ukoliko neraspoloženje i nepoverenje raste. U suštini Evropa će oscilirati između dve ekstremne pozicije - idealističke da je to zajednica ravnopravnih država/naroda i druge da su Nemačka i Francuska jedine ozbiljne države.
Bojan Posted February 1, 2015 Posted February 1, 2015 Naravno da je neravnoteza problem, no da li je bas toliko tesko podacima porediti dva narativa? Da li je nemacki izvoz bas toliko zavisan od Grcke? Da li su Nemacka izvozi Grckoj robu za siroku potrosnju, te se moze naci veza izmedju socijalnog populizma, trgovinskog deficita Grcke (ako ga ima) i izvoza? Ili je struktura uvoza takva (masine, kapitalna dobra) da se lako moze videti koji narativ je tacan? I da li je Nemacka bas toliki neto izvoznik u juzne zemlje EU? Najveci deficit u razmeni sa Nemackom imaju SAD, pa Francuska, pa Britanija, pa Austrija. Spanija i Italija imaju deficit u razmeni od oko 7 mlrd., Grcka manje od 2 mlrd. Ali zato Nemacka ima deficit u odnosu na Holandiju. Evo tabele za 2013. https://www.destatis.de/EN/FactsFigures/NationalEconomyEnvironment/ForeignTrade/TradingPartners/Tables/OrderRankGermanyTradingPartners.pdf?__blob=publicationFile Nemacki surplus je nastao nakon 2000, sto koincidira sa evrom ali i labour reforms. Ja guglanjem nisam nasao tabelu, ali bi bilo lepo videti koji su izvori tog rasta po zemljama. Iz ove tabele se jasno vidi da je taj narativ o težnji Nemačke da održi izvoz u mediteranske zemlje neozbiljan. Sa te strane ih ne bi mnogo potreslo da izgube koju milijardu izvoza. Francuska im je važan partner pa im zato daju najniže kamate. Nemačka priča svakako stoji na boljim osnovama. Oni su sproveli Šrederovu agendu i stvorili dobar privredni ambijent. Sada oni misle kako svi treba da preuzmu taj model, manje vodeći računa o strukturi tih ekonomija. Glavna primedba Nemcima bi bila ta da su preuzeli monetarnu politiku unije i prilagodili je svojim potrebama mega izvoznika.
Anonymous Posted February 2, 2015 Posted February 2, 2015 ... U suštini, Syriza treba da svojim biračima nekako saopšti da je vreme za trajni povratak na standard iz 80ih... I da se lupaju u dupeta od sreće ukoliko to zaista postignu.
Budja Posted February 2, 2015 Posted February 2, 2015 U, danasnji Gardijan briljira. Nakon sto se Timoti Garton Es obukao u uniformu i uzeo kalasnjikov da ratuje protiv Putina-Slobe (videti ukrajinski topik), Gardijan ocinski zabrinuto pise sledece, a prste je naravno upleo Putin-Sloba: http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/feb/01/guardian-view-europe-populists-left-right-united-worrying-xenophobia The Guardian view of Europe’s populists: left or right, they are united by a worrying xenophobiaIn Europe’s north, insurgent populist parties blame socialism; in the south they blame capitalism. But they all blame foreigners, and that must be wrong and dangerous W ith Syriza in power in Athens, and Podemos showing its strength on the streets of Madrid, there is a growing sense that a southern coalition of anti-austerity parties in Europe will overturn the existing dogma of economic discipline, largely upheld by Brussels and the north. There is cause to rejoice in the fact that stringent belt-tightening is now being questioned as the best way to pull Europe out of its doldrums. But the rise of these radical political forces tends also to fragment still further an already fragmented continent. In northern Europe, they attack the establishment from the right; in the south, from the left. The May 2014 European parliamentary elections were the first sign of a European Union-wide drive towards a populism which is now taking root in domestic politics across the member states, and 2015 will be a year of many general elections in the EU. Unlike the far-rightwing parties that are flourishing in northern Europe, Syriza and Podemos have steered clear of any anti-immigrant sentiment, and they have seriously toned down any anti-EU language (even if they criticise its policies). It is therefore much healthier for Europe to see such movements capture a general mood of discontent rather than the likes of Ukip or Marine Le Pen or the Sweden Democrats. Syriza and Podemos prefer to channel popular anger against the ruling class, the “casta” in Spanish, which includes centrist parties, left or right, all lumped together in popular opprobrium. But it would be dangerous and short-sighted not to point out the existing overlap between many anti-establishment movements. Insurgent parties of both left and right draw their conflicting passions from a well of nationalism, and this appears in the way that they apportion blame for the economic catastrophe. Both Spain and Greece have certainly been badly hit by the crisis and its aftermath. But it would be intellectually dishonest to lay all the blame for current hardships on Angela Merkel, as Syriza and Podemos often do, or on the patent dishonesty of Greek statistics, as northern European rightwingers do. Many of Spain’s difficulties find their origin in the home-grown speculative construction bubble of the early 2000s. Ideological extremes can meet in cold-blooded ways when it suits their interests. Such was the case when Syriza chose to form a coalition with the extreme-rightwing, nationalistic, anti-immigration and antisemitic Independent Greeks party. It is hard to see how the ideas upheld by such a partner can in any way fit with Syriza’s calls for democratic revival. Parliamentary arithmetic and the need for a broad anti-austerity front may be pleaded in mitigation, but it remains baffling how little criticism for this choice Syriza has received from leftist admirers elsewhere. They should also be disturbed by the support that Marine Le Pen had expressed for Syriza when she attacked “the totalitarianism of the EU and financial markets”. Another awkward overlap between the far right and far left can be found in their indulgence of Vladimir Putin’s propaganda over Ukraine. The first foreign officialAlexis Tsipras received after his election was the Russian ambassador to Greece. Podemos has shown similar sympathy for official Russian views. It is puzzling to see how parties bent on fighting oligarchy and promoting transparency at home can find it so easy to cosy up to a corrupt authoritarian state such as Russia. All the above means voters will want reassurance of the insurgent parties’ respect for the basic rules of liberal democracy. Both Spain and Greece have vivid memories of fascism which act as antidote against far-right tendencies. But that argument also overlooks the fact that the neofascists of Golden Dawn came third in the recent Greek elections. Europe has a north-south divide which reflects the different preferred solutions to its economic troubles. The political colouring of its anti-establishment parties may also depend on how close a country is to the North Sea or to the Mediterranean. But a surprising and disturbing part of their romantic appeal stems from their nationalistic messages. The EU must become a union for sober patriots if it is to defeat the intoxications of nationalism.
frn1782 Posted February 2, 2015 Posted February 2, 2015 Zakljucak je najsladji. Potrebna nam je postena inteligencija da prebrodimo ove nedace retrogradnog nacionalizma koji udara i sa levice i sa desnice. Nov covek za nove sjedinjene evropske drzave.
Eraserhead Posted February 2, 2015 Posted February 2, 2015 Spustio je Cipras dosta loptu, mozda i bude nesto od njega. Evo berza je odmah pozitivno odreagovala.
Muwan Posted February 2, 2015 Posted February 2, 2015 Biće najjače ako se ispostavi da je levičarsku retoriku koristio samo da bi uzjahao na vlast i zatim uredno nastavio da sve radi po starim i uhodanim kombinama.
Eraserhead Posted February 2, 2015 Posted February 2, 2015 Biće najjače ako se ispostavi da je levičarsku retoriku koristio samo da bi uzjahao na vlast i zatim uredno nastavio da sve radi po starim i uhodanim kombinama. Pravo da ti kazem ne deluje mi tako. Deluje kao revolucionar u dusi. Samo sto je realan svet to sto jeste. I mislim da kod takvih ljudi uspeh zavisi od sposobnosti da pomire svoj svet i stvaran svet
MancMellow Posted February 2, 2015 Posted February 2, 2015 ono sto je bitno, to su rezultati, a to ce biti moguce bar naslutiti posle nekog malo duzeg perioda od nedelju dana. ako se sve zavrsi "prijateljski", tako da im se dugovi, naravno, ne otpisu, nekakav aranzman bude zakljucen, ali uz znacajne olaksice, to bi po meni bio uspeh za Ciprasa. E sad, naravno, ostaju domaci problemi, ali to je proces, to cemo moci da cenimo tek malo kasnije.
Muwan Posted February 2, 2015 Posted February 2, 2015 Pravo da ti kazem ne deluje mi tako. Deluje kao revolucionar u dusi. Samo sto je realan svet to sto jeste. I mislim da kod takvih ljudi uspeh zavisi od sposobnosti da pomire svoj svet i stvaran svet Može biti, samo što će ovaj pomiriti ta dva sveta tako što će 100% uvažiti onaj realni i onako pomirljivo pustiti onaj revolucionarni niz WC šolju. Što bi bilo sasvim OK da ga na vlast nije dovela ponuda biračima da svi zajedno malo više budu revolucionari a malo manje realisti.
MancMellow Posted February 2, 2015 Posted February 2, 2015 Može biti, samo što će ovaj pomiriti ta dva sveta tako što će 100% uvažiti onaj realni i onako pomirljivo pustiti onaj revolucionarni niz WC šolju. Što bi bilo sasvim OK da ga na vlast nije dovela ponuda biračima da svi zajedno malo više budu revolucionari a malo manje realisti. ne bih se kladio na to. dovoljno je mlad (za visoku politiku) da ima vremena da ne kapitulira 100%. Ako cemo u procentima, mislim da ce "uvaziti realnost" negde oko 60%
Anduril Posted February 2, 2015 Posted February 2, 2015 Za Ciprasa uopste nema smisla da udara jako sada. Poenta je da se uspostave neki razgovori i saceka pobeda Podemosa u Spaniji. Zatim Grcka, Italija i Spanija mogu da uspostave blok protiv severnjaka sa Francuskom izmedju. I sve to nece biti samo oko ekonomskih tema nego i oko spoljne/bezbednosne politike. Stvaranje blokova unutar EU tokom krize je neminovno ukoliko se dalje bude cekalo sa federalizacijom.
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