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[Hamlet Strašni]

Konacno citam: Chuck Palahniuk - "Pygmy"

Procitao prikaz kada sam video post i nalozio se kao mlad majmun.Tako da je Pygmy prva knjiga koju sam narucio preko Amazona. Verovatno cu je videti sutra u Mamutu za istu lovu koliko cu je platiti ali wtf

[Њујоркер]

Procitah. Izuzetno vredna i prilicno jasno napisana knjiga o poslednjim godinama KJ, o (uzaludnoj) borbi male zemlje koja se nasla kao moneta za potkusurivanje velikih sila. Hoptner sjajno demaskira spoljnu politiku Francuza, Engleza, Italijana, Nemaca, pa i SAD, koje su kao bajagi neutralne. Od svih, Nemci su imali jedini koliko toliko jasan pravac u spoljnoj politici, Francuzi nisu imali ama bas nikakav, Italijani vidno sizofreni, Englezi potpuno indiferentni, bas ko i Amerikanci, dok to njih nije zabolelo, ali spremni da zrtvuju svakog drugog za svoje interese. Stojadinovic je prvi uvideo da od stare Evrope i starih saveznistava nema nista, i da od oslanjanja na Francuze nema vajde, pa je krenuo u politiku neutralnosti, kao jedinu mogucu za opstanak i razvoj nezavisne Jugoslavije u neizvesnim i opasnim vremenima. Pakt sa Italijom i otvaranje vrata Nemackoj ekonomiji da ulaze u KJ su svakako bili uspeh za vladu Milana Stojadinovica. Medjutim, nespremnost na kompromis na unutrasnjem planu sa Macekom i sve vece licne ambicije, dovele su do njegovog pada i formiranja Cvetkoviceve Vlade, ciji je glavni zadatak bio sporazum s Hrvatima. Cela 1939. godina je sprcana samo za to, a za to vreme, vec je ranije pao Prag, Slovacka je proglasena nezavisnom drzavom, Madjarska je uvecana na racun iste te Slovacke, Italija je upala u Albaniju (bez da je Cvetkovic kazao a), a sporazuma nigde. Tek u avgustu, kada je napad na Poljsku bio vec gotova stvar, Macek je nemajuci kud pristao na sporazum s Cvetkovicem. Ironija sudbine je ta da je potpisao isti papir koji mu je i Stojadinovic nudio 2 godine ranije. I dok se na unutrasnjem planu stvari koliko-toliko stabilizovale (bar na papiru i u knjizi, u stvarnosti je bilo to malo manje ruzicastije), spoljne okolnosti su bivale sve gore i gore za vladu Cvetkovic-Macek. Lepo je i potanko autor objasnio kako je jugoslovenska vlada, izdana od svih, bila jednostavno primorana na put u Bec, i na potpisivanje Trojnog pakta. Pomalo nestvarno deluje ponasanje beogradske vlade prema Berlinu, koji je hteo da Cvetkovic dodje u Bec pre Japanaca i 25. marta, znaci da potpisivanje bude najkasnije 23. ili 24, a ovi iz BGD stalno nesto zivkali i trazili nove uslove, sve nadajuci se da ce ih Berlin odbiti. Prvo su trazili uverenje da Jugoslavija nece ni na koji nacin biti uvucena u rat, da ce se postovati nezavisnost i neutralnost zemlje, sto je prihvaceno. Onda je trazeno da se preko nase teritorije ne vrsi transport vojnika i municije, kao ni ostalih potrepstina, i to je prihvaceno. I na kraju, kao poslednja nada, trazena je garancije da ce Jugoslavija imati teritorijalni izlaz na Egejsko more preko luke Solun, i kad je to prihvaceno nastala je panika u BGD. Jednostavno, prihvatanjem svih uslova, vlada u Beogardu vise nije imala kud osim da sedne na voz za Bec, i uzme penkalo u ruke. No, da pakt ne bude spas, ili barem kupovina dragocenog vremena, potrudila se bulumenta pucista na celu sa Mirkovicem i Simovicem. U roku od 12h sudbina Jugoslavije bila je zapecacena, Direktiva 25 izdata i smrt zemlje i naroda izvestan. Stvarno smo genijalci da se samounistimo. No, ova kjiga, koliko god vredna, ima jednu veliku manu. Autor je iz nekog razloga, meni nepoznatog, prilicno proregentski raspolozen. I dok autor nema problema da kritikuje (uglavnom s pravom) Stojadinovica i Mirkovica, dotle je neverovatno popustljiv prema Cvetkovicu i Maceku. Primera ima dosta. Za Stojadinovica tvrdi da je imao fasisticke tendecije i navodi da se divio Musolinijevim crnokosuljasima (sto je tacno); njegovi JRZovci su ga zvali vodjom, imali su svoje jednoobrazne kosulje i svoj pozdrav - ergo Stojadinovic je fasista. Medjutim, kada isto kaze za Maceka, da su njega HSSovci takodje svali vodjom, da su i oni imali svoje unifrome i svoj pozdrav, onda je Macek demokrata?!? Na stranu to sto Macekov potpredsednik javno veli da zeli da vidi autonomnu Hrvatsku makar i na 4 dana pre nego sto bude pregazena od neke velike sile... Takodje, u padu Stojadinovica autor vidi partiotski akt princa namesnika Pavla, jer su sile Osovine zelele Stojadinovica na vlasti, a na drugom mestu vele da te iste sile nisu verovale Stojadinovicu jer bi se ovaj prvom prilikom okrenuo Saveznicima. U jednom cisto kriminalnom aktu, kada je Stojadinovic, inace tada interniran na Ilidzi, po Cvetkovicevom naredjenju kidnapovan je i predat engleskim vlastima u Grckoj i interniran na Mauricijus, autor vidi spasonosni akt - da nije bilo ovog "milosrdnog" gesta, Stojadinovic bi docekao pad KJ na Ilidzi, mozda ne bi preziveo II svetski rat. Mozda. A mozda i bi. Mozda bi bio Nedic namesto Nedica, ili premijer Vlade u Otadzbini koja se vija po brdima Srbije i Bosne. Ko to zna. Posao istoricara nije da nagadja SBBKBB vec da se bakce sa cinjenicama. Prerma Hoptneru, Cvetkovic je bio vrstan politicar, prema Stojadinovicu i UO, najobicnija ljiga. Za uspeh autor navodi da je Cvetkovic uspeo da se dogovori sa Macekom i da potise Sporazum, na stranu to sto je macek potpisao manje vise isto sto mu je nudio i Stojadinovic. No, tada nije bilo neposredne ratne opasnosti, pa je mogao da vrda, sada nije. Sve je ipak u tajmingu. Uostalom, da je Cvetkovic bio iole valjan politicar, sprecio bi puc, za koji je znao da se sprema. Njegov odgovor na pretnju: ko je jos video puc o kome cela carsije bruji da bude uspesan? Eto ko, idijote! A o pucistima ne treba trositi reci. Nadam se da gore u paklu!Svejedno, iako mi se ne svidja ovo autorovo svrstavanje uz jednu vladu, knjigu toplo preporucujem.Postovacu ovde Zakljucnu rec, srce mi se pocepalo nanovo...

XI 
IN RETROSPECT 

The Kingdom of Yugoslavia lasted little more than two decades, 
Throughout its short life, marked by one crisis after another, the 
kingdom searched for ways of building unity within its borders and 
for security from outside aggression. 

Many forces contributed to its disunity. Under the Wilsonian star 
of self-determination three national groups with divergent and often 
conflicting historical, administrative, and cultural backgrounds found 
themselves joined together in one kingdom, Their debates over the 
nature of the new state promptly revealed the centrifugal nature of its 
political forces. From the outset the conflict that raged between the 
Croats who argued for federalism and the triumphant Serbs who 
insisted on centralism warped the growth of democracy in Yugoslavia. 
Because the Croats would not willingly accept defeat and the Serbs 
would not willingly compromise in victory, the processes of con- 
stitutional government broke down. Because the major politicians 
and parties lacked common political traditions and could come to no 
agreement on the fundamentals of government, the leaders of the 
new state were left to run the country by force and intrigue. At no 
point could the institution of the monarchy successfully exercise 
monarchy's prime function of unifying divergent elements and bridg- 
ing historic differences, The flat refusal of a substantial minority 
of Yugoslavs to participate in the government except on their own 
terms forced the crown to resort to controlled elections and coercion, 
rather than consensus, to administer the state. 

Inevitably some of Yugoslavia's dissatisfied political parties and 
restless national minorities began to respond to manipulation by 
revisionist Bulgaria, Hungary, and Italy. In its efforts to defend itself 
from these predators, Yugoslavia found itself relying on outmoded 
diplomatic weapons: on its ties with France, on the League of 
Nations, and on the Little and Balkan Ententes. After a strong 
Germany appeared on the scene, these configurations, so carefully 
designed and elaborated between 1919 and 1933, no longer seemed 
to many nations, including the Yugoslavs, to have relevance or power. 

Events set in motion by the dictatorships swept the democracies 
along or left them struggling in the wake. With the League's refusal 
to condemn the murder of their king, Mussolini's successful aggression 
against Ethiopia, and Hitler's occupation of the Rhineland, the Yugo- 
slavs watched France and Britain retreat before the dictators' power, 
and concluded that the League and the intricate entente system 
offered much less protection than would specific guarantees from 
Italy, then the most threatening of neighbors. 

After the Anschluss, after Munich, the Yugoslavs found themselves 
hemmed in by a second giant. There was no doubt in their minds 
now that they had been abandoned by the very states that at the 
peace tables of 1919 had created their country. It was clear that the 
great democracies of Europe had no intention of defending the in- 
tegrity of Yugoslavia and the other small states which were, in effect, 
the children of the Peace Conference. 

Germany quickly became more than an awesome neighbor. By 
1938, commerce with Germany was an integral part of the Yugoslav 
economy. While France, Britain, and the other democracies ignored 
the economic factor in international politics, the Yugoslavs grew 
more dependent on Germany as a market for their surpluses. Failing 
in their search for other outlets, they reluctantly watched the Reich 
gain control of their agriculture, industry, and natural resources. 

During the months between Munich and the German invasion of 
Poland, the Yugoslavs were preoccupied with disturbing domestic 
developments: a swift change of government and their first major 
attempt to negotiate the long-standing conflict between the Serbs 
and the Croats. Pushed toward a superficial domestic tranquillity 
by the knowledge that war was upon them, the two factions agreed 
to cooperate in running the government, and the country declared 
its neutrality in the quarrels of others. 

But the policy was one thing, the practice another. Despite the 
declaration of neutrality, the Yugoslavs vainly urged the French and 
the British to open a Balkan front. In the fall of France they sensed 
a great loss, in no way offset by their long-delayed recognition of 
the Soviet Union. With the Italian attack on Greece, they felt the 
tightening of the Axis vise. 

Ironically, their apprehension grew as the Greeks inflicted defeat 
after defeat on Mussolini's troops; despite their hope for a Greek 
victory, the Yugoslavs knew that each Italian setback brought nearer 
the day when Hitler would have to enter the Balkans to rescue his 
Axis partner and prevent a British landing in Greece. 1 Although the 
British urged the Yugoslavs and the Turks to join the Greeks in 
stopping the Axis, the Turks refused to fight until attacked and the 
Yugoslavs refused to fight without the Turks as allies and without 
British support on a massive scale. Neither troops nor materials were 
forthcoming, and the Yugoslavs held on to their neutrality, hoping 
for the best, trying to offset increasing pressure from Germany with 
new diplomatic overtures to Italy, a tactic that proved valueless. 

By March, 1941, Yugoslavia was surrounded. German troops were 
in Rumania and Bulgaria and on the point of entering Greece. 
France had fallen. There was no reason to think that any help could 
come from the Soviet Union. As for the British, they had little to 
offer but advice and fighting spirit; their promises of aid sometime 
in the future only convinced the Yugoslavs that to abandon their 
neutrality was to court destruction. But as they felt increasing 
pressure from Hitler, strict neutrality became a state they could no 
longer maintain. 

The objective observer would agree that the Yugoslavs had as 
much right to negotiate with Hitler in 1941 as did the British and the 
French in 1938 or the Russians in 1939. Indeed, they were in a 
better moral position to do so; they negotiated their own future 
instead of bartering away another country's territory. They accepted 
diplomatic embarrassment to gain time, just as Britain and France 
had done earlier. 

While they sought to keep themselves out of the war and the 
Germans oxit of their country, the Yugoslavs also had to face the 

1 According to Liddell Hart, the British "fatuously produced German inter- 
vention in the Balkans which . * . Hitler was chary of undertaking. The reponsibility 
for the consequent misery that has befallen the peoples [of] Yugoslavia and 
Greece . . . lies heavily upon us for losing the sense of military realities/' B. H. 
Liddell Hart, Why Don't We Learn from History? (London: Allen & Unwln, 1944), 
p. 40. 

problem of the tensions that were building up among the Serbs. 
Many Serbs considered the Cvetkovic government as unrepresen- 
tative and believed it was trying to transform Yugoslavia into a 
German satellite. Although their politicians, once linked in the 
United Opposition, realized some arrangement had to be made with 
the Germans, they bowed to public opinion, refused to support the 
government or do anything else that would injure their several parties 
in the eyes of the voters, and let Cvetkovic take the blame for 
coming to an agreement with the Reich, Cvetkovic and his ministers 
were fully aware of the hostility toward them before they went to 
Vienna to sign the Tripartite Pact; the coup d'etat came as no surprise 
to them in the psychological sense. The scope of the military and 
civilian preparations for the coup was a surprise in a concrete political 
sense. 

The coup itself had two distinct phases: first, the action, carried 
out after months of planning by a small number of officers who 
unquestionably believed they reflected Serb public opinion; second, 
the public's response to the action of these few officers. The leaders 
of the coup had many motives: some hoped to realize personal 
ambitions, some to bring historic Serb political parties back to power, 
others to express their opposition to the Sporazum of August, 1939, 
others to aid the Allies. Each felt himself attuned to Serb public 
opinion and each was prepared to act with it. 

The people who came into the streets of Belgrade on March 27, 
1941, voiced their confidence in the new government believing it 
would defy the Nazis and denounce the signatures on the Tripartite 
Pact In this their opinion differed in no particular from Hitler's; 
he too assumed the Simovic government would steer an anti-Nazi, 
pro-Allied course and hurriedly took steps to destroy it. Since he 
had never seriously considered invading Yugoslavia, 2 he now had to 
improvise plans within two weeks. 

The coup d&tat electrified and gladdened the anti-Nazi world with 
the sight of a people standing up to Hitler in his moment of triumph. 
It gave the Serbs a profound sense of national fulfillment. But when 
the putsch was over, when the "betrayers of Serbian honor" had been 

2 United States Department of the Army, German Campaigns in the Balkans 
(Spring, 1941), p. 25; and DGFP, D, X, Doc. 353. See also Go'ring testimony, IMT, 
IX, 333; Jodl testimony, IMT, XV, 385-86; Keitel testimony, IMT, X, 523-24. 

dismissed from office, the leaders of the new government had to take 
stock. Long before March 27th they had known the true military 
capacity of their country; for the purposes of the coup they had 
chosen to ignore its obvious military weaknesses. Now they were 
face to face with the sobering realization that to defend the honor 
of the Serbs they would have to defend all the Yugoslavs. They were 
no longer leaders of the Serbs alone; they were leaders of a country 
composed not only of Serbs but also of Croats and Slovenes and 
Bosnians and more minorities than they had ever before taken into 
account, In a few short hours, in the time it took to deploy troops 
around a few government buildings in the nation's capital and to 
depose a few officeholders, the new leaders of Yugoslavia found 
themselves transformed from Serb chauvinists into the responsible 
spokesmen for a multinational state whose citizens supporters and 
opponents alike expected them to defend their lives and property 
by keeping the Germans out of the country. 

Like Cvetkovic before him, Simovic refused to come to the aid of 
the British. He became acutely conscious of the military odds 
against his country and, like the regents, doubted the value of 
deliberately throwing it into a war in which its army could hold out 
no more than two weeks* He therefore continued the regency policy 
of neutrality and adherence to the Tripartite Pact and superimposed 
a policy of creeping mobilization, vainly hoping that one tactic or 
the other would prove successful in defending the country. 

The short-lived political unity of Yugoslavia, reflected in the Serb- 
Croat agreement of 1939, could not withstand the shock of the Axis 
invasion. The regency had only begun to accomplish what the 
monarchy should have strived for years earlier the unification of 
nationalities within the framework of democratic institutions. It 
would have taken still another generation of peace to build a demo- 
cratic state and to reaffirm a strong bond of union between the 
monarchy and the people. It would have taken at least another 
generation of patriots who thought of themselves as Yugoslavs and 
not as Serbs or Croats or Slovenes; there were too few who thought 
of the whole, too many who thought of the parts. From the outset the 
Yugoslav state was hampered by men of limited vision and even less 
flexibility who revealed no capacity for working together for their 
common good. 

After Hitler marched into Poland the world would not permit the 
Jugoslavs to freely choose between throwing themselves in the path 
of the dictators and trying to avoid a head-on collision. More than 
once the representatives of the great powers talked as if the future 
of the entire world depended solely on the degree to which the 
Yugoslavs were willing to sacrifice themselves. President Roosevelt 
put it plainly when he told United States Minister Lane: 

I think we should find some means of getting across to the Prince Regent 
and others that the United States is looking not merely to the present but 
to the future, and that any nation which tamely submits on the grounds 
of being quickly overrun would receive less sympathy from the world than 
a nation which resists, even if this resistance can be continued for only a 
few weeks. 8 

From this distance, the regency's foreign policy including the 
signing of the Tripartite Pact seems to have been the best possible 
in the adverse circumstances dictated by geography, the proximity of 
Yugoslavia's powerful enemies, and the disinclination of the Croats 
and of many Slovenes for conflict with Germany. 

The Yugoslav government was realistic in its analysis of German 
and Italian aims in the Balkans. It was realistic in its awareness of 
military impotence, its own and the Allies'. It was painfully conscious 
of the weakness and indecisiveness of the West. After the fall of 
France, after the rout of the British, the caretaker government saw 
no way of saving the country but to adopt policies of accommodation 
to the Axis powers, But even under those circumstances the regency, 
outwardly neutral, remained determinedly pro-Allied. It aided 
Greece when Greece was invaded. It fostered military collaboration 
between the Yugoslav army and the French. And for almost three 
years it parried the Axis thrust toward Yugoslavia. 

But the Allied leaders showed very little understanding of Yugo- 
slavia's difficult position during these years, They tried to coerce the 
Yugoslavs into the war. They failed to extend to Yugoslavia the 
patience and diplomatic restraint they showed to Sweden despite 
the fact that Sweden, under conditions similar to those facing Yugo- 

8 Hull, Memoirs, II, 930. 


slavia, signed an agreement with Germany permitting a steady flow 
of German military traffic to pass over its borders. 4 

In a larger sense, Yugoslavia provides a clear example of the small 
power that must continuously trim its sails to the conflicting winds 
stirred by the great powrs. In moments of crisis, the small state is 
persuaded, or coerced, or patronized, sometimes even consulted, on 
policies of war, peace, or survival. But it never is allowed to remain 
aloof; great powers at war do not permit small states the luxury of 
neutrality or independent thinking. 

The dynamics of war demanded that both the Allies and the Axis 
use Yugoslavia for their own purposes and then, if necessary, thrust 
it aside. 

In 1941 Yugoslavia tried to indulge in neutrality, to ward off 
Germany by diplomacy alone. In doing so, it challenged the assump- 
tion, shared by all great powers, that nations with military and 
economic prowess invariably pursue a wise and farsighted political 
strategy. That the independent course plotted by the Yugoslav 
regency was a sound one appropriate to the circumstances, that a 
neutral Yugoslaviaor even one which had signed a restricted pact 
with Germany could in the long run prove an asset to the Allies 
seem never to have entered their calculations. 

After 1933 the Yugoslavs had developed a foreign policy based on 
freedom of diplomatic action. In 1941 they attempted to express that 
freedom by remaining neutral. They could successfully pursue such 
a policy only so long as there was a balance of power in the Balkans. 
In addition, they needed strong natural defenses, a mobile and well- 
equipped standing army, an industrial economy, and a unified people. 
These essentials they lacked; for them, the regency tried to substitute 
diplomacy. When the Balkans became a center of conflict when the 
Italians moved into Greece, the British came to the aid of the Greeks, 
and the Germans moved into Bulgaria en route to Greece they 
destroyed the balance of power which had been the keystone of 
Yugoslav diplomacy. Without it, the structure fell. 

In January, 1940, the British had no objection to Yugoslavia's 

4 Sweden, with an effective army and economy, was in a stronger position to 
defend its version of neutrality, and could use its supply of minerals as a diplomatic 
weapon. Above all, Sweden was removed from the primary centers of conflict. 

neutrality. They did not then believe the Germans would move into 
the Balkans, nor did they themselves intend to do so. 

In January, 1941, it became evident that the British would honor 
their pledge to aid the Greeks. It became equally evident that the 
Germans would honor their pledge to aid the Italians. Because the 
Germans had more men and machines, it was also evident that they 
would ultimately occupy Greece. From the British point of view, 
therefore, Yugoslav and Turkish participation in the war did not 
mean immediate success for the democratic cause. It did mean, 
however, that the Germans, after forcing the British to withdraw 
from Greece, would have to use precious manpower to police large 
areas with hostile populations. 

These calculations sharpened the moral dilemma that faced the 
Simovic government as once it had faced the regency. Both had to 
make a moral decision for a nation which had little relation to the 
moral judgment they would have made for themselves as individuals. 
Both saw the issue as one of national survival. Both asked themselves 
if they could choose peace instead of national suicide. Both realized 
that their adherence to the Tripartite Pact would exact a high price 
in national honor and prestige abroad. Both hoped that their country, 
by accommodating itself to the German power within the limits of 
the Tripartite Pact and its accompanying guarantees, could survive 
today's crisis and tomorrow join the Allies. 

But with the coup of March 27th, Yugoslavia's political fortunes 
were set in flux, starting a process that would be resolved years later 
with little credit to the political wisdom of the Western democracies 
and with little concern for their political peace of mind.

OT: Sad da se bacim na MM djigante: Sindrom Metuzalema. Ovi Martiji iz 2009. prilicno razocaravajuci. Prva dva regularca ic ne valjaju, treci jedva da moze da prodje, samo je Moralesov Zabranjeni grad malo iznad proseka. Specijalac je standardno grozan, a od giganta ne ocekujem nista s obzirom da sam vec nacuo od drugih da je najgori gigant do sada objavljen.

lista se za legendarnu prosvetinu biblioteku

Aaahhh, markiz. Mislim da su mi u VA ostala sva njegova dela na srpskome objavljena barem, skupljana s konca i konopca iz raznih edicija... Simpa neki lik.I Crven ban, naravno..

[Roger Sanchez]

Imao sam ja za studija kratku postpredavateljnu raspravu sa Ivom Goldsteinom o Mačeku demokratu, rekoh mu, 'Vodja Hrvatskog Naroda', pa komada dva paravojnih postrojbi samo bez oružja (Zaštita broj 1 i broj 2), pristao je na ulazak u dvije oktroirane vlade (Cvetkovićevu i Simovićevu) i vladao pod oktroiranim ustavom i nedemokratskim izbornim redom, inaugurirao treću, fašističku, vladu svojim amanetom o građanskoj poslušnosti - kakav demokrat? Pred takvim divljačkim napadom oštrih argumenata ustuknuo je skoro pa odmah.

Edited November 15, 2009 by Roger Sanchez

[salerokada]

Pročitao Boru Ćosića - O zanatima + Uloga moje porodice u svetskoj revoluciji.Trebalo je da to čitam pre 10-15 godina. Knjiga/e ima zanimljivih momenata, ali je stil prikladan tinejdžerima. Sada sam počeo Vladimira Tasića - Kiša i hartija. Ne deluje mi zadovoljavajuće. Pomalo mi deluje kao ženska knjiga.

[WTF]

Procitao prikaz kada sam video post i nalozio se kao mlad majmun.Tako da je Pygmy prva knjiga koju sam narucio preko Amazona. Verovatno cu je videti sutra u Mamutu za istu lovu koliko cu je platiti ali wtf

Spremi se da se naviknes na tarzanski™ engleski na kome je knjiga napisana. Kad se naviknes, uzitak ce biti jos veci. Crossover Borat i Manchurian Candidate

[Tihajeza]

Pročitao Boru Ćosića - O zanatima + Uloga moje porodice u svetskoj revoluciji.Trebalo je da to čitam pre 10-15 godina. Knjiga/e ima zanimljivih momenata, ali je stil prikladan tinejdžerima.

isto mislim.Lars Saabye Christensen - Halvbroren (Polubrat)videla na sajmu da je izdavačka kuća Okean izdala nekih desetak petnaestak naslova skandinavskih autora. ako neko poznaje/čitao neka javne.

[Frau Gabrijela]

ako neko poznaje/čitao neka javne.

Izvoli.Od Okeanovih Skandinavaca čitala još Priče o noći Petera Hega. Zanimljivo ako voliš mistiku. I čitala sam Tišina u oktobru, što toplo preporučujem. Ali ima mali problem, nisam sto posto sigurna da je autor skandinavac, a ni ne znam sad kako se zove. Preporuka svakako ostaje. :)

[king_mob]

I čitala sam Tišina u oktobru, što toplo preporučujem. Ali ima mali problem, nisam sto posto sigurna da je autor skandinavac, a ni ne znam sad kako se zove. Preporuka svakako ostaje. :)

pisac je danac i zove se jens kristijan grendal (jens christian grøndahl). imate li još iskustava s nordijcima i preporuke u tom smislu? oštrim se na let the right one in johna ajvide lindqvista i pominjanu men who hate women stiega larssona (obe imam na engleskom). na sajmu sam se opskrbio i bergmanovim najboljim namerama, tako da se severnjačka (primetiti: prevashodno švedska) manija neko vreme ima čime hraniti. elektronski katalog moje općinske biblioteke kaže da ona dobro stoji s okeanovim izdanjima, tako da ću proveriti i grendala i kristensena. Edited November 18, 2009 by king_mob

[darling]

da prijavim da sam zavrsila trilogiju milenijum stiga lasona (muskarci koji mrze zene, druga sam zaboravila kako se zove, nesto sa sibicama, i treca knjiga je kula od karata). meni je to 1600 strana impresivnog trilerskog stiva: zapleti, likovi, prica, sve je na svom mestu, nijedne rupe nema, evenutalno bih zamerila piscu sto je umro pre nego sto je to objavljeno, eto, da je jos malo poradio s urednikom... odavno nisam imala ovako uzbudljivo citalacko iskustvo, to je ono kad se stegne zeludac i kad lupa srce i kad se navija i kad se cita 100 strana na sat i kad se odahne kad pravda pobedi i posle svega ostanes ushicena:)lizbet salander je uteha za kad god sam se osecala bespomocna kad bi neki muskarac osetio da ima prava da mi dobaci da sam kurva, nedojebana, ruzna i sve vec sto ide iz tog uobicajenog repretoara, a ja ne znam sta cu s tim, jer ne umem da se bijem. lizbet zna. i vise od toga. moj drug reko da je milenijum ko dostojevski na tripu. e pa tako nekako.

[Frau Gabrijela]

pisac je danac i zove se jens kristijan grendal (jens christian grøndahl). imate li još iskustava s nordijcima i preporuke u tom smislu? oštrim se na let the right one in johna ajvide lindqvista i pominjanu men who hate women stiega larssona (obe imam na engleskom). na sajmu sam se opskrbio i bergmanovim najboljim namerama, tako da se severnjačka (primetiti: prevashodno švedska) manija neko vreme ima čime hraniti. elektronski katalog moje općinske biblioteke kaže da ona dobro stoji s okeanovim izdanjima, tako da ću proveriti i grendala i kristensena.

Da, znam sad za Grendala, mrzelo me da guglam kad sam pisala, a knjiga mi nije bila pri ruci.Evo jedna preporuka, ako već nisi čitao, za švedsku knjižicu: Aprilska veštica Majgul Akselson (Majgull Axelsson). Izdavač je Geopoetika.

da prijavim da sam zavrsila trilogiju milenijum stiga lasona (muskarci koji mrze zene, druga sam zaboravila kako se zove, nesto sa sibicama, i treca knjiga je kula od karata). meni je to 1600 strana impresivnog trilerskog stiva: zapleti, likovi, prica, sve je na svom mestu, nijedne rupe nema, evenutalno bih zamerila piscu sto je umro pre nego sto je to objavljeno, eto, da je jos malo poradio s urednikom... odavno nisam imala ovako uzbudljivo citalacko iskustvo, to je ono kad se stegne zeludac i kad lupa srce i kad se navija i kad se cita 100 strana na sat i kad se odahne kad pravda pobedi i posle svega ostanes ushicena:)lizbet salander je uteha za kad god sam se osecala bespomocna kad bi neki muskarac osetio da ima prava da mi dobaci da sam kurva, nedojebana, ruzna i sve vec sto ide iz tog uobicajenog repretoara, a ja ne znam sta cu s tim, jer ne umem da se bijem. lizbet zna. i vise od toga. moj drug reko da je milenijum ko dostojevski na tripu. e pa tako nekako.

Mmm, jedva čekam. Svesno odlažem jer pokušavam da što duže ušivam u Noćnom vozu za Lisabon. Potpuno me je zanela i uvukla, ne priča, koja jeste iznenađujuća, koliko atmosfera.

[Joshua]

da prijavim da sam zavrsila trilogiju milenijum stiga lasona (muskarci koji mrze zene, druga sam zaboravila kako se zove, nesto sa sibicama, i treca knjiga je kula od karata). meni je to 1600 strana impresivnog trilerskog stiva: zapleti, likovi, prica, sve je na svom mestu, nijedne rupe nema, evenutalno bih zamerila piscu sto je umro pre nego sto je to objavljeno, eto, da je jos malo poradio s urednikom... odavno nisam imala ovako uzbudljivo citalacko iskustvo, to je ono kad se stegne zeludac i kad lupa srce i kad se navija i kad se cita 100 strana na sat i kad se odahne kad pravda pobedi i posle svega ostanes ushicena:)lizbet salander je uteha za kad god sam se osecala bespomocna kad bi neki muskarac osetio da ima prava da mi dobaci da sam kurva, nedojebana, ruzna i sve vec sto ide iz tog uobicajenog repretoara, a ja ne znam sta cu s tim, jer ne umem da se bijem. lizbet zna. i vise od toga. moj drug reko da je milenijum ko dostojevski na tripu. e pa tako nekako.

ideš, darling, sad moram da pročitam ovo. :Dveć nagomilala nekih 2600 strana s. kinga za odmor od života u decembru (Dome, Blaze, Just After the Sunset) + jednu knjižicu a. kristof.naguraću nekako i ovih 1600.. sad sam se baš zainteresovala. a i akselson dobro zvuči.

[gospa buba]

ideš, darling, sad moram da pročitam ovo. :D

idesh joshua, sad moram i ja <_<sramim se priznati na topiku sta chitate da ne chitam nishta

[Joshua]

pft, ja ti to neću uzeti za zlo: mojih par poslednjih postova odgovara na pitanje 'šta gomilate'. :D

[gospa buba]

pft, ja ti to neću uzeti za zlo: mojih par poslednjih postova odgovara na pitanje 'šta gomilate'. :D

aaa. i gomilam, neosporno. ^_^missim. izvinte, chitachi ^_^

[Sludge Factory]

Nik Stivenson - Dejvid Bouvi, izdanje: Clio.Bavi se Bowie-jem sa 1 socioloske strane, u stvari, vise njim kao celokupnim umetnikom i njegovom pojavom, a ne samo kao muzicarem. Identitet, transformacije, Bowie-jevi likovi, periodi, faze, uticaj na kulturu i kulture na njega... Onako, zanimljivo. Mada bih voleo da mi neki sociolog odavde kaze svoje misljenje o knjizi (ako je procitao, naravno). -_-