Politika u UK

[akibono]

Sadiq Khan has secured victory as London mayor, with Labour winning in more constituencies than the Conservative candidate Zac Goldsmith.

 

Khan had 44 per cent of first preference votes, with Goldsmith trailing on 35 per cent. Green candidate Sian Berry looks likely to come in third place with six per cent of the vote. 

 

London wide turnout looks set to reach as high as 45.6 per cent, up 7.6 per cent on 2012.

Goldsmith got off to a good start as the Conservatives secured an early win in Bexley and Bromley, but went on to win just five more constituencies to Khan's eight.

 

The Tory candidate also won in Barnet and Camden, Croydon and Sutton, Havering and Redbridge, South West and West Central.

 

However, Khan took the rest (and some by quite a large margin): Brent and Harrow, City and East, Ealing and Hillingdon, Enfield and Harringey, Lambeth and Southwark, Merton and Wandsworth, North East, and Greenwich and Lewisham.

 

All constituency votes have been 100 per cent verified. 

 

 

 

[kobni zelaya]

Ako Britanija izađe iz EU biće ozbiljnih posledica.

[jms_uk]

https://www.facebook.com/TheTabOfficial/videos/674252449389134

 

[Prospero]

must read:

Europe’s Sullen Child

Jan-Werner Müller
 
 
Would the Brexit debate have played out differently in a calmer, less crisis-ridden Europe? Maybe the threat of the UK leaving the EU would have caused citizens and politicians across Europe to think about ‘ever closer union’ and what it actually means or should mean for them. It’s a nice thought, but in reality virtually nobody in the last ten years or so has been willing to talk about what used to be known as finalité, the purported end-state of European integration. The European elite hasn’t forgotten either the fear of a European super-state that the ill-fated ‘European Constitution’ aroused in 2004-5 or its failure to ignite any passion for Europe, as Euro-enthusiasts had hoped. Far from concentrating minds, Brexit has been treated as yet another distraction in an EU facing multiple threats of disintegration. At last autumn’s summit meetings, convened to address the refugee crisis, other member states made clear their view that dealing with the UK was like trying to manage a narcissistic child. Ten years ago, London might have had a different vision for Europe and been taken seriously, even rallied other member states. Now Britain is seen not just as inward-looking, but as selfish and sullen. The very fact that the Brexit debate is almost exclusively about Britain indicates the extent to which Cameron has removed the UK from the project of determining the Union’s future as a whole.
[...]
A multi-speed Europe might have proved permanently compatible with the single market, yet it couldn’t easily co-exist with what in theory should have been a one-size-fits-all monetary union, and turned out to be one-size-fits-none. In December 2011 Cameron’s veto of plans to salvage the euro effectively forced the other EU member states to set up a parallel universe of European integration. All countries except the UK and the Czech Republic – which has become ever more Eurosceptic – signed what is technically not an EU treaty specifying harsher rules and penalties for the Eurozone and making it mandatory to constitutionalise ‘debt brakes’ in the way that Germany had. Cameron went for the nuclear option of a veto after he had been denied an opt-out, but he allowed the 25 signatories of the treaty to use the EU institutions to implement the new provisions, promising at the time that he would watch further developments ‘like a hawk’. Smaller member states see this as having been a strategic blunder: they feel they were forced to make a choice and, in the end, had to opt for a Berlin no longer balanced by London or, for that matter, an ever weaker Paris and a Commission that has been sidelined over the last ten years. The episode also left many with the bitter sense that London cared more about its own financial industry than any larger European interest. Countries that used to feel close to the UK are now described as Europe’s new ‘orphans’.
 
This sense of abandonment has taken less obvious forms. Brexiters regularly present themselves as champions of ‘national sovereignty’ and ‘the rule of law’ (the excellence of which supposedly explains the attractiveness of London for global finance – never mind deregulation or the role of the City as a major hub for illicit financial transactions). In recent years countries like Hungary and Poland have started systematically to dismantle democracy and the rule of law within their own borders. They have weakened the judiciary, captured the media, and attacked all opposition as illegitimate and unpatriotic. Brussels isn’t the great threat to the rule of law in Europe, it is increasingly authoritarian individual governments that pose a real danger not just to their own citizens, but to anyone holding a European passport; as long as they are represented in the European Council, the decisions they make affect everyone in the EU. There are even some Tories who understand these perils perfectly well, but they would never speak up for fear that it might lead to ‘more powers for Brussels’. Instead, shamefully, they opted to stand with Poland’s deeply illiberal Law and Justice party when it came under severe criticism in the European Parliament earlier this year (Cameron took the Tories out of the European People’s Party grouping in 2014 and joined an alliance with Poland’s ruling party as well as right-wing populists such as the Danish People’s Party and the ‘True Finns’).
 
Brussels has very limited legal means of intervening to safeguard democracy and the rule of law in member states, though these are ‘values’ which, according to the Lisbon Treaty, all EU countries have to respect. And even those very limited means cannot be deployed if member states aren’t willing to name the culprits. The UK has effectively put ‘national sovereignty’ over ‘rule of law’. It is reasonable to assume that in the run-up to the referendum it has also done some sordid deal with Poland and Hungary along the lines of ‘we will pretend you are still real liberal democracies, if you don’t give us a hard time about cutting benefits for Poles and Hungarians working in Britain.’ The UK was once a shining light in Europe; it was the Tories under Thatcher in particular who pressed for democracy in Eastern Europe. No more.
 

 

*

It is striking how little attention has been paid to the Brexit debate in the rest of Europe. European leaders were willing to engage in February’s summit kabuki, which allowed Cameron to declare victory at home, having secured some largely symbolic gains. But on the issues that really mattered – above all, free movement within the single market – other member states were uncompromising, making it impossible for Cameron to satisfy Ukip voters (or the right wing of his own party). And this time the UK’s usual allies didn’t see London forging a path they wanted to follow, in the way Sweden and Denmark once regarded Britain as creating possibilities for opt-outs of one kind or another. In theory, it might have been possible to build a coalition around a vision of Europe à la carte, but in practice, even those governments which worry that their own populations are becoming increasingly Eurosceptic realise that a Europe in which everyone can have it both ways would be utterly incoherent.
 
In many ways the EU is already incoherent. For the time being, it is in a situation where failing policies are neither reversed nor properly fixed. With the Eurozone, governments created a single currency; with Schengen, they created one border. But nobody has been willing fully to accept what has to follow from these major forms of integration: namely, one fiscal policy, with at least some modest redistribution to address imbalances across the Eurozone; and a shared asylum and border policy. This would not in itself create a federal state, but it could be a step in that direction.
 
Some have portrayed the UK as the major obstacle to making the Eurozone and Schengen work properly. But Britain is outside both and has no power to prevent fundamental changes to these schemes. Merkel and Hollande are both nominally committed to political union; indeed, Merkel at one point thought that a more coherent EU would be the major legacy of her third term. But Paris and Berlin mean very different things when they talk about gouvernement économique and Wirtschaftsregierung, and Brexit would not magically allow them to reconcile their differences. Both Hollande and Merkel face elections next year. The hapless Hollande, now confronted with open revolt in his own party, has little chance of winning; after the refugee crisis, Merkel’s political capital is also dramatically diminished. She is not in a position to take the country on another scary political journey where the best she can say is ‘Trust me’ or ‘We can do this,’ in the way she just about managed to do during the Syrian influx. But even if Merkel were still as powerful as she was before last summer, it is unlikely that Berlin would want to move on any major project of EU reform as long as France seems incapable of reforming itself.
[...]
There are others who might secretly be hoping for Brexit. The financial industry on the Continent calculates that it might get London’s business. Southern countries would reason that the balance of power had shifted in their favour and might make another attempt to escape German half-hegemony. Renzi is already rehearsing the role of leader, after Hollande’s miserable failure in 2012. The Italian prime minister stresses growth and even has ambitious plans for further integration, including a common European unemployment scheme. More important still, Renzi has been trying to argue that Europe’s multiple crises also present opportunities for trade-offs: Italy could help Germany with refugees, for example, if Germany were to relax its relentless demand for strict adherence to the rules on national deficits. So far, Berlin has flatly refused deals of this sort; if it were to give in a little, the question would soon arise whether other ‘Northerners’ might want to follow the example of Brexit. Polls indicate that if the UK goes, a majority of Swedes would want to leave as well. Jimmie Akesson, the leader of the right-wing populist Sweden Democrats, is already calling for a referendum on EU membership. If nothing else, it is clear that the EU cannot afford to give a post-Brexit UK a good deal.
 
The proponents of secessionism, another major form of identity politics in Europe today, probably also expect to gain from Brexit. One has to imagine that Brexit would be followed by another referendum on Scottish independence, which in turn could be the prelude to the break-up of Spain, Belgium and possibly Italy. However, even if an independent Scotland were quickly admitted to the EU, that wouldn’t solve the problem of the secession of Catalonia and the chances are even slimmer that the Lega Nord would finally seek an actual separation of its fantasy creation, ‘Padania’, from the rest of Italy. Belgium has its problems, but break-up would mean at least one party losing the capital of Europe – an unacceptable downside on which even all Belgians can probably agree.
 
Europe hasn’t yet found an institutional architecture that would create stability. The euro has brought about the very conflicts European integration had been intended to prevent. One of the Union’s founding fathers, the French foreign minister Robert Schuman, once spoke of the need to ‘detoxify the relationship between France and Germany’; now, the nationalist toxin is back virtually everywhere in Europe. Nobody at this point can or, for that matter, even really wants to move forward with ‘ever closer union’; Cameron secured an opt-out from something that for most Europeans has become meaningless. But in no country is there a majority for leaving (or dissolving the club) either.
 
A UK that goes it alone, and especially a former UK, will not necessarily lose two of the things that the EU achieved in the postwar period: peace and prosperity – even if most economists agree that the latter will be significantly diminished. But it certainly will lose power. It won’t have a seat at the table when the EU, the world’s largest economy, makes its deals with China and the US. Merkel has tried hard to keep Cameron invested, or even just interested, in a Europe where Britain has enormous clout because of its economy and, not least, its military. A UK that stays in will not solve the EU’s problems with Schengen and the Eurozone; but securing the former and strengthening the latter are not necessarily threats to Britain. The UK isn’t condemned to be a spoilsport for ever, let alone the solipsistic nation into which Cameron’s ill-timed referendum has turned it. Brexit would make Germany even more powerful, and Germany’s continued attempts to keep Europe British without Britain would create even more conflict and resentment. A UK that remained and co-operated selectively with Berlin might just make the EU more stable, better able to project power, and less toxic. Eventually, after what is likely to go down in history as a lost decade for Europe, the EU might even become an area of hope again.

[MancMellow]

 

 

But it certainly will lose power

 

kljucno

[jms_uk]

 

Stigao poziv za glasanje!

 

 

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[Tribun_Populi]

Say YESSSS! :)

[MancMellow]

Da,oce boli ga uvo, samo mu fali da mu se raspadne i druga zemlja

[Tribun_Populi]

Oni to ljudi rade civilizovano™. ^_^

 

edit: a i čemu sekiracija, tu su uvek transatlantske integracije™.

Edited May 27, 2016 by Tribun_Populi

[jms_uk]

Da,oce boli ga uvo, samo mu fali da mu se raspadne i druga zemlja

Ako se (i) to desi, onda idem negde drugde

 

 

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[Tribun_Populi]

Ja se nadam da će Predsednik Francuske Republike monsieur Francois Hollande da pozove građane Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva Velike Britanije i Severne Irske da glasaju za ostanak u EU :P

[Dagmar]

Kakve su trenutno prognoze? Kapiram da će evro da padne ako UK izađu.

[Sestre Bronte]

ma nema ništa od izlaska

[Dr Arslanagić]

2-3% prednosti za ostanak

[jms_uk]

Bice def. tesno...

 

 

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