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rasppputitsa 2022


Krošek
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Ovaj topik nije toliko vezan za tekuća dešavanja, već služi za razna šira razmatranja u okviru tematike pdf-a (o stanovištu da je Ukrajina trebalo da se preda diskutuje se na izdvojenoj temi). Ovde se pored pravila foruma primenjuje i kućni red potforuma "Politika - Svet" (vidi naročito pravilo 5.2), a moderisanje u svemu prati uobičajeni obrazac – u vezi s tim, pročitajte ovaj post, a proučite malo i istoriju objava moderatora (kako se iste ne bi ponavljale). Tema o događajima i kretanjima u regionu i oko regiona u kontekstu ovog rata nalazi se na potforumu Politika.

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Jadna Kina i Rusija, elita im se obogatila poslednjih 20 godina kao niko na planeti, lepo se naoruzali, prete naokolo a Rusija i napada, a sada Nato kriv sto pomaze napadnutom. Ne, SAD i UK su krive za napad na Irak, tj. Bush i Bler kojih odavno nema, ali za ovo sada nisu. Svakom svoje.
Ne kapiram, bogaćenje i naoruzavanje je rezervisano samo za zapadnjake.
Nema sranja gdje nato/usa nije ucackan i sprzio zemlju i dao ostalima playbook koji sada obilato koriste.
A koliko im je stalo do demokratskih procesa, ne treba dalje od ex yu.

Sent from my NTN-LX1 using Tapatalk

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10 hours ago, beeva said:

Ne kapiram, bogaćenje i naoruzavanje je rezervisano samo za zapadnjake.
Nema sranja gdje nato/usa nije ucackan i sprzio zemlju i dao ostalima playbook koji sada obilato koriste.
A koliko im je stalo do demokratskih procesa, ne treba dalje od ex yu.
Sent from my NTN-LX1 using Tapatalk

 

Ne, poenta je da u sadasnjem globalnom sistemu ni Kina ni Rusija nisu bile ugrozene. Naprotiv, bogatile su se i dobro naoruzale.

Drugo, ako cemo o playbooku, ovo sada u Ukrajini je mnogo slicnije devedesetim nego bilo cemu sta je Nato radio.

Trece, Nato u Evropi vec 70 godina ima pre svega pozitivnu ulogu jer je prvo bio garant protiv sovjetske okupacije (ukljucujuci i Jugoslaviju), a zatim je i odrzao mir kao nikad u Evropi od pamtiveka. Rat na Balkanu ili Ukrajini nije poceo Nato, nego Srbija i Rusija, ako cemo o playbooku. Nista slicno se nije dogodilo od WW2. Evropa uziva u zlatnom dobu u poredjenju sa krvavom evropskom istorijom i to je sta ljudi stalno zaboravljaju.

 

US (a ne Nato) jesu garant tog globalnog sistema i zato su i svuda umesane, sto je i pozitivno (recimo stabilizacija Evrope i Azije) ali i negativno (agresija na Irak).

Da li je pozitivno ili negativno, najvise zavisi od trenutne administracije i to je problematicno. Ali, ova kriza oko Ukrajine zapravo pokazuje sta bi bilo generalno bez njih - serija komsijskih ratova i agresija gde vece drzave napadaju manje i anektiraju radi teritorija i resursa. Ili Avganistan, povukli su se i sta sad? Med i mleko? Pa ne, naprotiv, vratilo se na stanje pre nego sto su se umesali i golgota velikog dela naroda tamo se nastavlja bez njihove krivice i nastavice se sledecih decenija. Ustvari Jugoslavija, Irak ili Avganistan jesu bili takvi sukobi gde su se SAD umesale tek kasnije, ali ih nisu zapocele. Bili bi i dalje ratovi na Balkanu, Turska - Grcka, otvoreni rat izmedju Irana i Arapa (sto znaci i totalni kolaps globalne ekonomije), Kina - Tajvan, Kina - Vijetnam/Filipini/Indonezija, Korejski sukob, ponovno masivno naoruzavanje Japana, Nemacke, proliferacija nuklearnog naoruzanja, itd. Sve su to pozitivne uloge koje SAD igraju, a nisu oni izmislili razne vehabije, sija fundamentaliste, kineski/japanski nacionalizam i ekspanzionizam, severnokorejske ludake, ili uopste autokrate koji bi da anektiraju po komsiluku ili se izivljaju nad sopstvenim narodom. To je zapravo bilo redovno stanje od pamtiveka.

 

Ono sto im se moze prebaciti je suvise velika podrska raznim problematicnim rezimima u sukobu sa drugim problematicnim rezimima (Saudijska Arabija vs Iran) iz strateskih razloga. Ali, to je generalni problem gotovo svih drzava i uopste medjunarodnih odnosa i politike a ne specificno za SAD ili bilo koju drugu zemlju - politicari stalno prave greske sto misle suvise kratkorocno a ne i dugorocno. SSSR ili Rusija su preplavili svet svojim oruzjem koje se koristi masovno i dalje u gotovo svim oruzanim sukobima poslednjih 70 godina. Drugi primer, SAD podrzavaju Katar jer je tamo americka baza koja zapravo sprecava SA ili Iran da preuzmu kontrolu nad najvecim zalihama gasa na svetu. Jeste, Katar je problematican, ali, sta je alternativa? Regionalni rat kao u Jemenu ali na mnogo vecoj skali? Aneksija gasnih i naftnih polja od strane Zapada Putin stajl? Instalacija prijateljskih rezima bombardovanjem SA ili Irana? Nema na Bliskom istoku dobrog resenja dok god cela planeta zavisi od njihovih resursa a problematicni rezimi i ideologije imaju znacajnu unutrasnju podrsku. A imaju, sa ili bez Amerike. 

 

Bottom line, sadasnji svetski sistem ipak funkcionise i bolji je od onog sta smo imali pre WW2, a cilj bi trebalo biti da se dalje poboljsa, da se osudjuju razni Bushovci, Cejniji i Blerovci i sprece najveci ekscesi, a ne da se podrzavaju autokratski rezimi koji bi da se vrate na stanje od pre WW2. Sasvim je iluzorno misliti da bi gomila autokrata resila sporazumno bilo koji regionalni ili svetski problem u nastupajuce doba katastrofalnih klimatskih promena, nedostatka resursa i povecanja ljudske populacije. Naprotiv, istorija nas uci da bi to redovno resavali pre svega velikim ratovima, jos vecom represijom i genocidom gde je ovaj pokusaj u Ukrajini samo manji uvod.

Edited by Anduril
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On 8.1.2023. at 9:39, Anduril said:

Ne, poenta je da u sadasnjem globalnom sistemu ni Kina ni Rusija nisu bile ugrozene. Naprotiv, bogatile su se i dobro naoruzale.

Gledaju me ljudi na semaforima, smejem se vec 3 dana... :D 

Cekaj da vidimo dalje: dakle Rusija i Kina nisu bile ugrozene?

SAD jesu? :ohmy:

Ko ih dir'o?

Nisu se dobro naoruzale???

Sa vojnim budzetom skoro jednakim zbirnom budzetu ostatka sveta sa sve Rusijom i Kinom? :ohmy:

Quote

...problematicni rezimi i ideologije imaju znacajnu unutrasnju podrsku. A imaju, sa ili bez Amerike. 

Cekaj, cekaj: problematicni rezimi sa znacajnom unutrasnjom podrskom se podnose pa i (p)odrzavaju, takva su vremena jebiga...

Mislim, ako su podobni, ako nisu, k'o u Rusiji ili Kini, gde takodje imaju znacajnu unutrasnju podrsku, e, to je onda nesto drugo...

 

Quote

Bottom line, sadasnji svetski sistem ipak funkcionise i bolji je od onog sta smo imali pre WW2, a cilj bi trebalo biti da se dalje poboljsa, da se osudjuju razni Bushovci, Cejniji i Blerovci i sprece najveci ekscesi, a ne da se podrzavaju autokratski rezimi koji bi da se vrate na stanje od pre WW2. Sasvim je iluzorno misliti da bi gomila autokrata resila sporazumno bilo koji regionalni ili svetski problem u nastupajuce doba katastrofalnih klimatskih promena, nedostatka resursa i povecanja ljudske populacije. Naprotiv, istorija nas uci da bi to redovno resavali pre svega velikim ratovima, jos vecom represijom i genocidom gde je ovaj pokusaj u Ukrajini samo manji uvod.

Ovo je, ipak, biser... :D 

Na stranu mangupi u nasim redovima, poput raznih Bushovaca, Cejnija i Blerovaca, nego da vidimo mi to cemu nas istorija uci?

A istorijska lekcija da u doba kriza cak i najdemokratije, od pamtiveka, stare Grcke, do najmodernijih vremena, u doba kriza stezu kaisna sve strane, ogranicavaju prava, ogranicavaju slobode, zauzdavaju stampu, slobodu govora, to nista...

Ili se bezalo sa casova kada je ta istorijska lekcija bila na programu...

A tek lekcija o pribegavanju ratovima: lekcija u kojoj su se u WW1 sukobile (demokratske) drzave bez prakticno znacajnih ideoloskih razlika, sukobile na krv i noz, zrtvovale milione, i to ne zarad ideala/ideologije nego prosto-naprosto oko - ponovne raspodele teritorija, dela kolaca...

 

Molim vas, jos jedan espreso, kratki....:fantom:

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1 hour ago, Gojko & Stojko said:

 

Pomahnitali KGB trovač i mafijaš je malo nervozan

 

 

SaE

 

jedan najobicniji sastanak u rusiji. ne vidim nervozu vec ne dozvoljava da ga prave budalom sa ulepsanim izvestajima, a rusi znaju da ulepsaju ko niko. dok sam radio za vel'ku rusku firmu u pocetku me na ovakvim sastancima, kada se ukljuce sa 30ak lokacija po rusiji i svetu, bilo sramota koliko nista numem i kako svima dobro ide, a moje predstavnistvo u pekingu kaska za svima. kasnije sam provalio da smo mi daleko najbolji u izvoznom sektoru, a na kraju godine su cifre pokazale da pravimo 90% ukupnog profita od izvoza. ja lupio ofrlje 250% marzu na jednu sirovinu, a ono em proslo u kini, em krenuli obimi da smo presisali domestic sales. car je car :D

 

pricao mi je neko juce za ovaj slucaj, ja reko palo neko ribanje kao onog fsb sefa ili oligarha koji je morao da vrati olovku, kad ono nista. 

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Ja radim dosta sa timom kojima je sef lik koji je bio relativno visoko rangiran u ruskoj vojsci.

Odmah sam primetio da uvek imaju skoro istovremen first response, ali na kraju odrade posao kao i svaki drugi tim tj nista brze. :)

Onda su me pozvali na neki njihov status meeting kao da ja posvedocim da nisu oni krivi za nesto sto nije uredjeno nego ekstertni nabavljac. Majko moja na sta je to licilo. Lik galami, preti, unosi se u lice, postavlja nerealne ciljeve, propituje. Posle sastanka samo ja skenjan oni svi normalni. Kazem njima sta bi ovo. Ovaj jedan odgovara ma on je dusa od coveka. Samo ostao mu ovaj nacin komunikacije iz vojske, ali nikada nije bilo nikakvih posledica. Cak ih je vecinu pogurao i napredovali su. Znaci lik se teatralno izdere i iskomananduje posle 2 sata zaboravi i sta su mu rekli i koji su rokovi i bilo sta. I ovi svi to znaju i opusteno ga trpe jer njemu odgovara da ima takav nastup.

 

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36 minutes ago, bags said:

Ja radim dosta sa timom kojima je sef lik koji je bio relativno visoko rangiran u ruskoj vojsci.

Odmah sam primetio da uvek imaju skoro istovremen first response, ali na kraju odrade posao kao i svaki drugi tim tj nista brze. :)

Onda su me pozvali na neki njihov status meeting kao da ja posvedocim da nisu oni krivi za nesto sto nije uredjeno nego ekstertni nabavljac. Majko moja na sta je to licilo. Lik galami, preti, unosi se u lice, postavlja nerealne ciljeve, propituje. Posle sastanka samo ja skenjan oni svi normalni. Kazem njima sta bi ovo. Ovaj jedan odgovara ma on je dusa od coveka. Samo ostao mu ovaj nacin komunikacije iz vojske, ali nikada nije bilo nikakvih posledica. Cak ih je vecinu pogurao i napredovali su. Znaci lik se teatralno izdere i iskomananduje posle 2 sata zaboravi i sta su mu rekli i koji su rokovi i bilo sta. I ovi svi to znaju i opusteno ga trpe jer njemu odgovara da ima takav nastup.

 

Slično sam doživljavao od Rusa dok sam radio za NIS... Onda su i naši počeli da usvajaju isti manir... Onda sam ih oterao u kurac posle 5 godina saradnje...

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10 hours ago, radisa said:

Slično sam doživljavao od Rusa dok sam radio za NIS... Onda su i naši počeli da usvajaju isti manir... Onda sam ih oterao u kurac posle 5 godina saradnje...

 

Mene jedanput preko poznanice koja je prešla iz jedne firme u drugu (rusku) startuje neki njihov direktor da se čujemo na Skype oko nekog softvera.

Nije uključio kameru i rekao je odmah da ne namerava, bio je izuzetno neprijatan u razgovoru i na kraju tražio da mu napravimo demo verziju sa svim funkcionalnostima da on vidi kako to radi pa da se dogovaramo (inače nije reč o nečemu šire upotrebljovom što može ponovo da se proda, već vrlo specifičan  zahtev). Naravno da smo ga odjebali na keca.

 

Onda se ova poznanica javila posle jedno mesec dana, tražila da ipak napravimo predračun za softver, ja preko volje napravio nešto i dodao jedno 50% na cenu u nadi da neće prihvatiti, samo da ne moram ponovo da se čujem sa kretenom.

Javi mi se lik iz njihovog IT-ja (naš, iz domaće podružnice), kaže sve OK, nađemo se, izdogovaramo, isporučimo aplikaciju u dogovorenom roku, oni plate bez ikakvog zatezanja.

 

Da sam morao sa tim Rusom da se čujem još jednom, mislim da bih batalio programiranje. :laugh:

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Peter Ramsay reviews Benjamin Abelow, How the West Brought War to Ukraine: Understanding How US and NATO Policies Led to Crisis, War, and the Risk of Nuclear Catastrophe (Siland Press, 2022).

 

(long read)

 

This pamphlet crisply details the West’s role in bringing about the war in Ukraine. Benjamin Abelow provides a systematic and concise explanation of how the USA and NATO provoked the war. He concludes with a short, powerful argument for attributing the primary responsibility for the violence not to its immediate cause—Vladimir Putin’s decision to invade Ukraine—but to its less proximate, more mediated, yet much more significant causes: ‘American governmental stupidity and blindness’, and ‘the deference and cowardice’ of Europe’s leaders to that ‘stupidity’ (p.59). If you still think the official Western version has any credibility, you need to read this. And if you already know that the chief cause of the war is much closer to home than the Kremlin, you should give a copy to anyone you think may be open to the truth about Ukraine.

 

Although Abelow describes the self-deluding arrogance and hypocrisy of Western policy very clearly, he does not attempt to explain how or why US policy has become so stupid or European leaders so cowardly. He appears dumbfounded by it, describing the level of irrationality involved as ‘almost inconceivable’ (p.59). Nevertheless, we must conceive of it, because it has happened and if we are to mitigate the war’s dire consequences we must understand why it has happened. Abelow’s brief discussion of the attitudes of American policy-makers does provide a very useful insight. However,  to turn it into an explanation we need to go beyond the tradition of political ‘realism’ that Abelow seems to rely on, and grasp the critical importance of the ideas that motivate Western elites. 

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Odlican tekst, izdvojio bih recenicu:

Hill seems to confirm George Kennan’s assertion that the policy of expanding NATO in order to protect against the Russian threat was a ‘self-fulfilling prophecy’.

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Iz knjige:

Spoiler

5.
Policy Experts Warned Against
NATO Expansion
During the past 30 years, senior U.S. foreign policy experts have repeatedly warned that, in expanding NATO into Eastern Europe, the United States was making a dangerous policy error. In 1997, as NATO was taking a major step toward expansion, George Kennan, perhaps the most eminent American statesman then alive (during the 1940s, he pioneered the policy of “containment” and later served as ambassador to the Soviet Union) warned that “expanding NATO would be the most fateful error of American policy in the entire post-cold-war era.” Kennan lamented the senselessness of the entire expansionary project, asking:

Why, with all the hopeful possibilities engendered by the end of the cold war, should East-West relations become centered on the question of who would be allied with whom and, by implication, against whom in some fanciful, totally unforeseeable and most improbable future military conflict?32
A year later, in an interview with Thomas Friedman, the 94-year-old statesman responded to the Senate’s ratification of NATO expansion:

I think it is the beginning of a new cold war. I think the Russians will gradually react quite adversely and it will affect their policies. I think it is a tragic mistake. There was no reason for this whatsoever. No one was threatening anybody else. This expansion would make the Founding Fathers turn over in their graves.33
Kennan then added: “Don’t people understand? Our differences in the cold war were with the Soviet Communist regime. And now we’re turning our backs on the very people who mounted the greatest bloodless revolution in history to remove that Soviet Regime.”

Kennan was not alone. Many others—including prominent hawks—also argued against expansion. Among these were Robert McNamara, ex-Secretary of Defense, who planned and implemented massive bombing campaigns during the Vietnam war; Paul Nitze, previously Secretary of the Navy and Secretary of Defense, who had opposed Kennan’s policy of static containment, favoring more aggressive attempts to compel the Russians to vacate territories; the crusading anti-Communist Harvard academic Richard Pipes, who had headed a team organized by the CIA to analyze the strategic capabilities and goals of the Soviet Union; ex-CIA chief Robert Gates, who later became Secretary of Defense; Jack F. Matlock, Jr., the second-to-last ambassador to the Soviet Union, who helped negotiate the end of the Cold War; and past ambassadors to Romania, Poland, and West Germany. These and other prominent Washington insiders publicly and vociferously opposed NATO expansion.34 Yet their counsel was not followed.

In 2015, University of Chicago professor John Mearsheimer began stating publicly that if the West did not stop trying to integrate Ukraine militarily, politically, and economically, the Russians, out of concern for their security, might feel compelled to take military action, including attempting to “wreck” Ukraine as a way to remove it from the equation—a warning that, like Kennan’s, was prescient.

Perhaps surprisingly, the basic thrust of the historical argument made by Mearsheimer and other critics of NATO expansion seems to be accepted even by some aggressively Russophobic analysts. A recent interview with Fiona Hill, a Washington insider and outspoken Russia hawk, illustrates this point.35 In the final paragraph of the interview, published in the online magazine Politico, Hill states, “Of course, yes, we’ve [the United States] also made terrible mistakes.” In saying this, Hill seems to be referring to her response to a question posed to her early in the interview. When asked, “So Putin is being driven by emotion right now, not by some kind of logical plan?” Hill corrected the interviewer:

I think there’s been a logical, methodical plan that goes back a very long way, at least to 2007 when he [Putin] put the world, and certainly Europe, on notice that Moscow would not accept the further expansion of NATO. And then within a year in 2008 NATO gave an open door to Georgia and Ukraine. It absolutely goes back to that juncture.
Hill continued,

Back then I was a national intelligence officer, and the National Intelligence Council was analyzing what Russia was likely to do in response to the NATO Open Door declaration. One of our assessments was that there was a real, genuine risk of some kind of preemptive Russian military action, not just confined to the annexation of Crimea, but some much larger action taken against Ukraine along with Georgia. And of course, four months after NATO’s Bucharest Summit [when the NATO policy about Ukraine and Georgia was announced], there was the invasion of Georgia. There wasn’t an invasion of Ukraine then because the Ukrainian government pulled back from seeking NATO membership. But we should have seriously addressed how we were going to deal with this potential outcome and our relations with Russia.
A remarkable aspect of Hill’s response is that she asserts several important points that hawkish analysts are typically loath to acknowledge. First, she asserts that in 2007—seven years before Russia’s annexation of Crimea—the U.S. intelligence establishment recognized there was a “real, genuine risk” that in response to NATO expansion Russia might annex Crimea. Second, she asserts that in 2007, the intelligence community recognized that NATO expansion might precipitate a broader Russian military action, not just one confined to Crimea, but a “much larger action” taken against both Ukraine and Georgia. Third, Hill asserts that Russia’s participation in the Russo-Georgian war was a response to NATO expansion. Finally, Hill states quite directly that, unlike what it did in Georgia, Russia took no action in Ukraine in 2008 because “the Ukrainian government pulled back from seeking NATO membership.”

In these points, especially the final one, Hill directly acknowledges the crucial role that NATO expansion and Western military encroachments have played in motivating Russian actions in Ukraine. Thus, it appears that, while arguing for a hawkish position, Hill helps make the case for a perspective much like the one presented by Mearsheimer. However, for reasons hard to fathom, she and like-minded policy gurus give this perspective little or no weight in their decision making. Rather, the perspective seems to fade into the background. Instead of openly acknowledging the untoward consequences of NATO expansion, they attribute Mr. Putin’s recent invasion of Ukraine to an unhinged and unprovoked Hitler-like drive for territorial expansion.

Yet even when explicitly portraying Putin as the new Hitler, Hill appears to bring NATO expansion back into the picture. When asked, “So just as the world didn’t see Hitler coming, we failed to see Putin coming?” Hill comments:

We should have. He’s been around 22 years now, and he [Putin] has been coming to this point since 2008. I don’t think he initially set off to do all this, by the way, but the attitudes towards Ukraine and the feelings that all Ukraine belongs to Russia, the feelings of loss, they’ve all been there and building up.
It’s worth juxtaposing this remark with Hill’s previous statement, quoted in full above: “I think there’s been a logical, methodical plan that goes back…at least to 2007 when he [Putin] put the world on notice that Moscow would not accept the further expansion of NATO.” Considering these two statements together, and focusing on her references to 2007 and 2008, I think it’s fair to read Hill as saying that Putin underwent his transformation into the new Hitler because of NATO expansion. Whether Putin actually is Hitler-like is a different question entirely, but here I am speaking only about the view communicated by Hill.

Further, in assessing Mr. Putin’s objectives, Hill notes, “So what Putin wants isn’t necessarily to occupy the whole country [of Ukraine], but really to divide it up…. That’s something Putin could definitely live with—a fractured, shattered Ukraine with different bits being in different states.” This statement should be compared with Mearsheimer’s predictions, starting in 2015, that if NATO and the West continued to encroach on Russian territory, Russia might feel the need to, in Mearsheimer’s word, “wreck” Ukraine.

Here we see a remarkable parallelism. Both Mearsheimer and Hill appear to believe NATO expansion formed the underlying basis for the transformation of Russian behavior that culminated in the Ukraine war. And both analysts anticipated that, in response to NATO expansion, Russia might seek to “wreck” Ukraine—or, as Hill put it, to turn Ukraine into a “fractured, shattered” nation. I find little fundamental disagreement between Hill and Mearsheimer. But what I do find confusing is that Hill seems not to account in her overall analysis for this important area of agreement between herself and Mearsheimer.

In fact, late in the interview, Hill describes those who point to Western responsibility for the Ukraine crisis as dupes of Russian disinformation: “I mean he [Putin] has got…masses of the U.S. public saying, ‘Good on you, Vladimir Putin,’ or blaming NATO, or blaming the U.S. for this outcome. This is exactly what a Russian information war and psychological operation is geared towards.”

In stating this, Hill seems to disregard her own conclusions about the untoward consequences of NATO expansion. Also, it simply is not accurate that those who hold the United States and NATO responsible for the crisis are saying, in effect, “Good on you, Vladimir Putin.” Rather, most of those who emphasize Western culpability for the Ukraine crisis seem to view the Russian invasion of Ukraine as an unmitigated disaster. They see it as an event that—regardless of what the underlying causes might be—has resulted in horrible suffering, destruction, and death. Many critics of NATO, in fact, are also explicitly critical of Putin, even as they emphasize the role of the West in precipitating the crisis.

In forming her view of Russian actions, Hill is, of course, aware of the terrible consequences of the German invasion of Russia during World War II. She even observes in the interview, “Vladimir Putin’s own family suffered during the siege of Leningrad.” Her comment is accurate, though somewhat of an understatement. As Stephen F. Cohen describes it, “[Putin’s] mother and father barely survived near fatal wounds and disease, his older brother died in the long German siege of Leningrad, and several of his uncles perished.”36 Further, the suffering of Mr. Putin’s family is representative of that of the Russian nation. Although the precise numbers are unknown, roughly 25 million Soviet citizens died during the German invasions of World War II, with half of those—around 12.5 million—in Russia. That is a death toll equal to about one in every seven Russians then alive.37

Yet rather than noting the relevance of this painful history to the question of Russian security; and rather than pointing out how NATO expansion and the encroachment (or, perhaps, in Russian eyes, the re-encroachment) of Western military power on Russia’s border resonates with that history; and rather than even positing a psychological sensitivity on the part of Mr. Putin based on his own family’s experiences—Hill frames Mr. Putin’s personal familial experiences as further support for her view that he is motivated by a dangerous and irrational expansionism. Thus, after mentioning Putin’s family, she adds sardonically, “yet here [in invading Ukraine] is Vladimir Putin doing exactly the same thing [that Germany did to Russia].” Even when dealing with Mr. Putin’s own family traumas, Hill appears to have no room in her analysis for Russian security concerns. There is only Hitler, Nazi Germany, and World War II all over again.

There is no doubt that Russian perceptions of external threats have been deeply influenced by Russia’s past. In addition to the German invasions of World War II and World War I, Russia had, a hundred years earlier, been invaded by Napoleon, whose army reached as far as Moscow. Richard Sakwa, professor of Russian and European politics at the University of Kent, England, describes the interplay of this history with the region’s geography: “Moscow…doesn’t have two major oceans to defend itself. It has no mountains to defend itself. No major rivers. It’s set on a vast north Eurasian plain, with no defensible borders, and a constant sense of threat from the West.”38

Policy hawks such as Hill are, of course, aware of this history and geography. However, instead of viewing them as potential psychological reinforcements for legitimate Russian security concerns, these analysts communicate the view that Mr. Putin is engaged in a Hitlerian land grab, a modern version of a pitiless hunt for lebensraum, and that Putin himself is essentially Hitler incarnate—paranoid, living in the imperial past, and driven by an innate Russian militarism. This sort of analysis can be maintained only by disregarding conclusions about NATO expansion that Hill herself has reached and publicly asserted in her interview in Politico.

 

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Interesantan kanal koga zanima, defence economics.

 

https://m.youtube.com/@PerunAU/featured

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An Australian covering the military industrial complex and national military investment strategy. Since the outbreak of the conflict in Ukraine, I've been covering lessons from the conflict and how they may inform the future investment decisions that other nations may or should make

 

Edited by eumeswil
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