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Permanentna kriza domaće ekonomije

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Prospero

Najvažnija skrivena prednost socijalističkog razvojnog modela bila je vezana upravo za način na koji je funkcionisao bankarski sistem.

 

Teško je znati na šta tačno misli, nije postojao 1 bankarski sistem, ali hej...

 

 

 

YUGOSLAV MONETARY SYSTEM, ACES Bulletin, Vol.23, Issue 1, 1981.

Ivan Ribnikar

University of Ljubljana

 

 

The structure of the Yugoslav monetary and banking system has gone through several phases corresponding more or less to major changes in the economic and social system. In the first phase, from 1945 to 1951, a new monetary and banking system was instituted whose principal characteristics were determined by the centrally planned or administrative socialist economy. In the second phase, from 1952 to 1971, when workers' self-management was introduced and developed, a central bank, the National Bank of Yugoslavia, emerged which had practically no direct connections with business enterprises. It was a bankers' bank, while commercial banks provided services to business enterprises, to other entities from the social sector, and to individuals. In the third phase, from 1972 to.1976, some of the socially and economically undesirable features of the monetary and banking system were eliminated, especially in the sphere of the management of commercial banks. These changes were in some sense the preparation for major changes that took place in 1976.

 

...

 

The Yugoslav monetary system is composed of the central bank, i.e., the system of nine national banks, and three types of banks of which two correspond to previous commercial banks, namely basic and united banks, and one is a new financial institution--the so-called internal bank.

...

 

There are three main channels by which primary money is issued. These are: credits to the federal government and some semi-governmental institutions, credits to banks mainly for specific purposes, and foreign-exchange transactions. Unless the quantity of primary money is decreased through foreign exchange transactions, the issue of primary money is greater than it should be according to monetary requirements. The central bank is then in a difficult situation. On the one hand it is responsible for monetary stability and on the other hand it is obliged to provide enough credit for federal government and some very important parts of the economy. Credits to the business sector are not given directly but via commercial banks. As all recipients of central bank credits are heavily dependent on them, the central bank cannot simply curtail these credits in order to put them into the so-called monetary frame.

 

Consequently it must find ways to neutralize the excess quantity of primary money if it wants to maintain the quantity of money in circulation somewhere near planned targets. Should this not be possible, as has been the case in the past, the bank will sacrifice planned targets and monetary stability in order to be able to provide the federal government and some sectors of the economy with enough finance.

 

The central bank thus stands between two opposite obligations which generally cannot be fulfilled simultaneously. Paradoxically the position of the central bank is worse in the presence of a substantial balance of payments surplus, as in 1976, with the resulting highest increase in primary issue. Its position is better if there is a large balance of payments deficit, as in 1974. In that case there was a considerable reduction in the quantity of primary money through central bank sales of foreign-exchange on the foreign-exchange market.

 

...

 

Central banks, basic banks and internal banks that provide money or, as in the case of internal banks, provide very important money substitutes, are not the only monetary institutions. Up to April 1976 one of the peculiarities of the Yugoslav monetary system was a changing degree of liquidity or illiquidity of the economy. As this is a rather specific phenomenon that shows that there are some other "monetary" institutions as well, let us look at it very briefly.

 

In the years or periods when our monetary policy was relatively expansionary, with monetary growth rates above 25 percent, business enterprises had enough money. They were able to pay not only taxes, various contributions and personal incomes but also purchases of goods and services from other business enterprises in due time. If monetary policy changed and became more and more restrictive, business enterprises were less and less able to pay purchases of goods and services from other business enterprises in due time. Indebtedness between business enterprises was increasing and eventually the so called general clearing of debts was organized and/or the monetary policy changed. At the peak of illiquidity there was only about 20 percent of all money in the business sector as compared with about 40 percent in normal times, when there was no illiquidity.

 

Since April 1976 some things have changed, but this does not mean that illiquidity can no longer occur. In the first place the form of indebtedness between business enterprises has changed. If a purchaser of goods and services does not pay in 15 days, he must give to the seller a bill of exchange guaranteed by the bank. In periods of a relatively restrictive monetary policy there is an increase in the issue of bills of exchange, which generally do not circulate but are kept by sellers or by the banks that discounted them. In this way business enterprises are able to circumvent restrictive monetary and credit policy. The final results are more or less the same as they were before April 1976.

 

We can say that the business sector remains relatively independent from monetary and credit policy even after April of 1976. Only the form of indebtedness among business enterprises, i.e. basic and other organizations of associated labor, has changed. The basic and other organizations of associated labor are in a way additional "monetary" institutions, a fact which must be taken into account if we are to understand the functioning of the monetary system and/or the role of money in the Yugoslav economy.

 

...

 

 

Ale Hartman, Understanding the Yugoslav “Bust”: An Austrian Analysis of Global Economic Intervention in Yugoslavia

Washington University

September 20004

 

...

 

Banks without Bankers

 

Among the rights afforded to these enterprises was the right to establish and maintain banks. Since these banks existed solely to serve the needs of the enterprises that created them, their basic objective was to provide their founder enterprises with low cost investment loans, regardless of banking profitability. This problem was exacerbated in 1977 with the introduction of the “redepositing” system by the National bank of Yugoslavia (NBY). This complicated system effectively shifted the exchange rate risk from the commercial banking system and transferred it to the NBY and later the federal budget. This system made it even easier for communal banks to continue their decades-long practice of lending at extremely negative real rates of interest. In the eleven years the program existed, it created $12.2 billion in debt, the ultimate creditors of which were individual savers, who had unfortunately deposited so-called “hard currency” in the Yugoslav banking system.

 

 

Running Virtual Printing Presses

 

The structure of the banking system threw the nation into an amazing inflationary cycle. The practice of fractional reserve banking (which is nearly inevitable with pure fiat currency) turned banks into virtual printing presses, allowing then to loan out money that technically could still be claimed by savers. The effect of this was to multiply the “money supply” over and over, having the same effect as printing off mass quantities of cash. This was one cause of the inflation the plagued Yugoslavia in the 70’s and 80’s, which experienced an annualized inflation rate of 79 percent from 1971 to 1999; only Zaire and Brazil experienced more inflation over the same time period. This system then fed itself. The high inflation rates caused by excessive loaning made real interest rates fall into the negative double-digits, making loans even more attractive to the enterprises that borrowed from them and thus increasing demand. This in turn led to more lending which caused even greater inflation. By 1989, despite running a modest federal budget surplus, Yugoslavia experienced 2,795 percent inflation.

 

 

Making Bad Business Worse: Malinvestment on Top of Calculation Impossibility

 

While inefficiently run, the community owned enterprises were not free from the threat of bankruptcy by law. Significant protections were in place: if an enterprise didn’t earn enough income to cover minimum wage for all its employees, the difference would be taken out of the local commune’s budget. In theory, if an enterprise was so poorly run that the commune couldn’t finance it, it would go bankrupt and be dissolved. The possibility of bankruptcy was also open for Yugoslavia’s many privately owned enterprises—and such enterprises didn’t have the security of a commune budget to fall back on.

 

However, the banking system made sure that even the most unprofitable of businesses managed to stay afloat. Not only did the system extend credit to businesses which not only would have failed without it, it also provided loans to enterprises that were clearly not credit worthy, financed the foreign exchange losses that borrower enterprises had made on overseas loans, and issued loans at a subsidized rate. By doing this the banks made the system even more unstable. But irresponsible banking was the least of Yugoslavia’s problems. On top of the uncertainty caused by inflation, interest rate manipulation further weakened the prospects for true economization.

...

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Tribun_Populi

Ja samo žalim što  trošim vreme na Katićeve nebuloze ali pošto si mi ti ljubazno jednom prilikom odgovorio na postavljeno pravno pitanje pokušao sam eto koliko mi znanje  i kratko vreme dozvoljava da obrazložim zašto mislim da je dotični prodavac magle.

I da, ne slažem se da smo sve više u čabru.Taljigamo lagano na bolje,a koliko bi i kako moglo brže i bolje je pitanje za neki drugi topik.

 

Nisu mi poznati tačni podaci iz nacionalne ekonomske istorije, pa mi džabe sve to, jedino što znam je da je u poslednjih 15 godina ta 1989. godina uzimana kao nekakav reper, merilo koje se juri i nikako ne dostiže. To nije radio samo Katić već svi živi. Ja se čovekom ni najmanje ne opterećujem, zanima me samo šta ti i Prospero, pošto vidim da ste najbučniji u osporavanju njegovih tvrdnji, mislite o ovome

 

 

Preduzeća koja imaju veliki razvojni potencijal ali mali hipotekarni, biće uvek hendikepirana u odnosu na preduzeće koje ima hipotekarni potencijal, bez obzira na racionalnost investicija.

 

jer to jeste činjenica. I tu postojeće banke fejluju jer ih ne zanima/isuviše je rizično/ne dozvoljava kreditna politika centrale, a da i ne pričam o poduhvatu emitovanja akcija ili čega već u ovoj zemlji, kako bi se prikupio početni kapital za dobru biznis ideju. Dakle, to bi morala da radi ipak nekakva razvojna institucija (banka, agencija, fond), jbg. A to je, obrni-okreni, državna firma.

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Prospero

Potencijal se procenjuje, na razlicite nacine i iz razlicitih uglova. Ne moraju razliciti investitori videti isti potencijal u istom projektu. Mislim da gresi u tome sto uzima zdravo za gotovo ono sto tek mora biti podlozno proceni.

 

Imati "razvojni potencijal" je ljustura od izjave, na nivou alokacije kredita to mora da ima jasan okvir procenjivanja, a koji neko mora da sastavi.

 

Btw, ja sam vec rekao sta mislim da je model za drzavni upliv, ali si to nekako preskocio.

 

1989. se uzima jer je tada ostvaren najveci proizvod pre 1991, 1990. je vec bio pad.

 

by Tapatalk

Edited by Prospero

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Tribun_Populi

Nisam direktno tebi replicirao pa nisam ni pominjao model koji ti priželjkuješ, inače ga nisam preskočio. Možda je to i OK rešenje, s tim da mora biti subvencionisana kamatna stopa jer nijedna privatna banka neće davati kredit uz zaradu od 1-3%, što opet znači da država mora ozbiljno da zagrize (da subvencioniše i osigurava privatni kapital). Ali OK, recimo da će privatni sektor bolje procenjivati potencijal poslovnog poduhvata i rizik plasmana i svakako bolje i racionalnije administrirati ceo poduhvat, tako da bih se tu i složio.

 

Što se tiče godine, znam zašto je uzimaju, ali je Luther opalio po njojzi pa i rekoh da to nije posebno Katićeva izmišljotina.

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Luther

http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-poland-investment-idUKBRE89C0ED20121013

 

 

Ја ти не бих предлагао да идеш са том са том причом о слободном тржишту које све регулише. Онај ко зна исторјку развоја: САД, Немачке, Јапана, Ј. Кореје ће те "покопати". То није ни приближно онако како ти замишљаш да јесте. Оно што ти прелдажеш се масовно примењивало по Африци и Л. Америци па су се дешавалае револуције које не би поправиле ствар, јер комунизам то дефинитивно не може, али не може ни оно што ти предлажеш.

Нема већег протекционисте од САД у свом најбољем периоду развоја током Позлаћеног доба(крај Грађанског рата-1914). То није применљиво на Србију, из гомиле разлога, само помињем. Али већ нешто као Ј. Кореја би могло да прође у Србији а то није нешто што ти предлажеш.

Ako se ovo odnosi na mene bojim se da nisi razumeo šta sam pisao a ni ono što piše Katić. On želi  državnu finasijsku represiju, regulisanje i usmeravanje kreditnih aktivnosti postojećih komercijalnih  banaka. Da ih nekako natera da finansiraju ono što bi on u svojoj mašti želeo da se finansira. Ja kažem da je to štetno a i nezakonito. Bolje da ih onda nacionalizuje. Po meni nije dobro ni postojanje tzv.razvojnih banaka bile one u Poljskoj ili negde drugo ali to je druga tema.

 

Nigde nisam napisao da tržište sve reguliše, iako najveći broj stvari reguliše najbolje, tako da nema šta ko da me "pokopava". Sa druge strane ti si izgleda pobrkao trgovinski protekcionizam i slobodu poslovanja u okviru jedne države. Podsetiću te da u SAD upravo u periodu koji ti nazivaš zlatnim nije postojala ni centralna banka a kamoli neka državna institucija tj. banka koja bi se bavila "razvojem".

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Luther

Teško je znati na šta tačno misli, nije postojao 1 bankarski sistem, ali hej...

Naravno, a onda će Katić svojim oštrim okom i brilijantnim umom iz ovih opisa ekonomskih katastrofa da izvuče pouku o "skrivenim prednostima socijalističkog razvojnog modela vezanog za bankarski sistem". Toliko skrivenim da ih niko sem njega nije uočio. Potencijalni Nobel.

 

Mislim, ja o tom modelu nisam čitao ja sam po njemu hodao. Učestvovao u uzimanju inokredita, u tučama oko raspodele kontingenata i dozvola, u rarzadi DUPES-a, raspodeli DPRP-a(ovo ko pogodi šta je svaka čast) i brojnim drugim korisnim aktivnostima koje su nas elegantno uvele u ekonomski, politički i moralni bankrot. I onda treba ovaj pajac da mi palamudi o prednostima. 

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Prospero

D(U)PES je bio dugoročni plan ekonomske stabilizacije a DPRP bi trebao biti dugoročni plan razvoja privrede :)

 

 

 

Nisu mi poznati tačni podaci iz nacionalne ekonomske istorije

 

Ne boj se, nisi ti ništa lošiji od Katića:

 

 

 

Evo malo vode sa izvora, podvukao sam neke crtice na brzaka, čisto da vidimo da Katićev argument kako je nekad nešto radilo i sad ga samo treba ponovo primeniti prosto ne stoji:

 

20160225_131132.jpg
20160225_131147.jpg
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20160225_131208.jpg
 
x
 
20160225_132906.jpg

 

 

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Tribun_Populi

Ne boj se, nisi ti ništa lošiji od Katića:

 

Teši me činjenica da nisam ekonomista :(

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Luther

Nisu mi poznati tačni podaci iz nacionalne ekonomske istorije, pa mi džabe sve to, jedino što znam je da je u poslednjih 15 godina ta 1989. godina uzimana kao nekakav reper, merilo koje se juri i nikako ne dostiže. To nije radio samo Katić već svi živi. Ja se čovekom ni najmanje ne opterećujem, zanima me samo šta ti i Prospero, pošto vidim da ste najbučniji u osporavanju njegovih tvrdnji, mislite o ovome

Uzmanje GDP-a iz 1989.g. je klasičan primer manipulacije jednim statističkim podatkom bez posmatranja drugih relevantnih podataka ili šireg konteksta događaja. Navode ga uglavnom oni koji žele da dokažu da je "pre sve bilo bolje" da "ovo sada ništa ne valja" ili da su DOS ili "žuti" sve upropastili.

Ja sam već dao link na članak koji pored toga što ti može dati dosta podataka iz ekonomske istorije, otvoreno izražava sumnju u validnost tog podatka a možeš naći i okolnosti u kojima se sve to odigravalo. Taj GDP je pre svega naduvan potrošnjom koja je došla od povećanja plata(nezarađenog) uvozom robe koja je ludački krenula liberalizacijom spoljne trgovine ali i pokretanjem privatnog biznisa koji je tada dozvoljen kao i drugim faktorima a sve kao posledica dolaska A.Markovića na čelo vlade. To je na duži rok bilo neodrživo što je pokazala i devalvacija od 30% sledaće godine.

 

Katić onda elegantno preskače devedesete godine, kao da ekonomija Srbije nije doživela jednu od najvećih kalvarija u istoriji sa sve  bembanjem na kraju. Ovde se treba podsetiti savršeno tačnih reči koje je u više navrata izrekao Manc Mellow (KIA? or MIA? or "Who is John Galt"?) da lljudi ovde uglavnom nisu svesni razmera propasti koja nas je zadesila devedesetih(ne samo ekonomske naravno). Od ove misli treba uvek početi razmatranje daljeg razvoja tj. od proleća 2001.g. Pa ipak od tada do danas GDP pc je porastao nominalno  pet puta a ppp dva puta (prema wiki) i to pored jake  SEKE iz 2008.g. 

 

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Luther

D(U)PES je bio dugoročni plan ekonomske stabilizacije a DPRP bi trebao biti dugoročni plan razvoja privrede :)

Dupes si pogodio ali DPRP nisi. To su : "društveno priznate reprodukcione potrebe" tj. iznos devizne supstance koje je pojedino preduzeće (da ne kažem OOUR) dobijalo od finalne cene izvezenog proizvoda a u zavisnosti od svog učešća u vrednosti proizvoda i nakon odbitka dela koji je uzimala federalna  država i sve se to usaglašavalo i raspoređivalo u Samoupravnim interesnim zajednicama za ekonomske odnose sa inostranstvom po republikama. Tj. pravo da od banke po zvaničnom kursu kupiš devize radi uvoza.

 

Prosto ko pasulj. Ja tu vidim mnoge skrivene razvojne prednosti samo neću još da ih otkrivam

 

Da i pošto si linkovao studiju ekonomski instituta čini mi se da nema ozbiljne ekonomske istorije 1945-1991. Neko veće, sveobuhvatno a ipak široj publici prihvatljivo delo. ili ja to ne umem da nađem.

 

 

 

 

 

 

Edited by Luther

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Tribun_Populi

Pajsad, razmere ekonomske propasti 90-ih ja gledam u sklopu sveukupne propasti još od 80-ih, budući da privredni sistem u vreme Miloševića skoro da nije ni dirnut. Činjenica da je ekonomska blokada isušila dobar deo svega, plus na to dodaj bombardovanje, međutim ono što se je od 2001. naovamo dogodilo i što u mnogo velikoj meri zamagljuje perspektivu pojedinca, jeste alokacija kapitala. Ljudima stoga mnogo rogobatnije izgleda ono što se je desilo od 2001-ve nego ono pre toga, jer (upravo reče Prospero na prethodnoj strani) svakoga ponaosob interesuje prvo on i njegovi najbliži, pa tek onda država i makroekonomski pokazatelji.

 

Zašto je to važno? Pa važno je jer se održava na nezadovoljstvo, time na politički sistem a onda i na privredu ponovo. Ja slobodno mogu reći da meni ne da nije bolje, nego je višestruko gore, ali se ipak trudim da na osnovu svog primera ne izvodim generalizovani zaključak.

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Prospero

Meni je jasan diskurs, samo mislim da nije dobar/tačan.

 

Dupes si pogodio ali DPRP nisi. To su : "društveno priznate reprodukcione potrebe" tj. iznos devizne supstance koje je pojedino preduzeće (da ne kažem OOUR) dobijalo od finalne cene izvezenog proizvoda a u zavisnosti od svog učešća u vrednosti proizvoda i nakon odbitka dela koji je uzimala federalna  država i sve se to usaglašavalo i raspoređivalo u Samoupravnim interesnim zajednicama za ekonomske odnose sa inostranstvom po republikama. Tj. pravo da od banke po zvaničnom kursu kupiš devize radi uvoza.
 
Prosto ko pasulj. Ja tu vidim mnoge skrivene razvojne prednosti samo neću još da ih otkrivam
 
Da i pošto si linkovao studiju ekonomski instituta čini mi se da nema ozbiljne ekonomske istorije 1945-1991. Neko veće, sveobuhvatno a ipak široj publici prihvatljivo delo. ili ja to ne umem da nađem.

 

A znaš li šta je bio DOM? :D

Nema takve studije na jezicima naroda i narodnosti, mada ima na ENG. 

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Tribun_Populi

Gde nije tačan tj. gde omašujem?

 

TT tj. CZ M57

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Luther

Meni je jasan diskurs, samo mislim da nije dobar/tačan.

 

 

A znaš li šta je bio DOM? :D

 

Nema takve studije na jezicima naroda i narodnosti, mada ima na ENG. 

 

 

Za DOM mislim da nikada nisam čuo(u samoupravnoj terminologiji) pa ne vredi da nagađam. Imam u vikendici gde sam lagerovao takvu literaturu samoupravno-engleski rečnik. Možda bi tamo pronašao, ali ti to svakako već znaš.

 

Eto ideje za hrabrog i vrednog istoričara da zagreje stolicu i napravi kapitalno delo. Šalu na stranu, ovakve knjige mnogo nedostaju pošto ljudi jednostavno ne znaju ni podatke ni procese o vremenskom periodu od gotovo pola veka. Do devedesete je u medijima bila neka vrsta cenzure, posle su došli ratovi pa se spasavala glava, pa ubrzana tranzicija i prođe voz. Gotovo sve zablude potiču iz tog neznanja. Ima recimo ovakvih stvari http://www.doiserbia.nb.rs/img/doi/0038-0318/2012/0038-03181204695Z.pdf, ali mislim da to nije dovoljno razrađeno i sveobuhvatno. Slabo se poznaje recimo robna razmena sa COMECON državama, robne liste, kliring i ko je tu šta dobijao i gubio.

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jovanovic

Posto smo precizno ustanovili da je Katic sarlatan i zamlata za kojeg je Zika Obretkovic velikan enonomske misli, dajte nam vode sa drugog ex-YU ekonomskog potoka/bloga. Ima li među nama nekog vrednog?  

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