Jump to content
bigvlada

NATO

Recommended Posts

Gandalf
18 minutes ago, namenski said:

Ili mozda izistinski verujes da bi americka benevolentnost isla dotle da u slucaju ozbiljne krize ne bi iskoristili mogucnost da se cenjkaju na racun zapadne Evrope?

imam nešto jače od vere, ozbiljnu krizu. 

 

The reason was that, for Kennedy, the crisis was not centrally about missiles in Cuba; it was about Berlin... If Kennedy showed weakness in face of Khrushchev's challenge, the effect might be to embolden Khrushchev to ignore American warnings about Berlin. It would then be Kennedy, not Khrushchev, who would bear the onus. 'A Soviet move on Berlin,' Kennedy said to the joint chiefs of staff, 'leaves me only one alternative, which is to fire nuclear weapons - which is a hell of an alternative.'

 

(potpuno nebitno da li je Hruščov imao Berlin na umu. u ovoj diskusiji je bitno samo to da je Kenedi verovao da na Kubi brani i Berlin, pa je braneći Berlin rizikovao sudbinu Kolumbusa. nije se cenjkao.)

Share this post


Link to post
namenski
1 minute ago, Gandalf said:

(potpuno nebitno da li je Hruščov imao Berlin na umu. u ovoj diskusiji je bitno samo to da je Kenedi verovao da na Kubi brani i Berlin, pa je braneći Berlin rizikovao sudbinu Kolumbusa. nije se cenjkao.)

Zaista mislis da se ne bi cenjkao?

A u pricu o bilo cijoj veri veri da se na Kubi brani Berlin, ma daj bre mani me idealizacije Kenedija...

Pa jebote, ubih se pokusavajuci da raspravim da se upravo u tome sastoje ekstremne negativnosti hegemonizma, ma bio i benevolentantm: kriza na Kubi, potencijalno ugrozavanje americkog kopna, neposredno se odrazava - Amerikanci je odraze - na odnose u Evropi koju bi - sa ili bez NATO - boleo kurac za to sto se neko usudio da zagrozi Svetoj Americi i to u situaciji kada je cela na meti.

Uostalom, zar ti samo stavljanje Berlina u kontekst kubanske krize ne govori dovoljno upravo o onome na sta sam pokusao da ti skrenem paznju: na cinjenicu da kad benevolentni hegemon kine na Kubi ili Indokini, svejedno, Evropa dobije kijavicu.

Sustina hegemonizma, onako kako ga ti pokusavas da predstavis se, bez maske, odlicno vidi danas: pritisak na Evropu da uvede Rusiji sankcije, nepotrebno i pogresno zaostri odnose, guranje u raznorazne intervencije u kojima Evropa nema ama bas nikakvog interesa - razlika je samo u tome sto hegemon nije vise benevolentan, nego ogoljeno sirov u pokusaju da zastiti svoje interese to po pravilu na racun benevolentno hegemonisanih.

 

Uostalom, ne vidim sta te sprecavalo da potegnes i jednu drugu krizu, inace skolski primer americke benevolentnosti glede zapadnoevropskih interesa: pogledaj, na primer, pod Suec 1956...

Share this post


Link to post
dillinger
1 hour ago, Gandalf said:

hebem li ga, to da je neko u proleće 2014-e tripovao kako je državni udar u Kijevu nekakva američka ujdurma... imalo je nekog smisla.

 

više nema nikakvog smisla. previše vremena je prošlo, bez ikakvih indicija da su Ameri (ili EU) imali iole bitnu ulogu u protestima ili u puču.

 

A ko se uopšte bavi istragom, od koga očekuješ da obelodani te konekcije?

 

To je ko i slučaj ekspresnog naoružavanja opozicije u Libiji i Siriji. Nema dokaza, sve grassroots pokreti!

Share this post


Link to post
slow
11 hours ago, Gandalf said:

ponudili im dogovor nakon što su protesti uzeli maha, čime su samo stvorili percepciju da je Janukovič Putinova kučka. 

 

Ah, kučka...dve godine pre tih događaja EU i MMF su ucenjivali Ukrajinu nemogućim finansijkim uslovima i nisu hteli da pomognu raspaloj ukrajinskoj ekonomiji, već su zatezali kratak dužnički lanac kojim je bila privezana Ukrajina: 

 

Quote

The reason given for the (stop preparations for signing EU-agreement) decree was that the previous months Ukraine had experienced "a drop in industrial production and our relations with CIScountries".[26] The government also assured "Ukraine will resume preparing the agreement when the drop in industrial production and our relations with CIS countries are compensated by the European market".[26] During two years of negotiations, Ukraine did not raise the issue of large, unconditional grants from the EU and IMF until the eve of the Vilnius summit.[27] According to Ukrainian Prime Minister Mykola Azarov "the extremely harsh conditions" of an IMF loan (presented by the IMF on 20 November 2013), which included big budget cuts and a 40% increase in gas bills, had been the last argument in favor of the Ukrainian government's decision to suspend preparations for signing the Association Agreement.[28][29] On 7 December 2013 the IMF clarified that it was not insisting on a single-stage increase in natural gas tariffs in Ukraine by 40%, but recommended that they be gradually raised to an economically justified level while compensating the poorest segments of the population for the losses from such an increase by strengthening targeted social assistance.[30] The same day IMF Resident Representative in Ukraine Jerome Vacher stated that this particular IMF loan is worth US$4 billion and that it would be linked with "policy, which would remove disproportions and stimulated growth".

 

Onog trenutka kada je Janukovič odlučio da olabavi omču ekspresno je dobio Desni sektor na ulicama. 

Edited by slow

Share this post


Link to post
Anduril

Slucajno si zaboravio sta je prethodilo - sankcije Kremlja. To naravno nikad ne bi okarakterisao kao nemoguce i udarac ekonomiji. Kako te ne mrzi da stalno precutkujes? Ako te zanima analiza, obda uzimas sve u obzir, ako te zanima propaganda onda radis ovako kao sada.

 

In Mid-August 2013 Russia changed its customs regulations on imports from Ukraine.[8][nb 1] Ukrainian Industrial Policy Minister Mykhailo Korolenko stated on 18 December 2013 that because of this Ukraine's exported had dropped by $1.4 billion (or a 10% year-on-year decrease through the first 10 months of the year).[8] The State Statistics Service of Ukraine reported in November 2013 that in comparison with the same months of 2012 industrial production in Ukraine in October 2013 had fallen by 4.9 percent, in September 2013 by 5.6 percent and in August 2013 by 5.4 percent (and that the industrial production in Ukraine in 2012 total had fallen by 1.8 percent).[10] In June 2010 (a few months after the 2010 Ukrainian–Russian Naval Base for Natural Gas treaty[11]), Ukraine paid Gazprom(the Russian government controls 50.002% of shares in Gazprom[12]) around $234 per 1,000 cubic metres of natural gas.[13] In January 2013 Ukraine paid $430 per 1,000 cubic metres.[14]And at the time of the 17 December 2013 agreement Ukraine still paid more than $400.[3]Since August 2011 Ukraine seeks to reduce imports of Russian natural gas by two-thirds (compared with 2010) by 2016.[15] Natural gas is Ukraine’s biggest import at present and is the main cause of the country’s structural trade deficit.[16]

Share this post


Link to post
Gandalf
15 hours ago, namenski said:

Zaista mislis da se ne bi cenjkao?

Kenedi i njegovi savetnici su bili uvereni da su sovjetske nuklearke na Kubi u suštini pokušaj da se Ameri prisile da predaju zapadni Berlin*. to uverenje je bilo toliko jako da je Kenedi bio ubeđen da bi se lako dogovorio sa Hruščevom, ukoliko Berlin ne bi bio toliki problem. umesto da Hruščovu ponudi ono što je Hruščov navodno najviše želeo (tj. Berlin), Kenedi se kockao i rizikovao nuklearni rat u kome bi nuklearke padale po američkim gradovima. pri tome je Kenedi pred saradnicima procenjivao rizik nuklearnog rata tu negde između 1:3 i 1:2. 

 

u najgorem trenutku, američki predsednik nije ponudio da preda zapadni Berlin kako bi spasao Kolumbus.

 

nije se cenjkao.

 

*to uverenje je bilo potpuno pogrešno, ali to u ovoj diskusiji nije bitno. takođe je poptuno nebitno da li je Kenedi bio lep, dobar, pametan... nebitno da li je ono što je uradio valjalo ili ne... ništa od toga nije bilo tvoje pitanje.

Edited by Gandalf

Share this post


Link to post
namenski
3 minutes ago, Gandalf said:

nije se cenjkao.

Gandalfe, Gandalfe, cenjkanje je sustina te igre, koreografijatm ponasanja u nuklearnim krizama se oko Kube tek ucila, uspostavljala su se neka pravila igre: cenjkanja je bilo onoliko, sa sve americkim pristankom na izjavu da ni u kom slucaju nece napadati Kubu, pristankom da povuku svoje rakete razmestene u Turskoj poprilicno pre Kube i obostranom zeljom da ni jedna strana u sukobu ne bude javno ponizena i dovedena u polozaj gubitnika.

Ne mogu da verujem da se (bas toliko) pravis blesav: Berlin je bio kolaterala, za Sovjete u svakom slucaju lak i ako vojno nevazan cilj s obzirom da se nalazio u sred srede DDR, dok za SAD ni u kom slucaju nije bio nista vise od objekta prestiza.

Na sve to uporno izbegavas da komentarises tvrdnju da je zapadna Evropa pod americkom benevolentnom hegemonijom bila - izmedju ostalog - talac americke politike i odbrane americkih interesa diljem Planete sto je donekle i danas, da nema dobre ili po tebi benevolentne hegemonije, bas kao sto nema ni onog cuvenog besplatnog rucka: uostalom, zar ti samom ne smeta sopstvena tvrdnja da se igre oko evropskog Berlina igraju na i oko tamo neke Kube sa koje je - gle slucaja - ugrozen ne Berlin ili bilo koji evropski cilj, nego Svete Americke Drzave.

I to od strane 2 hegemona: onog benevolentnog i onog drugogtm...

Ali, 'ajde...

 

A sto se tice Kenedijeve kocke i slicnih mitova za mlade, lepe i pametne: nema tu, niti je bilo ikakve kocke.

Danasnja novokomponovana istoriografija pokusava da romantizuje i ideologizuje Kenedijevu kratkotrajnu vladavinu, prenebregava da je on covek koji je nepovratno uvukao Ameriku u Vijetnam, itd, itd...

A sto se tice same kubanske krize, ona je bila upravo suprotno od kocke: zaboravlja se da su sa Kenedijem u Belu kucu usli likovi poput Maknamare i kompanije, 1 tehnokratska elita i to u sred perioda nevidjenog tehnoloskog entuzijazma - bila je verovatno prva lekcija modernog, tehnokratskog pristupa politici i ratovodstvu, sa sve uvodjenjem teorije igara u arsenal, ali jeste bila i prilika u kojoj je Kenedi dokazao da poseduje osobine kao sto su odlucnost, cvrstina ali i sposobnost citanja i slanja diplomatskih signala u najboljoj tradiciji klasicne diplomatske tradicije.

 

Pricam ti pricu su procene o 1:3, 1:2..., a unapred ti kazem zajebi me sa citatima :D 

 

23 minutes ago, Gandalf said:

u najgorem trenutku, američki predsednik nije ponudio da preda zapadni Berlin kako bi spasao Kolumbus.

Nije, a i zasto bi:

Quote

 

...Khrushchev broadcast (27. oktobar)  from Moscow a second message saying the missiles would be removed if, in addition, the United States withdrew nuclear missiles and other 'offensive means' from Turkey.

The second Khrushchev message provoked furious debate. With Ball in the lead, Kennedy's advisers said almost unanimously that Khrushchev's new condition was unacceptable. America's NATO allies would think the United States was sacrificing their security for the sake of its own. Kennedy alone seemed unconvinced. When Ball said, 'If we talked to the Turks... this would be an extremely unsettling business', Kennedy replied with asperity, 'Well, this is unsettling now, George, because ... most people would regard this as not an unreasonable proposal ... I think you're going to have it very difficult to explain why we are going to take hostile military action in Cuba ... when he's saying, "If you'll get yours out of Turkey, we'll get ours out of Cuba."'.

 

Na sta sledi potez da se sacuva obraz, svi vuci siti, a ovce na broju:

Quote

He sent Robert Kennedy to see the Soviet ambassador, Anatoly Dobrynin, to tell him that the missiles in Turkey were obsolete, and that the US planned to pull them out within about six months.

Itd, itd, uostalom nevazno, valjanost koju potezes sa ovom pricom nema ama bas nikakve veze.

 

 

(The Kennedy Tapes: Inside the White House During the Cuban Missile Crisis by Ernest May, Philip Zelikow, Ernest R. May (W.W. Norton, 2002)

Share this post


Link to post

Create an account or sign in to comment

You need to be a member in order to leave a comment

Create an account

Sign up for a new account in our community. It's easy!

Register a new account

Sign in

Already have an account? Sign in here.

Sign In Now

×