Grčka - enormni dug, protesti oko mera štednje

[Pontijak]

А шта ти кажем , у праву си.

 

zlo i naopako ako sam u pravu :(

 

nego evo tebi mali odlomak iz intervjua glumca bore stepanovica, lekovit intervju i za srce i za um :) a govori o nasim intelektualcima, nebitno da li u domovini ili u svetu

 

Zato što su iz opanaka ušli u cipele. Obrazovani divljaci. To je najgore. Ne mislim ništa ružno o seljacima, ali mislim o seljaku-intelektualcu. Pamtim kada je u mojoj rodnoj kući postavljan drveni pod. To je jedna svest, potreba, od sebe i od sveta, prirode, sasvim svedena na najminimalnije potrebe. Ali, bilo je onih koji su tada govorili: "Šta će mi drveni pod? Pa moji su hiljadama godina živeli na zemljanim podovima sa otvorenim krovom i tako sušili meso. To ima svoje tehnološke prednosti. Šta će meni drveni pod? Šta će mi plafon i kako ću da sušim meso?

Pedesetih godina ja sam bio svedok kad je otac strugao sa stričevima i pravili su sve to. I sada isti ti ljudi postaju evropejci a ovi drugi mrze Ameriku koja tobože nema istoriju a mi je imamo. Koju istoriju? Koju istoriju su imali ti seljaci kod Nikšića, Trebinja, u centralnoj Bosni koji su živeli tako hiljadu godina. I odjednom došla struja, voda, asfalt, automobili, i oni su izdali sve svoje zbog toga. Sad se vraćaju u prošlost, u svoje ruralno, fundamentalno, primitivno...

 

Edited January 30, 2015 by Pontijak

[porucnik vasic]

zlo i naopako ako sam u pravu :(

Па што си писао ако мислиш да ниси у праву? -_-

[Pontijak]

Па што си писао ако мислиш да ниси у праву? -_-

 

u dubini duse sam se ponadao da mozda i gresim

 

nego, procitaj ovo od bore stepanovica sto sam naknadno stavio gore u prethodni post :)

[porucnik vasic]

u dubini duse sam se ponadao da mozda i gresim

 

nego, procitaj ovo od bore stepanovica sto sam naknadno stavio gore u prethodni post :)

Драго ми је да си се понадао да грешиш. Да је другачије било би страшно. ;)

Јес'вала Стјепановић мислилац, историчар философ. Ценим да је Саида прочитао пар пута од корица до корица. Провинцијалац балкански(не смем да кажем српски) најстрашнији. Оно што је проблем је што покушаваш овим текстом да дисквалификујеш свог саговорника као необразованог. То је оно што растужује.

[Pontijak]

Драго ми је да си се понадао да грешиш. Да је другачије било би страшно. ;)

Јес'вала Стјепановић мислилац, историчар философ. Ценим да је Саида прочитао пар пута од корица до корица. Провинцијалац балкански(не смем да кажем српски) најстрашнији. Оно што је проблем је што покушаваш овим текстом да дисквалификујеш свог саговорника као необразованог. То је оно што растужује.

vidim ja da boro ujeda tamo gde treba, u samo srce tame takozvanog srpskog nacionalnog bica. bas zato sto mislim da imas odlicno obrazovanje a pritom si i u sjedninjenim drzavama, cudi me kada tako zaguslas nicim izazvan, okreni se dobrim pivima a mani se tih dveri lazne percepcije (one morisonove dveri percepcije su makar bile hedonizam elesdija i ostalih djakonija) iza kojih je hodnik koji vodi do srca tame srpskog nacionalnog bica

 

i dosta sa oftopikom od mene

Edited January 30, 2015 by Pontijak

[Budja]

odmah da kažem, ja ne verujem da će biti fantastični. ovo što su oni izabrai je potez očajnika. i poslednja brana pred zlatnom zorom i fašizacijom društva. ja to tako vidim. i jedan očajnički potez autsajdera da pokrene neke šire debate na nivou EU. I u tom smislu pozdravljam. Osim rezultata u narednom periodu će se još videti i da li oni imaju nekoga ko to, krijući se iza njih, podržava ili su totalni soleri. 

 

Da, dobro je ovo razmrdavanje.

 

Samo fotka onog Holandjanina sa Varufakisom je signal da evropska birokratija nije navikla na politicki dijalog na otvorenom i da je to potpuno novi svet za njih.

[Meazza]

Archi, kidas tebra. Kidas.

[steins]

Da, dobro je ovo razmrdavanje.

 

Samo fotka onog Holandjanina sa Varufakisom je signal da evropska birokratija nije navikla na politicki dijalog na otvorenom i da je to potpuno novi svet za njih.

 

naravno da je. oni sede u svojim udobnim kancelarijama i zevaju pišući uglavnom besmislene eseje koje jedni drugima čitaju. Oni mu dodju ko ekonomisti li pravnici u nekom preduzeću kod nas. 

Njihova jedina terenska akcija je kad se sjure iz Brisla po indijanskim naseobinama da priprete onima koji već unapred spuštaju čakšire i podmazuju čmarne kolutiće ili da se obžderu i opiju na račun domaćina po raznoraznim seminarima.

I ovaj pajac se zaleteo da pripreti glupim grcima da se sa birokratima i bankarima nije zajebavati kad ga je tamo dočekao real Dinkara koji mu je uvalio ladnu patku toliko jako da ovaj nije znao dal je zbunjen, uplašen ili samo ljut.

 

Neprijatno, ako ćemo pošteno!

[MancMellow]

real Dinkara 

 

E nemoj jbt čak ni u istu rečenicu. Razlika je nepojmljiva. Na stranu sve ko je koga tu predstavljao, ovde je, bukvalno, učenik došao kod profesora. E sad ljudi treba da vide ovo i onda pogledaju Krstića(29) i slične. Nebo i zemlja. 

[Meazza]

+1

 

Kosmos. Svemir.

[Anduril]

može neko meni prostom da pojasni - kakve će tačno posledice snositi grčka ako odbije pregovore sa Trojicom? Ono što ja čitam od pretnji je - snižavanje kreditnog rejtinga i eventualni odlazak stranih banaka iz Grčke? I šta onda? Šta dobijaju sve te strane banke ako odu iz Grčke? 

 

Eto par detalja:

 

 

If Mr Tsipras pushes his luck, creditors are likely to push back equally firmly, insisting that failure to abide by their terms would mean Greece being expelled from the monetary union. The German government came close to taking this decision in 2012, but pulled back; Mrs Merkel was worried about the wider consequences for the euro zone. However, officials in Berlin reckon that the risk of financial and economic contagion is now lower.

The euro area now has a permanent rescue fund. And with the ECB launching its big programme of quantitative easing in March, creating money to buy sovereign bonds and other assets, a flare-up in the bond markets of other peripheral countries seems less likely. There has so far been little sign of contagion from Greece to the rest of southern Europe. The political risks for Mrs Merkel are also lower, because it would be Mr Tsipras who would be blamed rather than her.

That calculation may yet be proved wrong. Grexit would breach the principle that euro membership is irrevocable, making investors worry about other countries that might be forced out. But whatever the wider impact, the consequences for Greece would be traumatic. Overnight, euros would become a foreign currency as the government converted domestic assets and liabilities into drachmas. A new Greek currency would immediately plummet in value. The IMF reckoned nearly three years ago that it would fall by 50%; some economists thought it would fall by even more.

Such a depreciation would restore Greek competitiveness with a bang, helping to lure tourists and boost exports. But it would also trigger inflation, as prices of imports shot up. More important, currency depreciation would make Greece’s foreign debts, which would remain in euros, unsustainable. That would cause the country to default, which could lock it out of global capital markets for years.

The shock of Grexit would hit the economy hard. The IMF estimated in early 2012 that, in the first year, it could depress GDP (which was already falling sharply) by an additional eight percentage points. The impact now might be less severe, but Greece would still lurch from its recovery into a renewed and sharp recession. The longer-term benefits from regained competitiveness might also be lost if it were forced to leave the EU and the single market as well as the euro, as a widely cited legal paper from the ECB maintains.

Will Tsipras sign out of the euro?

Even if Grexit is only halfway as ruinous as these projections suggest, Mr Tsipras should be wary about provoking such an outcome, especially as Greeks want to remain in the euro. This suggests that, despite a bigger-than-expected election victory, his bargaining position is weak. The task for European governments is to find a way for him to retreat from his demands without losing face altogether.

His war-memorial visit and complaint about the official statement on Russia are dismissed by officials in Brussels as gestures for domestic consumption. A meeting of EU heads of government on February 12th, Mr Tsipras’s first, may be more revealing. What can he achieve? On paper he has little leverage. And he has aroused high expectations among voters and his fractious party.

Discussions with Brussels are only part of the story. Any bail-out extension must be approved by parliaments in Germany, Finland, the Netherlands and Estonia: four countries not renowned for their forbearance towards fiscal sinners. The attitudes of such hardline governments will matter at least as much as those of EU institutions.

The Finnish government, which in 2011 refused to back Greece’s second bail-out until it was offered collateral, has every reason to be tough: it faces a difficult election in April, and there are few votes to be won by being nice to Greeks. Similarly, the Dutch government must contend with the threat of Geert Wilders’s populist Party for Freedom, which has lately been leading the opinion polls.

Yet the crucial country is Germany. Politicians in Mrs Merkel’s ruling coalition have couched their intransigence in appeals to the sanctity of rules. Steffen Seibert, her spokesman, insists that the new Greek government must meet the commitments made by the outgoing one. Wolfgang Schäuble, Germany’s finance minister and a stern advocate of fiscal probity, declared both that he respected the outcome of Greece’s election and that the new government must respect the “obligations” to which its predecessor had signed up.

The talk is tough at the centre of German politics. Any hint of softness towards Greece might increase the appeal of the political fringes. The Left, a party that descends from the Communists who once ruled East Germany and that sees Syriza as an ideological ally, cheered what it hoped was the start of an uprising against Mrs Merkel’s policies. On the populist right the Alternative for Germany, a party founded in 2013 with a call to dissolve the euro, also celebrated, believing that the Greek election would bring its goal closer. Its leader, Bernd Lucke, suggested that Greece should leave the single currency at once.

 

Po meni, i dalje najbolji plan je onaj iz Bundesbanke o paralelnom uvodjenju drahme uz evro u Grckoj. 

[MancMellow]

Ponoviću, ako  Grci skroz soliraju u ovome, neće im na dobro izaći, a ako dobiju/imaju(skriveno) podršku neke od bitnih EU zemalja u ovome - ceo kontinent će se naći na istorijskoj prekretnici.

Edited January 30, 2015 by MancMellow

[hazard]

Eto par detalja:

 

 

Po meni, i dalje najbolji plan je onaj iz Bundesbanke o paralelnom uvodjenju drahme uz evro u Grckoj. 

 

Meni to skroz neubedljivo. Zvuci OK na papiru, ali realno, ako imas 2 paralelne valute, jedna ce uskoro postati bezvredna i svi ce je izbegavati. To bi bila kao neka situacija sa dinarom i markom u Srbiji sredinom 90ih, gde je dinare imao samo ko mora, i svako je gledao da ih u rukama zadrzi sto krace.

 

Najbolji je plan ono sto je napisano u clanku iz Economista, a sto je slicno onome sto sam vec ovde pisao: Grcka treba da dobije plan, ugovor s EU i MMF po kojom ce se postepeno otpisivati njen dug prema ovim poveriocima kako se bude ostvarivao napredak u strukturnim reformama. Zauzvrat Cipras treba da iskulira sa svojim populistickim levicarenjem i leba za 3 dinara programom, i da se skoncentrise na onaj deo svog programa koji se tice razbijanja oligopola i tajkuna.

[hazard]

i, btw, za vreme 2014-te učešće javnog duga Srbije u BNP-u skočio sa 59% na 71%. Mada, znam, to je u stvari pad a ne skok, ali samo kažem.

 

To je ustvari poklon...

[Anduril]

 

Contrary to popular belief, the authorities do not fear that a Greek exit could cause a serious financial crisis of the euro. The ECB can create money like the US Federal Reserve, and has all the firepower it needs to make sure that a Greek exit would not cause serious damage to the eurozone financial system. ECB President Mario Draghi proved this in July 2012 when he brought an end to the financial crisis of the eurozone — and doubts about the survival of the single-currency bloc itself — by merely stating that he would do "whatever it takes" to defend the euro.

The real fear is that Greece might leave the currency and, after weathering the flight of capital and an initial crisis, recover much more quickly than the rest of Europe, prompting other governments to also want to leave the euro. The entire currency union could be threatened. Bluffs and bluster fill the financial press at the moment, but the smarter people in Brussels and Frankfurt understand this reality, and will want to make some concessions to the new government in Greece.

Either way, this is the beginning of the end of the eurozone's long nightmare.

 

Neki misle da bi povratak drahme zapravo bilo super - kao i pre evra.