Grčka - enormni dug, protesti oko mera štednje

[yolo]

O da. I ne samo nemacke. I ne samo jednom. 

 

Ne zelite da znate koliko je mit o nemackim reparacijama jak u Grckoj. Ne postoji razgovor sa Grcima poslednjih godine na temu njihove krize koji nece pre ili kasnije dotaci ovo uz zakljucak da Nemci nemaju moralno pravo da potrazuju novac od njih. 

[Pontijak]

je l jaci od mita o zlatnim viljuskama na srpskom dvoru?

[yolo]

je l jaci od mita o zlatnim viljuskama na srpskom dvoru?

 

mislim da trenutno jeste. grcka mitomanija sije srpsku uzduz i popreko, mi smo malji deca za njihovu ostrascenost, upornost, slepilo i tupost. jedino sto u tome imaju mnogo vise šarma od nas plus što smo mi ubijali da bi se oni rajcali.

[MancMellow]

Ama znam bre i to ne samo u Grckoj, nego bilo gde da ih sretnes, nece da te puste dok ti objasne svetsku zaveru protiv Srba (i Grka, naravno). Ok, naucni skupovi umeju biti izuzetak, ali ne uvek :D

 

Ali jbg, ionako u svakoj zemlji mozes da nadjes gomilu onih koji nas™ ne podnose, pa ti na kraju dosadi branjenje od izliva simpatija. Ali nema frke, uspece Vucic i to da sjebe, just watch

[yolo]

Angela haters unite. Nalazim ovaj tekst vaznim jer konacno neko u Nemackoj pocinje javno da prica o tome.

 

 

 

Angela Merkel must accept that her austerity policy is now in tatters Joschka Fischer

Syriza’s victory in Greece has produced an unambiguous defeat for the German chancellor and her strategy for sustaining the euro

 

 

Not long ago, German politicians and journalists confidently declared that the euro crisis was over; Germany and the European Union, they believed, had weathered the storm. Today, we know that this was just another mistake in a continuing crisis. The latest error, as with most of the earlier ones, stemmed from wishful thinking – and, once again, it is Greece that has broken the reverie.

 

Even before the leftist Syriza party’s overwhelming victory in the recent Greek election it was obvious that, far from being over, the crisis was threatening to worsen. Austerity – the policy of saving your way out of a demand shortfall – simply does not work. In a shrinking economy, a country’s debt-to-GDP ratio rises rather than falls, and Europe’s recession-ridden crisis countries have now saved themselves into a depression, resulting in mass unemployment, alarming levels of poverty and scant hope.

 

Warnings of a severe political backlash went unheeded. Shadowed by Germany’s deep-seated inflation taboo, Chancellor Angela Merkel’s government stubbornly insisted that the pain of austerity was essential to economic recovery; the EU had little choice but to go along. Now, with Greece’s voters having driven out their country’s exhausted and corrupt elite in favour of a party that has vowed to end austerity, the backlash has arrived.

But, though Syriza’s victory may mark the start of the next chapter in the euro crisis, the political, and possibly existential, danger that Europe faces runs deeper. The Swiss National Bank’s unexpected abandonment of the franc’s euro peg on 15 January , though posing no immediate financial threat,was an enormous psychological blow, one that reflected and reinforced a massive loss of confidence. The euro, as the SNB’s move implied, remains as fragile as ever. And the subsequent decision by the European Central Bank (ECB) to buy more than €1tn in eurozone governments’ bonds, though correct and necessary, has dimmed confidence.

 

The Greek election outcome was foreseeable for over a year. If negotiations between the “troika” (the European commission, the ECB and the International Monetary Fund) and the new Greek government succeed, the result will be a face-saving compromise for both sides; if no agreement is reached, Greece will default.

 

Though no one can say what a Greek default would mean for the euro, it would certainly entail risks to the currency’s continued existence. Just as surely, the megadisaster that might result from a eurozone breakup would not spare Germany.

 

A compromise would, de facto, result in a loosening of austerity, which would entail significant domestic risks for Merkel (though less than a failure of the euro would). But in view of her immense popularity at home, including within her own party, Merkel is underestimating the options at her disposal. She could do much more, if only she trusted herself.

 

In the end, she may have no choice. Given the impact of the Greek election outcome on political developments in Spain, Italy and France, where anti-austerity sentiment is similarly running high, political pressure on the Eurogroup of eurozone finance ministers will increase significantly. It does not take a prophet to predict that the latest chapter of the euro crisis will leave Germany’s austerity policy in tatters – unless Merkel really wants to take the enormous risk of letting the euro fail.

 

There is no indication that she does. So, regardless of which side – the troika or the new Greek government – moves first in the coming negotiations, Greece’s election has already produced an unambiguous defeat for Merkel and her austerity-based strategy for sustaining the euro.

 

Simultaneous debt reduction and structural reforms, we now know, will overextend any democratically elected government because they overtax its voters. And, without growth, there will be no structural reforms either, however necessary they may be.

 

That is Greece’s lesson for Europe. The question now is not whether the German government will accept it, but when. Will it take a similar debacle for Spain’s conservatives in that country’s coming election to force Merkel to come to terms with reality?

 

Nothing but growth will decide the future of the euro. Even Germany, the EU’s biggest economy, faces an enormous need for infrastructure investment. If its government stopped seeing “zero new debt” as the holy grail and instead invested in modernising the country’s transport and municipal infrastructure, and in digitisation of households and industry, the euro – and Europe – would receive a mighty boost. Moreover, a massive public investment programme could be financed at exceptionally low (and, for Germany, conceivably even negative) interest rates.

 

The eurozone’s cohesion and the success of its necessary structural reforms, and thus its very survival, now depend on whether it can overcome its growth deficit. Germany has room for fiscal manoeuvre. The message from Greece’s election is that Merkel should use it before it is too late.

Edited January 31, 2015 by yolo

[Prospero]

...

 

Da bi Grčka ovde mogla imati značajnu ulogu vidi se i po poslednjoj sednici Saveta ministara u vezi sa proširenjem sankcija Rusiji. Ukoliko bi Grčka vlada insistirala na sprovođenju programa Sirize, Evropa bi morala ili da odustane od principa konsenzusa (da odlučuje glasanjem) ili da bitno redefiniše neke pozicije ili da promoviše neki novi, uvrnut, princip tipa „konsenzus minus Grčka“. Čak i da se krene samo putem formalnog glasanja (dobijanje kvalifikovane većine), treba imati u vidu da 4-5 zemalja može blokirati neku odluku. Ovo je značajno ukoliko se očekuje da i neke druge zemlje mogu pratiti Grčku po određenim pitanjima. Izolacija Grčke u Savetu je takođe teško ostvariva ukoliko bi je pratila makar jedna zemlja.

 

Nije realno da će se spoljnom politikom unije rukovoditi na bilo koji drugi način sem konsenzusom. 

[MancMellow]

 

Angela haters unite. 

 

 

[Bojan]

Šanse da Grčka nešto radikalno izmeni na svetskoj sceni nisu velike. Bio bih iskreno iznenađen da se Siriza oslanja na očekivanja da mogu da promene svet pa da onda ta promena donese promene u Grčkoj. Izbori su za samo četiri godine (ako ne i pre) i rezultati se moraju isporučiti™ vrlo brzo. U Srbiji možda može da prođe priča da ćemo 2014-5-6-7-8. osetiti da možemo da živimo bolje, ali ne i u Grčkoj.

 

Da, ali floskula "sto dana" važi za kozmetičko-oportunističke vlade. Ovde se grize mnogo veći zalogaj. Ovo je značajno i ako se anticipira da će evropske birokrate ići na umaranje Grčke i čekanje da ovogodišnji izbori u Španiji prođu "kako treba".

 

Ipak, prežvakavanje političke scene u Evropi je neminovnost, tako da u naredne 3-4 godine možemo očekivati dosta toga.

[Bojan]

Nije realno da će se spoljnom politikom unije rukovoditi na bilo koji drugi način sem konsenzusom. 

 

Upravo tako. I ne samo spoljna politika, već i zakonodavstvo.

[Budja]

U medjuvremenu u Madridu se nastavlja lozana.

Podemos.

 

[Lezilebovich]

A da ta globalna priča ne bude dodatni teg Sirizi u smislu da će povećati želju ostalih zacementiranih kapitalizama da propadnu ? Jer ako Syriza stvarno napravni nešto korisno u Grčkoj, slični pokreti će izrazito ojačati,a to nije na ruku trenutnim vladajućim elitama.

[MancMellow]

nego, sto Yoda rece...i to iz 1 telegrapha. Mislim, Guardian ok, od njih je i ocekivano, no...

 

 

 

Europe's creditors play with 'political fire' in pushing Greece to the brink

...

 If premier Alexis Tsipras breaches the terms of Greece’s EU-IMF Troika bail-out – signed by earlier leaders under duress, and deemed unjust in Athens – Europe will cut off €54bn of support for the Greek banking system and force the country out of the euro in short order. Europe must not yield to “blackmail,” said Germany’s ZEW institute.

Wolfgang Schäuble, Germany’s finance minister, said the new Syriza government is bound by the contractual terms of Greece’s €245bn loan package from the Troika. “Elections change nothing. There are rules. We did whatever could be done to support Greece in difficult times, again and again," he said.

When the crisis first erupted in 2010, and re-erupted in 2012, Europe lacked a firewall. The conflagration threatened to spread instantly from Greece to Portugal, Ireland, and beyond.

This time Mr Schäuble thinks they are ready. “We face no risk of contagion, so nobody should think we can be put under pressure easily. We are relaxed,” he said.  

 

...

 

 The creditors are treating the unfolding drama as if it were a local Balkan affair. If a country of eleven million chooses to commit economic suicide, it is free to do so. The broader consequences will be no greater than the fall-out from Argentina’s default in 2001. That is the message from Berlin.

Brussels is for now sticking to the tough line. “We expect them to fulfil everything that they have promised to fulfil,” said Jyrki Katainen, the EU’s economic enforcer.

Experts are deeply divided about the wisdom of this strategy, and the implications of Grexit.

Professor Luis Garicano from the London School of Economics says it is Syriza that has misjudged badly, both by teaming up in coalition with a virulently anti-German party, and by violating Troika terms across the board – halting privatisation, raising the minimum wage to €750 a month, re-hiring 10,000 civil servants, and blocking mortgage foreclosures.

“Tsipras is slapping the Germans in the face: it is almost as if he wishes to be thrown out of Europe. I can’t see any political support for Syriza from any government in southern Europe. They are all terrified of their own populist movements,” he says.

Prof Garicano thinks the eurozone can now withstand contagion from Grexit. The economy is on the mend. The ECB’s quantitative easing has covered the currency bloc in a protective blanket. By ejecting Greece – he argues - Chancellor Angela Merkel gains “political cover” to relax austerity and reward those countries that play by the rules. 

 

...

 

 Yet there are darker signals in other markets. Paddy Power is offering 6/4 odds on Grexit by 2016, rising to 3/1 for Spain, 4/1 for Portugal, and 13/2 to two for Italy, a ranking that reflects politics as much as finance.

It is politics that now matter. ...  Spain’s Podemos party – much in evidence at Syriza’s victory party in Athens, and even more mutinously radical – is leading national polls at 27pc. Marine Le Pen’s Front National won the EU elections in France with calls for a return to the franc and a return to sovereign borders. The three biggest opposition parties in Italy are now hostile to the euro. This is not contagion from Greece. It is running in parallel. Yet how it is handled will spill over with emotional force into the internal debates everywhere in Europe.

“Syriza has just won a landslide popular mandate from the Greek people to tell the Troika to go to Hell. It is ludicrous to shout at them and tell them they can’t wriggle out of agreements,” said Giles Merritt, head of the Brussels think-tank Friends of Europe.

Mr Merritt said the Syriza revolt has exposed the political failure of EMU crisis strategy with refreshing clarity. “People in Brussels are losing patience with Germany. The real issue at hand is how we are going to rescue the eurozone from economic depression caused by five years of misguided austerity. Tspiras may find that he has more friends in this city than he thinks,” he said.

“We cannot possibly risk Grexit at this stage and trigger a fresh eurozone crisis, so the Commission will soon waiver. Jyrki Katainen is towing the line for now but he is not a fool. It is Greece that really has the whip hand, and the task is to find a face-saving formula for Germany,” he said.

Prof Ashoka Mody, a former IMF bail-out chief in Europe and now at Princeton University, said hints by ECB members that they may pull the plug on Greek banks are “extremely irresponsible” and beyond the proper authority of these officials.

“They are supposed to be the guardians of financial stability. I have never heard of such outlandish threats before. The EU authorities have no idea what the consequences of Grexit might be, or what unknown tremors might hit the global payments system. They are playing with fire,” he said.  

 

...

 

 The ECB would shield Portugal from immediate Grexit fall-out, but corrosive doubts would be planted. As the Portuguese newspaper Publico wrote in an editorial entitled “Portugal is not Greece, but...”, the country has the same afflictions of crushing debt, low-growth, and lack of competitiveness within EMU.

Combined public and private (non-financial) debt is 380pc of GDP, the highest in Europe, making the country acutely vulnerable to debt-deflation dynamics. Nor is it still viewed as an austerity poster child by Berlin. “The reforms have stalled. Behind the scenes they have put a halt to cuts. It is surprising that people haven’t paid attention to this,” said Raoul Ruparel from Open Europe.  ... Mr Mody says EMU shock therapy has failed to put monetary union on a viable course. The deficits of the EMU crisis states may have fallen but the mix of perma-slump and “lowflation” - now deflation of minus 0.6pc – have by caused the debt stock to spiral upwards. This is a mathematical effect. The interest costs have been rising faster than nominal GDP. Italy’s public debt has jumped from 116pc to 133pc of GDP in three years despite a primary budget surplus.  

 

...

 

 “Europe is sleepwalking into a very dangerous situation,” said Hans Redeker from Morgan Stanley. “Diplomacy is breaking down and we are seeing same sort of emotional behaviour that led to the misjudgements of 1914.”

“The EU always said that the currency union is irrevocable. Once you destroy that faith, the eurozone becomes little more than a fixed-exchange system, an 'ERM3' with currency tail-risk always a nagging doubt. We think the euro would fall to $0.90 to the dollar very fast,” he said.

The stakes are high. Greece is a NATO member on the edges of Europe’s “arc of instability”, a string of conflicts, civil wars, and failed states that stretches from Ukraine, through the Levant to Libya. Critics say it would be an act of strategic vandalism to push Greece over the abyss into this maelstrom.  

 

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/economics/11381071/Europes-creditors-play-with-political-fire-in-pushing-Greece-to-the-brink.html

Edited January 31, 2015 by MancMellow

[Lord Protector]

A da ovo sve ne miriše na EU sa dve brzine u nekom bliskom periodu? Ne vidi se ovde mnogo prostora za kompromis...

[Bojan]

A da ta globalna priča ne bude dodatni teg Sirizi u smislu da će povećati želju ostalih zacementiranih kapitalizama da propadnu ? Jer ako Syriza stvarno napravni nešto korisno u Grčkoj, slični pokreti će izrazito ojačati,a to nije na ruku trenutnim vladajućim elitama.

 

Kako sada stvari stoje tačka propasti leži u bankarskom sistemu. Valja spasiti banke, a njihovim spašavanjem se uvećava javni dug (znači prebacuje se na sve nas). Veći deo bailouta je u Grčkoj potrošen na banke i to se teži očuvati. To su i njihove najveće kompanije (uz Helenik petroleum). Pri tome banke vuku poteze uz sve manje realnog pokrića i kredibiliteta. To ne ide u dobrom pravcu. Svakako mnogi u Evropi neće želeti da trpe dodatna opterećenja, iako ni alternativa nije vesela.

 

A elite postoje razne. Ali možda ove finansijsko-oligarhijske već računaju sa nekom odstupnicom u slučaju kraha.

[Prospero]

nego, sto Yoda rece...i to iz 1 telegrapha. Mislim, Guardian ok, od njih je i ocekivano, no...

 

 

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/economics/11381071/Europes-creditors-play-with-political-fire-in-pushing-Greece-to-the-brink.html

 

 

 “Elections change nothing. There are rules.

 

Zanimljiv stav, posebno u smislu da je jasno izgovoren.

 

Pri tom ja nemam načelnu poziciju spram toga, reč je o starim dilemama demokratije.