Evroazijska Unija - to je ta Evropa kojoj težimo!

[Eraserhead]

Pa to ti kazem, fiktivna zajednica nastala na zelji najveceg da leci kompleksei okuplja iako za to nema kapaciteta i zelji malih da iskoriste najveceg.

 

Jedan clan umalo nije ispao iz price 7 dana pred osivanje.

Edited January 1, 2015 by Eraserhead

[Zaz_pi]

EAU nije nastala na zelji Rusije vec kazahstana jos 1995 kada niej bilo Putina na celu Rusije. Kao sto sam rekao mnogim drugim clanovima organizacije je Rusija potrebnija nego obrnuto.

Sa druge strane iz ekonomski uspesne EU/evrozone pretnju ispadanjem mozemo videti svakih godinu-dve. Lukasenko je bio u Kijevu da bi ponovo poceli pregovori Kijev-Donjeck, sto se desilo kasnije. Kazahstan je usao u pricu kako bi takodje bio medijator tako u Astani za par dana treba da se odrzi sastanak Putin-Merkelova-Oland-Porosenko, moguce da bude neko iz Novorusije na sastanku. To je cela prica.

[Anduril]

EAU definitivno nije nesto u rangu EU ili NATO ali ne zbog nedostatka volje.

 

Jednostavno, EU i NATO su institucionalizovani savezi sa jasnim pravilima, gremijumima i procedurom.

 

Kako tako nesto moze Kremlj da izgradi kad nije u stanju da stabilizuje cak i svoje institucije vec 25 godina. Duma je smejurija, stranke takodje. Sudstvo je korumpirano a vlast bazira na licnim odnosima. Cak i mafija je bolje organizovana.

 

 

[frn1782]

Sta kaze Ujka Sem ima da se odradi do jaja sofisticirana organizacija i pravila.

[Anduril]

Pa da, tvoju glupu tezu potvrdjuje posebno napad na Irak 2003 i reakcija EU/NATO na sve to.

[frn1782]

Koja reakcija lol

Nisu dobili zeljeni deo plena pa nisu bili aktivni ucesnici u reketu.

Nije kao da su se pobunili/protivili ili to ikad i mogu.

Vazal ima da cuti i ne talasa.

[Кровавый Пастор]

Koja reakcija lol

Nisu dobili zeljeni deo plena pa nisu bili aktivni ucesnici u reketu.

Nije kao da su se pobunili/protivili ili to ikad i mogu.

Vazal ima da cuti i ne talasa.

 

Zato je Rusija tj. Lukoil, dobila sasvim fin deo "plena" u Iraku.

[Prospero]

CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPEAN REVIEW

Volume 8, 2014

 

EURASIANISM AND THE FAR RIGHT IN CENTRAL AND SOUTH EAST EUROPE

By Vassilis Petsinis

Herder Institute, Marburg

 

Abstract

 

This article focuses on Eurasianism as an ideological trend with a political appeal beyond the

post-Soviet space. It demonstrates that the roles envisioned for the ‘Trojan horses’ of

Eurasianism among the far right in Central/Southeast Europe and for Eurasianism’s sympathizers

in Western Europe bear a qualitative difference. In the former case, the emphasis is on systemic

transformation whereas, in the latter case, on a gradualist strategy.

 

 

 

 

The latest developments in Ukraine are indicative of Russia’s motive to solidify its status within

the Eurasian space. In Russian geopolitical discourse, Eurasia roughly coincides with the post-

Soviet territories to the east of the Baltic Republics that stretch all the way to the Caucasus and

Central Asia. As early as the 1990s, experts in Geopolitics, such as Sergey Karaganov, had been

advocating that Russian minorities should be utilized as instruments of Russian foreign policy in

the ‘near abroad’ (e.g. the ‘Karaganov doctrine’ in 1992). However, Boris Yeltsin’s foreign

policy of appeasement towards the West softened the impact of these approaches.

 

During Vladimir Putin’s tenure in office, Moscow has demonstrated a more powerful

resolution to safeguard its interests within a region that it regards as a ‘traditional’ sphere of

geopolitical influence. My aim in this article is to focus on Eurasianism not so much as a new

agenda in Russian foreign policy but, mainly, as an ideological trend with a political appeal

beyond the post-Soviet space. Eurasianism’s newly-acquired ‘fellow-travellers’ comprise a

number of far right parties in the ‘old’ (e.g. Golden Dawn in Greece) as well as the ‘new’ (e.g.

Jobbik in Hungary, Ataka in Bulgaria) EU member-states in Central and Southeast Europe. This

research acquires greater importance if one considers the successful performance of populist and

far right parties in the May 2014 elections for the European parliament.

 

For the purposes of this article, I concentrate on the most prominent representative of

Eurasianism, Alexander Dugin. A Professor of Sociology at Moscow State University, Dugin

commenced his literary and political engagement as a dissident journalist in 1988. Instead of a

classical theorist in International Relations, Alexander Dugin has been an avant-garde figure

involved in a series of literary and political initiatives. Throughout the 1990s, he took active part

in quite a few controversial circles in the midst of the ideological vacuum that accompanied the

fall of the Soviet Union (e.g. the nationalist grouping Pamyat and Edvard Limonov’s National

Bolshevik Party). Alexander Dugin launched the Eurasian Movement in 2001. Despite his

flamboyant writing and controversial statements, the author is one of the State Duma’s advisers

in foreign affairs. The main questions here are:

 

3

 

1) What are the ideological foundations and evolution of Eurasianism?

2) How is it possible to interpret the appeal of Eurasianism among political actors from the

far right in Central and Southeast Europe?

 

 

 

 

Eurasianism: early beginnings

 

Alexander Dugin introduced the foundations of Eurasianism in the Principles of Geopolitics

(1997). In this book, the author advocates a foreign policy doctrine shaped by cultural

essentialism and historical revisionism. Dugin’s essentialism consists of dividing the world into

geopolitical spheres of influence in accordance with ‘established’ historical and cultural

attributes. Within this global context, the primary goal of Russian foreign policy must be to

maximize its national interest within the Eurasian space.

 

In accordance with the ‘Karaganov doctrine’, Dugin also contends that Russia must

intervene to endorse the collective rights of ethnic Russians living in the ‘near abroad’.

Nevertheless, there exists a basic difference between the ‘Karaganov doctrine’ and the concept of

Eurasianism at its early stages. In the former case, Sergey Karaganov positions his thought

within the context of Classical Realism and advocates ways for Russia to maximize its national

interest inside the post-Soviet geopolitical environment (e.g. involving the Russian minorities in

Estonia and Latvia). On the other hand, although he assigns Russia a role of pivotal importance

within the Eurasian project, Dugin does not endorse a strictly statist approach. By contrast, the

thinker aspires to embed Eurasianism within a political infrastructure that goes beyond the role

of states as the main actors in international politics (Shekhovtsov, 2008, p.496).

 

A dichotomy of fundamental importance is the one which consists of the Continental

(mainly Russia) versus the Atlantic powers (i.e. the US and NATO). Russia’s main global

competitor is ‘Atlanticism, the NATO/US imperium, and the liberal, as well as expansionist,

principles that underpin US foreign policy’ (Dugin, 1997 p.p. 255, 259; Ingram, 2001). Russia’s

main objective must be to utilize its resources in order to sustain a balance of power vis-à-vis its

global rival and harness ‘Atlanticism’s incursions to the Eurasian heartland’ (Ibid). An early sign

of Dugin’s differentiation from the ‘Karaganov doctrine’ is his occasional choice of appeasement

for tactical purposes. In this light, the author judges that the Baltic Republics, together with

Central and Eastern Europe, may be ‘conceded’ to the Atlantic sphere of influence

 

4

 

Dugin’s outlook on global politics as a puzzle that consists of ‘Russian/Eurasian’,

‘Atlantic/Western’ and/or ‘Arab/Islamic’ spheres of influence, reads like a rehearsal of the

pattern introduced in Samuel Huntingdon’s Clash of Civilizations (1996). It also reads like a

‘reversal’ of the pattern introduced by Zbigniew Brzezinski in The Grand Chessboard (1998). In

an opposite outlook to Dugin’s, Brzezinski views Russia as the main competitor to the US and

recommends ways to counter Russian influence in international politics.

 

 

Concretizing Eurasianism: Towards a ‘Fourth Political Theory’

 

Dugin’s most recent work, The Fourth Political Theory (2012), standardizes and enhances the

political infrastructure within which the Eurasian project is embedded. In this work, Dugin

desires to set up the foundations upon which a fourth ideology will emerge after Communism,

Fascism, and Liberalism. The author subscribes to a vague notion of neotraditionalism and

deplores the way that liberalism and postmodernity aspire to achieve universal homogeneity and

lead towards an ‘end of history’.

 

In The Fourth Political Theory and in quite a few of his recent statements, Dugin has

concretized Eurasianism as a cultural sphere which, in his own words, is as distinct as the Islamic

or the Buddhist world. According to the author, this has been the outcome of a historical process

that has consisted in intercultural contacts and bonds of mutual reliance within a common

geographic space. As a matter of fact, Dugin has been particularly cautious in order not to

conflate Eurasian identity with a ‘Greater Russian’ identity of any sort. By contrast, the author

has opted to portray Eurasianism as a transnational and inclusionary mosaic within which

smaller national identities can coexist with the Russian one in harmony. For Dugin, it is the

cultural diversity, as well as idiosyncrasy, of Eurasia that renders its strict categorization into

either the European or the Asian cultural zones highly problematic.

 

For instance, Alexander Dugin has lately been quite active in his endeavour to convince

Lithuanian nationalists that the Russian and the Lithuanian national identities can coexist on the

basis of equality within the fringes of the Eurasian world. The feeble reactions over Crimea’s

annexation by Russia on the part of the Lithuanian populist parties (e.g. Order and Justice) serves

as, if only, an early hint at Eurasianism’s success in softening the ‘traditional’ Russoscepticism

among Lithuanian nationalists.

 

5

 

Another important aspect in The Fourth Political Theory is the inversion of leftist

principles and their fusion with neotraditionalism and cultural essentialism within the context of

a new geopolitical strategy for Russia (Shekhovtsov, 2009). During the recent developments in

Ukraine, Alexander Dugin has been calling, via his personal blog, for a continuous anticapitalist,

anti-imperialist and anti-fascist revolution from Vladivostok to Lisbon. These calls

often combine in the author’s speech with other calls for the necessity of cementing Slavic unity

as a bulwark against ‘Western-sponsored’ acculturation.

 

At a first glance, this corresponds to a change of course in comparison to the situational

choice of appeasement which Dugin advocates in The Principle of Geopolitics. To the eyes of a

Constructivist, this is indicative of Eurasianism’s malleability and high subjectivity regarding

geopolitical developments. Nevertheless, how can Alexander Dugin and his fellow-Eurasianists

use the term ‘anti-fascist’ when they maintain relations with political parties accused of being

either quasi-fascist or overtly fascist (e.g. Golden Dawn)? This topic requires some further

elaboration.

 

The Great Patriotic War against Fascism and its symbolism form a major component of

nationalist imagery in contemporary Russia. The portrayal of the Great Patriotic War retains

much of its Soviet-era paraphernalia. Nevertheless, instead of being national in shape and

Socialist in content, the image of the Great Patriotic War has been given a distinctly national

(Russian) content. In his recent statements, Dugin adds ‘Fascism’ to the content that this notion

has acquired in Russian political and popular discourse nowadays.

 

In this light, Russia is being portrayed as an anti-fascist force not on ideological but,

mainly, on national grounds. Along these lines, Russia’s rivals in foreign affairs can be viewed

as potentially Fascist. Indeed, this emphasis on anti-fascism in Dugin’s most recent writings has

reaped some benefits for Russian foreign policy. Although this article concentrates on the links

between Eurasianism and the far right in Central and Southeast Europe, a number of leftist

parties in Western Europe (e.g. Germany’s Die Linke) often tend to interpret the developments in

Crimea and Eastern Ukraine as a justified response to the ‘EU-sponsored, Fascist government in

Kyiv’.

 

According to Dugin, Russia’s more active engagement within the Eurasian space

provides an early vehicle for the materialization of the ‘continuous anti-capitalist, anti-imperialist

and anti-fascist revolution from Vladivostok to Lisbon’. Although the final chapter in the Fourth

 

6

 

Political Theory is entitled ‘Against the Postmodern World’, its author’s rhetoric is ironically and

clearly set within a postmodernist matrix.

 

At this point, a crucial detail should be set in context. As result of Dugin’s idiosyncratic

and obscure writing, it might be an exaggeration to contend that his Eurasianism shapes Russia’s

foreign policy in the same way that, say, Machiavelli’s thought inspired domestic as well as

foreign policies in Mussolini’s Italy. However, it remains equally valid that Dugin’s unilateral

networking with various representatives from the European far right and, to a lesser extent, the

far left has expanded the pool of supporters for Russian foreign policy beyond the geographic

boundaries of Eurasia .

 

 

Why the appeal to the far right in Central and Southeast Europe? The cases of Jobbik

(Hungary), Golden Dawn (Greece), and Ataka (Bulgaria)

 

As Alexander Dugin has often acknowledged, he maintains close connections with the leaders of

Jobbik (Gábor Vona), Ataka (Volen Siderov), and Golden Dawn (Nikolaos Michaloliakos). The

Russian thinker has held a series of cordial meetings with the Jobbik-leader. He has also,

allegedly, addressed a letter of support to the, currently imprisoned, leader of Golden Dawn.

Alexander Dugin has openly admitted that he regards such parties as a potential vanguard or as

‘fellow-travellers’ in the European revolution against Atlantic imperium. However, why the

appeal of Eurasianism, in particular, to these parties? One might isolate the following factors in

regards with these parties’ appreciation for the Eurasian project.

 

The first factor is the interaction between identity-politics and foreign policy. All three

parties have been very sceptical of the ways that globalization may allegedly result in

‘worldwide acculturation’. Along these lines, Dugin’s neotraditionalism has struck a chord with

them. Eurasianism’s agenda clearly coincides with Jobbik’s calls to reconnect Hungary with the

Asian part of its cultural ancestry. Although it subscribes to Hungary’s ‘historical’ image as a

hegemonic power inside the Carpathian Basin, the Jobbik leadership equally acknowledges the

Eurasian origins of the Hungarian ethno-genesis (i.e. the references to the Ancient Magyars and

Huns).

 

Gábor Vona and other high-ranking members of Jobbik have been quick on their feet to

dispel any Eurocentric or Orientalist outlooks and emphasize Hungary’s role as a bridge between

East and West. This aspect of Jobbik’s foreign policy doctrine has come to legitimize Vona’s

 

7

 

campaign among emerging regional powers such as Turkey, Kazakhstan or, in this case, Russia.

In particular, it is a shared belief in cultural exceptionalism and the conviction that neither

Russian nor Hungarian culture can be confined within the narrow limits of ‘Europe’ or ‘Asia’

that provides common ground between Dugin’s and Vona’s understandings of Eurasian identity.

The same thing can be said over the employment of the Slavophil and Christian Orthodox

imageries vis-à-vis Bulgaria’s and Greece’s position inside the Eurasian project. With specific

regard to Greece, Dugin has also stated that if Greece and Cyprus were subsumed within the

Kremlin’s sphere of influence, this would upgrade the maritime status of Russia, as a Continental

power, vis-à-vis the Atlantic competitors.

 

The second factor is hard Euroscepticism. All three parties reject the EU as a bureaucratic

construct that simply promotes the interests of the powerful states to the detriment of the

peripheral ones. Alexander Dugin has also regarded the EU as a feeble entity within which the

Franco-German axis and the post-industrial states of Northwestern Europe maximize their

national interests over the EU’s peripheries. Most importantly, the Russian thinker views the EU

as a mere instrument through which Atlanticism promotes its geopolitical interests within the

European space.

 

The third factor is anti-capitalism. All three parties sense discomfort with neoliberal

capitalism and the way that transnational capital scours the globe with few constraints in its flow.

In their political platforms, these parties often blend elements from the traditional political

culture of nationalism in their countries with an artificial ‘anti-capitalism’. Dugin’s denunciation

of global capitalism and its greed complements the discomfort of these and other far right parties

with the ‘Eurocrats’, Atlanticism, and the alleged loss of cultural identity and national values

during a global era.

 

Last but not least, anti-liberalism, in the political and cultural sense, provides an essential

bridge between Eurasianism and its fellow-travellers from the far right in Central and Southeast

Europe. Dugin has been denouncing Liberalism as an ideology that may ultimately turn human

societies into herd-like aggregates of individuals without any awareness of collective belonging.

Indeed, the prospective erosion of the collective bonds which, allegedly, constitute human

societies (e.g. family, religion and cultural traditions) features as one of the greatest fears among

the European far right. Meanwhile, the same political actors tend to regard Putin’s Russia as a

‘healthier’ political model in comparison to the mainstream patterns of politics in the West (i.e.

 

8

 

involving a leader-centred and strong government, the promotion of national values, and the

safeguarding of the ‘naturally ascribed’ gender-roles, etc.).

Implications for the future

 

By contrast to the bipolarity of the ‘80s and the unipolarity of the ‘90s, we are currently

witnessing the emergence of a multipolar international system. The European financial crisis

revealed not only the feeble foundations of monetary unification but also the conflict among

various models of governance and financial management inside the EU.

It is particularly interesting how the latter conflict has often acquired cultural

underpinnings in political and popular discourse (e.g. ‘Germany versus Southern Europe’). It is

equally intriguing how such cultural reductions have enacted themselves within an EU which is

(informally) structured according to a ‘three-gear’ balance of power. This consists of the

‘Franco-German axis’ and the post-industrial states of Northwestern Europe, Southern Europe,

and the new member-states from Central and Southeast Europe.

 

Recently, Russia has reasserted its ambition to evolve into a potent global actor. Despite

his obscure and controversial outlook, Alexander Dugin maintains access to the halls of power in

Moscow. The three parties that have been nominated in this article operate on the peripheries of

an EU marred by economic stagnation and, occasionally, political instability. Meanwhile,

Greece, Hungary and Bulgaria are three societies where Eurasianism’s employment of cultural

identity politics is likely to gain higher popular appeal compared to the Western ‘core’.

Depending on the evolution of the balance of power between Russia and the EU, one

should not exclude the possibility of such political actors functioning as ‘Trojan horses’on behalf

of Russian foreign policy. The prospects for Eurasianism to expand this strategy to political

actors within the EU core, remains to be seen in the near future. In all of this, it should be borne

in mind that the role envisioned for the pro-Eurasian ‘Trojan horses’ from Central and Southeast

Europe within the EU bears a qualitative difference from the role reserved for the sympathetic

parties from the ‘core’ of Western Europe.

 

In the former case, Eurasianism seems to be pondering on systemic transformation, or a

radical shift in the foreign policy agenda, that would bring the states in question within Russia’s

sphere of influence. In the case of Greece, the drastic realignment of the party-system and the

state of turbulence between 2010 and 2011 revealed the fragile foundations of political

 

9

 

institutions. In the case of Hungary, the state of friction between Budapest and Brussels over the

management of the economic crisis has been a driving force behind the readjustment of this

state’s foreign policy towards Moscow. By contrast, the polities of Western Europe are

characterized by greater stability and their democratic institutions have been established as a

result of a long historical process.

 

Therefore, the prospects for systemic transformations with groundbreaking repercussions

are rather weak. Within the West European context, then, Eurasianism has opted for a more

gradualist strategy. This consists in an attempt to employ sympathetic parties from Western

Europe as a bulwark with the aim of countering the impact of Atlanticism upon the foreign

policy agenda(s) in these states. So far, a variety of political parties, as diverse as the National

Front in France and the UKIP in the United Kingdom, seem to endorse Russian foreign policy

inside the Eurasian/post-Soviet space. The growing popularity of these parties signals the shape

of things to come.

 

 

References cited

 

Dugin, A. (1997). Principles of Geopolitics, (Moscow: Arktos Publishing).

Dugin, A. (2012). The Fourth Political Theory, (Moscow: Arktos Publishing).

Ingram, A. (2001). ‘Alexander Dugin: Geopolitics and Neo-Fascism in Post-Soviet Russia’ in

Political Geography 20 (8): 1029–1051.

Shekhovtsov, A. (2008). ‘The Palingenetic Thrust of Russian Neo-Eurasianism: Ideas of Rebirth

in Aleksandr Dugin’s Worldview’ in Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions, Vol. 9,

No. 4: 491–506.

Shekhovtsov, A. (2009). ‘Aleksandr Dugin’s Neo-Eurasianism: The New Right a la Russe’ in

Religion Compass, 3/4 (2009): 697–716.

 

Dr Vassilis Petsinis is a Visiting Researcher at the Herder Institute (Marburg, Germany).

His main areas of specialization are European Politics and Ethnopolitics with a regional

focus on Central and Southeast Europe. His email address is vpetsinis@hotmail.com.

 

https://www.academia.edu/7652284/CENTRAL_AND_EASTERN_EUROPEAN_REVIEW_Volume_8_2014_EURASIANISM_AND_THE_FAR_RIGHT_IN_CENTRAL_AND_SOUTH_EAST_EUROPE

 

 

[Budja]

Sarko ponovo jase.

 

 

 

Les premiers résultats sont tombés à 20 heures. Le score du FN se situerait entre 24 et 26 % des voix, bien moins que ce que prédisaient les sondages pré-électoraux. En tête, l'UMP et l'UDI totaliseraient entre 29 et 32 % des voix, et les socialistes comptabiliseraient environ 20 % des voix. Les différents partis de gauche, eux, auraient conquis un peu plus de 10 % des voix.

[Roger Sanchez]

Jao, nikad nećete pogodit tko je od nedavno gainfully employed u RT America kao nounar™! (ne, hella, nije vasa)

[Hella]

Jao, nikad nećete pogodit tko je od nedavno gainfully employed u RT America kao nounar™! (ne, hella, nije vasa)

 

okej nećemo ajde ko je

[Roger Sanchez]

[Hella]

čestitamo još jedan korak ka većoj objektivnosti rt

[Roger Sanchez]

Frapantno, jelda, ja sam npr totalno očekivao angažiranje 1 Dinka Gruhonjića

[aram]

a, ouaj, tko je mladac?