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Tribun_Populi

Poenta je što su u austriji, nemačkoj, švajcarskoj, belgiji i francuskoj balkanski kriminalci deo svakodnevnice već 40 godina, sa popriličnim imigrantskim zajednicama. A i ove zemlje nemaju stav i politiku prema EU kao GB.

 

Jedini problem tu su Turci, koji neće ući nikad.

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Prospero

Special relationships in flux: Brexit and the future of the US–EU and US–UK relationships

TIM OLIVER AND MICHAEL JOHN WILLIAMS

 

https://www.chathamhouse.org/publication/ia/special-relationships-flux-brexit-and-future-us-eu-and-us-uk-relationships

 

...

The United States’ relationship with the UK and the rest of Europe remains

one defined by shared ideas, deeply entwined economic and security interests,

well-established institutional arrangements, common international problems,

and individual leaders and elites who remain Atlanticist in outlook. In the uncertain

world that it faces, the US government would prefer the states of the North

Atlantic to continue to work closely together on issues of international peace and

security. A British departure from the EU would complicate these relations, but

not undermine them unless it were compounded by other crises and changes to

both the EU and the United States that have the potential to drive them apart. It

is the UK that has the most to lose from Brexit, becoming a country whose unity

could be thrown into question and one that would have to work harder to affect

changes in the wider transatlantic relationship. In such a situation the United

States could find its closest ally becoming an awkward inbetweener, dependent

on how the larger US–EU relationship moves forward.

Nevertheless, there is no escaping the fact that the role of Britain in the EU is

important to the United States, to US–EU cooperation and to the wider transatlantic

relationship. Despite this, British political debate rarely considers the implications

that the referendum result could have on wider European and transatlantic

security, and economic and political arrangements. While we envision relations

remaining cordial, albeit with the UK as an awkward inbetweener, we set out

below three possible scenarios for the United States—the good, the bad and the

ugly—that could occur, depending on how the referendum result mixes with

other pressures.

 

The good ...

 

The best scenario for the United States and stable transatlantic relations is one

where the British people vote to remain in the EU, with the UK–EU renegotiation

and referendum followed by a sustained effort by the UK government

to rebuild relations with an EU for which the ‘British Question’ has been an

unwanted distraction from other matters. Should a new EU treaty emerge, the

UK would be in a stronger position to push for changes that strengthen the Union

while ensuring the UK remains an active member inside it rather than pushing

for changes from the outside. For the United States, this option preserves the

EU’s foremost Atlanticist power as a part of Europe’s predominant organization

for economics, politics and non-military security. It could also help ensure that

the EU focuses not only on domestic European matters but also on issues outside

the EU, especially in its near abroad. A UK engaging with its European partners

would also help show that isolationism and populism have their limits in national

discourse and thus decision-making.

 

... the bad ...

 

UK–EU relations muddle through, with a referendum result either to stay in or to

leave not leading to any clear and settled relationship. Animosity persists on both

sides, particularly between UK and EU leaders who feel aggrieved at the renegotiation

and referendum result. Neither side is willing to do more than make the

minimal commitment to a functional relationship. For the United States, Britain

would retain an important place in transatlantic relations, but now as an awkward

inbetweener, dependent on developments in the larger US–EU relationship. Any

effort by the UK to play the part of a transatlantic arbitrator would find some

footing in the context of NATO and traditional military matters, although even

here the United States would be aware that the future of NATO, EU enlargement

and EU foreign policy rested more with Germany. Britain’s attempts at leadership

might be welcomed by some Republicans, but would be extremely difficult—

and probably fiercely resisted by the EU and its member states—in areas such

as economics and wider political relations where Washington will be conscious

of the need to pay attention to the wider EU and, again, in particular Germany.

The United States would have to work around Britain in its wider relations with

the EU. Both the UK and the EU would remain difficult partners for the United

States in dealings with Asia.

 

... and the ugly

 

A British exit leads to a severe deterioration in UK–EU relations. A UK that is

denied some privileged external relationship with the EU could be tempted to

act as a spoiler in any efforts at NATO–EU cooperation, particularly if the rest of

the EU tried to develop in a more united way. There are precedents for such an

outcome, as is evident from the course of NATO–EU relations regarding Turkey,

Greece and Cyprus, for example—a long-running headache for US approaches

to south-eastern Europe. A particularly ugly scenario would see Brexit unleash

centrifugal forces that begin the unravelling of the EU. Here the place of Germany

would be key, with Brexit triggering some form of German crisis of confidence in

the EU. More likely Brexit would lead to the UK’s fragmentation, with Scotland

leaving the UK to rejoin the EU and a resurgence of violence in Northern Ireland,

while the businesses and inhabitants of the international and European metropolis

of London were left feeling resentful towards the rest of the UK. The United

States would be faced with the fallout from the fragmentation of one of its closest

allies.

 

Should a Brexit lead to EU disintegration, then weaknesses and divisions in

Europe would be likely to invite Russian meddling in central Europe; it is even

possible that the Kremlin might put pressure on some former Soviet territories

such as the Baltic republics. In this case, Washington would have serious questions

to answer about how to respond to such a crisis. Given its preoccupation with

the Asia–Pacific region, coupled with extreme frustration about the ability of

Europeans to manage European problems, the US might decide to allow for a

new status quo in Europe, preferring to divert its own energies to Asia rather than

continue to subscribe to a declining Europe that is seemingly unable to function as

a cogent actor in international relations. Washington would also be extremely alert

to the potential for Brexit to make the EU less accommodating to US and Atlantic

priorities—if the EU did not collapse, of course. US policy-makers would be

conscious of what such developments would say about US power and the potential

effect it could have on isolationist elements in their domestic politics. Other

world powers might interpret further tensions within NATO and a fragmenting

or weakened EU as a sign of the deterioration of two of the major institutions to

whose creation and development the United States has committed itself since the

Second World War.

 

There is, in short, no good outcome for the United States resulting from a

British decision to leave the EU. Some British Eurosceptics might dream of Britain

becoming a North Atlantic Singapore or a ‘Switzerland with nukes’, neglecting

the fact that Singapore and Switzerland play minor roles in regional politics

and are ultimately subject to regional politics rather than shapers of it. British

debate about the EU has too often ignored the benefits of EU membership and

the complexities of withdrawal, with certain elements indicating a yearning for

some sort of imperial past that is long over. The crisis of British membership in

the EU is in part a result of a changing EU, but is also one that British politicians

have exaggerated over the past several decades. This is not to say that there are not

serious issues with the governance and direction of the EU. These, however, are

problems which the United States has a clear interest in seeing addressed, from

which the UK cannot escape, and which a Brexit has the potential to make worse

rather than help solve.

 

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Tribun_Populi

Je li Borise, šta misle Francuzi o BrExitu? Jel sve najbolje? :fantom:

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borris_

Englezi nasi strai prijatelji. :D

 

Ovi sto su protiv evrope navijaju za Borisa dok su ostaliprotiv BrExit-a. Ovdje imamo drugih problema trenutno tako da to  nije glavna tema za sada. 

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Dr Arslanagić

+1

 

Štrajkovi, poplave a sad će i EP... Treba preživeti sledećih mesec dana.

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dragance

Samo Marina i par ostalih strančica mogu da profitiraju BrExitom. Za divno čudo, ako mlitavi Hollande istraje u svojim reformama, koje kasne jedno 30 godina barem i koje su pokušane već nekoliko puta u istom periodu, Francuska i Nemacka bi napokon bile prave powerhouse u Evropi. Sindikati i strah od terorizma su tome za sada glavna prepreka.

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Prospero

 

 

EU referendum

The Observer

 

Poll gives Brexit campaign three percentage points lead

 

Opinium survey also shows extent of age and class divisions between leave and remain camps

 

Daniel Boffey

Saturday 4 June 2016 22.23 BST

 

 

The leave campaign has picked up momentum and taken a three point lead over remain in the latest Observer/Opinium poll on the EU referendum. The Brexiters now stand on 43%, while 40% say they support the campaign to keep the UK in the union.

 

The poll suggests the remain camp has lost four percentage points in the last two weeks, during which Boris Johnson and Michael Gove have relentlessly campaigned on the theme of immigration.

 

The leave campaign appears to have picked up three percentage points. The potential in the leave campaign’s strategy is reflected in responses suggesting that two in five voters (41%) cite immigration as one of their two most important issues when deciding how to vote. Just over a third (35%) cite Britain’s ability to make its own laws without EU interference and 29% cite the impact of leaving on the UK economy.

 

Half of the 2,007 people surveyed said they believed that immigration would be under better control if the UK did leave the EU. Twelve per cent feel that the UK would have more control if the country retains its EU membership, and 24% say there would be little difference.

 

A fresh campaign to highlight the security dangers of EU membership, including the possibility of Turkey’s accession to the EU, is expected to be launched by Johnson this weekend.

 

However, the leave campaign also believes that, if it can keep the headline polls close, a relatively poor turnout among Labour voters who support remain could deliver it victory.

 

Opinium also issued a different set of figures using an alternative methodology to try to reflect the fact that online samples are sometimes seen to over-represent socially conservative respondents, who may be more likely to favour Brexit.

 

With the adjustments to the make-up of the sample surveyed, remain keeps its lead. Opinium found that 43% of UK adults said they would vote to remain in the EU in a referendum, while 41% would vote to leave the EU and 14% don’t know how they would vote.

 

However, Opinium said a move to leave had also been reflected in answers to their so-called “nudge” question, which asks those who don’t yet know how they will vote in what direction they are leaning. In the last Opinium survey two weeks ago, those split 55% leaning to remain and 32% leaning towards leave.

 

In the latest survey the gap has narrowed dramatically, with 36% leaning towards remain and 33% towards leave, even when the methodological updates were implemented. When those who don’t know were forced to choose, 47% said they lean more towards remain, while 32% lean more towards leave.

 

Generally the polls show an electorate split by social class, region and party political affiliation. The more affluent favour staying in the EU, while older people are typically more likely to back Brexit.

 

London is a stronghold of the remain camp, while the East Midlands tends toward leaving. Areas such as north-west England are more evenly poised.

 

Nearly half (48%) say that Cameron should resign if Brexit occurs, 32% that he should not. Remain voters are evenly split (42% either way) while leave voters overwhelmingly say he should resign (65% to 22%).

 

 

 

by Tapatalk

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Kampokei

I ja na tviteru ovih dana nalecem na te ankete koje daju prednost Brexitu. Ali, na kladionicama i dalje suvereno vodi Remain. Meni je i dalje potpuno sumanuta i pomisao da ce da pobedi Leave. Mozda za dlaku u samoj Engleskoj, ali mislim da ce ostale tri "countries" da pretegnu.

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Kampokei

Cudne su te situacije kada neka opcija uziva tek skromnu ili cak samo marginalnu podrsku, i onda se u rekordnom roku priblizi ili predje 50%. Crna Gora, Katalonija, a pogotovo Skotska i Brexit. A to sve u poslednjih 10+ godina. 

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MancMellow

zato sto kada neki izbor postane realna opcija za koju mozes da actually glasas onda naglo postan katalizator velikog broja problema koji su prisutni u drustvu. A problema uvek ima. Na nekom takvom kljucnom pitanju se onda skupi sve nezadovoljstvo, posebno onih siromasnijih. To je bio slucaj u Skotskoj, a to je sad slucaj i u Engleskoj. Tipa - daj da se bar nesto promeni. 

Edited by MancMellow

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Kampokei

Slazem se. Ekonomska kriza u kombinaciji sa percepcijom da vlastiti glas na redovnim izborima ne menja gotovo nista (pri cemu je u kampanji Leave tu glavni krivac zli Brisel). 

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Prospero

brisel se trudi da olakša brexit:
 


Britain will face demands to pay billions more into the EU budget following a vote to Remain in Europe on June 23 as Brussels looks to set to ask for more cash from national governments to pay for the unfolding migrant crisis.

 

The European Parliament has passed a resolution demanding greater spending which - if followed through- would tear a hole in David Cameron’s historic cut to the seven-year EU budget, which was capped at £847bn until 2020.
 
And in moves that could see Britain asked to increase its current net contributions of £10.4bn a year, the EU vice president for budgets issued ominous warnings last week on the sidelines of an European conference that member states should be “making room for new commitments”.
 
The unguarded remarks by Kristalina Georgieva to the Chinese state news agency Xinhua have raised fresh fears that Mr Cameron will face calls for big budget increases, particulary when the current settlement comes up for its mid-term review this autumn.
 
"We have to make sure that our budget for next year absorbs all the commitments made so far to deal with the migration crisis, while at the same time making room for new commitments,” said Ms Georgieva.
 
"We have exhausted to a great extent flexibilities offered within the budget. Member states and the European Parliament need to allow more room for flexibilities."
Her warning follows complaints from Jean-Claude Juncker, the president of the Commission, last year that the budget is “too small” to handle the migration crisis and will require “exceptional financing”.

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