Crtice o prvom svetskom ratu

[namenski]

Нема фанова СФ-а на историји?

Ima 1.

Ti.

Ali si neke stvari pomesao :P

[namenski]

на знам како да ти одговорим кад твоје поређење нема везе ни са логиком ни са подацима.

 

Krenes sa poredjenjem Jutlanda i Borodina pa se setis logike?

A sto se podataka tice, mozemo i o njima, i ako sam ti samo na ovom topiku jedno 100 x ponovio da su takozvani takticko-tehnicki podaci bez ikakvog znacaja kad se (pokusava) da razgovara na vojne i ratne teme.

Osim ako ne promenis nick u kadet Biegler  :P

 

Немачки БК уопште нису били спорији од британских.

 

 

Naravno da nisu, ko je to uopste pomenuo: broje se i racunaju BB, a tebi kao starom podatkasu^tm valjda ne moram (ponovo) da pricam o koncepcijskim razlikama u izgradnji britanskih i nemackih BB.

 

 

Објасни ми на који начин Стаљинградска битка може да буде совјетски пораз?

 

Pa Biegler logikom: Sovjetski gubici bili veci, dakle Sovjeti izgubili.

Lukav si ti  :): ja sam ti podmetnuo, pored Staljingrada i Verden, takodje bitku u kojoj su gubici pobednika bili veci od gubitaka porazenog, al' ti nista, ne uklapa ti se u logiku, jebiga.

Inace, ne budi mi zamereno, gresis strasno sto 1 apsurdno iracionalnu rabotu kakva je rat, rabotu koju je nemoguce meriti pokusavas da sabijes u logicke okvire.

Takozvana tvrda ratna logika je naravno od najvece vaznosti, ali na sasvim drugim nivoima: mesati ih je opasno i zavrsava se uobicajenim vojno-tehnickim entuzijazmom koji meri brzine, visine, tezine, domete, zamisli komandanata, planove, naredjenja i svasta nesto, trazeci u tim glupostima objasnjenja za dogadjaje.

 

За Бородино сам ти већ написао да су Руси имали и више губитака, и да је после пала Москва, али да је Наполеону било потребно да уништи руску армију да би остварио победу.

 

Vatra, zezanje na stranu, ali ozbiljno mesas babe i zabe, aj kad si vec stavio (nedopustivo) u isti kontekst Borodino i Jutland: Borodino je bitka jednog drugog vremena, bitka koja je - pored svega ostalog - oznacila i kraj 1 strateskog ekstremizma, takozvane unistavajuce/resavajuce/odsudne bitke, sna svakog strategijskog ekstremiste, od Hanibala pa na dalje, ali san koji je mogao da se ispuni samo kad se stekne gomila drustvenih, istorijskih i konacno tehnoloskih uslova.

WW1 je bio ekstremno nepodoban za tu rabotu: predstavljao je sukob koji se zabio u tehnoloski, ako hoces i u civilizacijski corsokak i ceo je - barem kad su glavna poprista u pitanju - prosao u pokusajima da se ili iznudi/stvore uslovi za takozvanu resavajucu bitku ili da se napravi/stvore mogucnosti za proboj, odnosno da se armije izvedu na otvoreno i omoguci im se manevar koji bi opet imao za cilj samo i jedino - resavajucu bitku, dakle mrtva petlja koju ce tek naredni rat da razresi.

Od toga nije em bilo nista, em nije tema: Jutland je na neki nacin samo odraz desavanja/stanja na kopnu u WW1, sto ne menja ni rec od onog sto sam ti vec otpisivao na tu temu - Britanci su Nemcima videli ledja, saterali ih nazad u baze da ih tih baza do kraja rata ne izadju.

BTW, ni na jednu od tih tvrdnji se nisi osvrnuo, nego si zapeo sa bojnim krstasima, Borodinima i Staljingradima.

I za Borodino sam pokusao da te opasuljim: i bez bitke, Moskva bi 'pala' to pod 1.

Pod 2. rekoh ti vec: nema svedocenja, ne postoji, koje ne potvrdjuje da su se noc posle Borodina na ruskoj strani osecali kao porazeni, oni koji su bitku izgubili. 

Uostalom, svedocenja na stranu - to je istorijska cinjenica.

To se broji i racuna, svim logikama uprkos.

E, sad, ako ti tvrdis drugacije - OK.

A tvoja tvrdnja da je Napoleonu bilo potrebno da unisti rusku armiju da bi ostvario pobedu vazila je, kad su Napoleonovi ratovi u pitanju samo do - Borodina.

Kurac bi Napoleon ostvario pobedu i da je unistio rusku armiju kod Borodina, bas kao sto bi kurac Rusija^tm prihvatila - hipoteticki - mir koji bi bilo ko zakljucio ili pokusao da zakljuci sa Napoleonom posle unistenja ruske armije.

Rat kao drustvena pojava dobio je neke nove, do tada nepoznate kvalitete, a da se pri tom niko nije osvrnuo na kalibre, domete, itd, itd...

Taj luksuz je bio rezervisan za evropske dvorove, a i to je prestajalo da vazi samo par godina posle Borodina.

To sto ne uvidjas tu kvalitativnu promenu u desavanjima tokom Napoleonovih ratova - ne zameram ti.

Nije uvideo ni 1 Napoleon  :P

 

 

БК као класа су се показала врло корисном, јер су успели да спрече крстарички рат.

Нису били намењени да се боре са противником исте снаге или јачим, зато и јесу имали губитке у Јиланду, али то је до погрешне употребе.

 

Jesu su pokazali korisnim: toliko da su ih se svi brze-bolje ratosiljali, a jedina vajda vidjena od njih bila je sto su se pokazali zgodnim da ih se posle rata preradi u nosace aviona, koje zahvaljujuci tehnickim pogodnostima, koje nekim zakonskim aktima^tm.

Jesu lepi^tm, mozda najlepsi ratni brodovi modernog doba, ali beznadezno neupotrebljivi: krstaricki rat nisu sprecili, to ponajmanje, ali to mozemo negde drugde.

A sto se tice pogresne upotrebe kod Jutlanda ne videh da si je zamerio Nemcima  -_-

I jedni i drugi su ih koristili kao prethodnice, Nemci i kao mamac u neku ruku, opekli su se i jedni i drugi i - ako cemo vec o tehnologijama - dosli do zakljucka da je od njih slaba vajda.

Usput, zaista ne razumem fasciniranost 'uspesima' Nemaca kod Jutlanda izrazenu kroz izdrzljivost njihovih BK: rekoh ti da kod Jutlanda nije potopljen ni jedan BB i da je to - ako cemo vec o tehnologiji - znacajna i tehnoloska cinjenica koja poprilicno menja sliku o superiornosti Nemaca, ali 'ajde...  :)

[vathra]

Naravno da nisu, ko je to uopste pomenuo: broje se i racunaju BB, a tebi kao starom podatkasu^tm valjda ne moram (ponovo) da pricam o koncepcijskim razlikama u izgradnji britanskih i nemackih BB.

Код ББ су само бродови класе QE били нешто бржи, остали су били прилично уједначени.

 

Pa Biegler logikom: Sovjetski gubici bili veci, dakle Sovjeti izgubili.

Код Стаљинграда су по свим параметрима немачки/осовински губици били већи.

То што неко пореди бабе и жабе је његова ствар.

 

Vatra, zezanje na stranu, ali ozbiljno mesas babe i zabe, aj kad si vec stavio (nedopustivo) u isti kontekst Borodino i Jutland:

Ја сам објаснио по чему су упоредиве, ако то не можеш да разумеш не знам због чега ме даље смараш.

[namenski]

Zum Befehl, herr Kadett! :D

[Prospero]

 

Sir Edward Grey and the July Crisis

Christopher Clark

The International History Review, 38:2, 326-338

https://fs09n5.sendspace.com/dl/3417be44ece4b5b1d3cc6cfa3a342c06/5727b6b161cebcd3/x3pzbx/%5B2016%5D%20Clark%2C%20Sir%20Edward%20Grey%20and%20the%20July%20Crisis.pdf

 

 

...

In addressing Grey’s role more precisely - his responses to the July Crisis of 1914 - I

want to focus on three questions. The rst relates to the extent to which Grey had already

framed in his own mind a plausible response to the kind of crisis that broke out in the Bal-

kan Peninsula after the Sarajevo assassinations of 28 June 1914. That is the rst question:

had he already framed in his own mind a kind of scenario to cover that eventuality? The

second concerns his response to the Balkan crisis once it got underway; the third relates

to the epic misunderstanding that transpired, or perhaps did not transpire, between Grey

and Prince Lichnowsky, the German Ambassador at London during the last days of the

July Crisis. 

...

 

 

In November 1912, as the Serbian Army pushed across northern Albania toward the Adriatic

coast, Bertie, the Ambassador at Paris, warned the French Foreign Minister, on instructions

from Grey, that Britain would not go to war in order to secure an Adriatic seaport for

Belgrade.

And yet only a few days later on 4 December 1912 Sir Edward Grey in a famous epi-

sode, discussed in detail by Keith Wilson, summoned the German Ambassador, Prince

Lichnowsky, and issued to him a stark warning: ‘If a European war were to arise through

Austria’s attacking Serbia, and Russia, compelled by public opinion, were to march into

Galicia rather than again put up with the humiliation like that of 1909, thus forcing Ger-

many to come to the aid of Austria, France would inevitably be drawn in and no-one could

foretell what further developments might follow.’2 The pretext for this exchange, it has to

be recalled, was Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg’s ten-minute speech to the German Reich-

stag in which he had warned that if against all expectations Austria were attacked by

another Great Power (the reference was clearly to Russia, although Russia was not named)

then Germany would intervene to protect its ally. Lichnowsky relayed Grey’s comments as

‘a hint that cannot be misunderstood’. They meant that ‘it was for England a vital necessity

to prevent [France] from being crushed by Germany.’3

It was reading Lichnowsky’s summary of his conversation with Grey that panicked Kai-

ser Wilhelm into summoning the famous War Council of 8 December 1912:

...

Then there was Grey’s odd supposition that this intervention by Russia would openly

involve aggression against a state whose actions imposed no direct threat to Russian secu-

rity - Serbia is actually a long way from Russia - and must inevitably, to use his words ‘bring

in France’, a point of view that essentially endorsed or at least implicitly accepted

Poincare’s scaling-up of the treaty commitment to cover the possibility of a Russian attack

on another European Great Power; and this, Grey implied, would oblige Britain at some

point to intervene on the side of France. Grey may have felt discomfort. He certainly

expressed it intermittently about the prospect of, as he put it, ghting for Serbia. But it

seems that he had understood the Balkan inception scenario, and perhaps to some extent

had absorbed it into his own thinking. This scenario, it is important to remember, was not

an immutable feature of the international system. It did not embody an impersonal neces-

sity. Rather it was a fabric of partisan attitudes, commitments, and threats. In sketching the

scenario for Lichnowsky Grey was not foretelling a foreordained future, but rather himself

articulating part of a set of understandings that made that future possible.

On the other hand Grey had very little to say about Austria-Hungary’s rights to defend

its close-range interests in the manner of a European power.

...

So the Balkan inception scenario was not - and this is important

to note - a plan or a plot that steadily matured over time. It was not a conspiracy, nor was

there any necessary or linear relationship between the positions tentatively mooted in

1912 and 1913 and the outbreak of war in the following year. It was not that the Balkan

inception scenario drove or led Europe towards the war that actually happened in 1914. It

was rather the other way round: that it supplied the conceptual framework within which

the crisis was interpreted once it had broken out. I want to come back to that a little bit

later.

...

 

 

However, in his conversations dur-

ing July with the London ambassadors of the powers Grey plotted, as so often before, a

meandering path that steered clear of straightforward commitments. On 8 July he warned

Paul Cambon, the French Ambassador at London, that if the Austrian Emperor were forced

by Austrian public opinion (again there is that reference to a government whose hands

are being forced by public opinion; it is a trope one nds everywhere in the Europe of

1914) in the direction of a demarche, as he put it, against Serbia, then France and Britain

would have to do everything in their power to calm St Petersburg.

...

When Count Mens-

dorff complained to Grey on 17 July of the excesses of the Belgrade press Grey listened in

silence and then replied with a question - it is a really odd response - was there not per-

haps one Serbian paper that had behaved decently? Now why ask this question? I don’t

know but it is an odd reply to Mensdorff’s complaint. Mensdorff conceded that this might

well be the case, perhaps there was one sensible paper, but went on to say that the Dual

Monarchy could no longer tolerate political subversion at this level of intensity. ‘Sir

Edward Grey conceded this,’ Mensdorff reported, ‘but he did not enter into any further

discussion of the subject.’5 End of meeting.After receiving the text of the Austrian note to

Belgrade, Grey invited Mensdorff to come to see him again on 24 July and it was on that

occasion that he described the note, famously cited throughout the literature over the

last 100 years, as the most formidable document of its type that he had ever seen. But

even on that occasion the Foreign Secretary conceded to Mensdorff that Austria’s claims

concerning the complicity of certain Serbian state agencies, and even some of the

demands listed in the Austrian ultimatum, were justied.

...

He subordinated in his reaction to events his understanding, in as much as

he developed one, of the Austro-Serbian quarrel to the larger imperatives of the Entente,

which meant in effect tacitly supporting Russian policy. Grey did speak at intervals of the

importance of calming Russia and he did ask St Petersburg to avoid unnecessarily provoc-

ative measures but he showed remarkably little knowledge of, or interest in, what was

actually happening in Russia during the crucial days following the presentation of the

Austrian note.

...

At his meeting

with Benckendorff on 8 July, and at various points thereafter, Grey had after all acquiesced

in the Russian view that ‘a Servian war inevitably meant a European war’, and this is, I

think, why he does not bother approaching Vienna. Later, in a conversation with Berna-

dotte Schmidt, he criticised himself for not dealing directly with Vienna; but one of the

reasons he did not was because he subscribed to the general view that Vienna was no lon-

ger a force to be taken seriously. Vienna had been written off. This is one of the problems

with the Concert of Europe. It could no longer exist in an environment where the right to

a future for one of its members had been placed under a question mark.

...

Sazonov had

asked Buchanan to convey to Grey his hope that the British government would ‘proclaim

[its] solidarity with France and Russia’.7 Commenting on this despatch Eyre Crowe used

more trenchant language than Edward Grey would ever have chosen but captured, I think,

the inner logic of the position that the Foreign Secretary himself would subsequently

adopt: ‘Whatever we may think of the merits of the Austrian charges against Servia, France

and Russia consider that these are the pretexts’ (it is interesting to see the word ‘pretexts’

used in this context; it is often used in the literature to refer to the murders at Sarajevo,

they were the pretext, but of course there was more than one pretext):

… and that the bigger cause of Triple Alliance verses Triple Entente is denitely engaged. I

think that it would be impolitic, not to say dangerous, for England to attempt to controvert

this opinion, or to endeavour to obscure the plain issue by any representation at St Petersburg

and Paris … Our interests are tied up with those of France and Russia in this struggle, which is

not for the possession of Servia, but one between Germany aiming at a political dictatorship

in Europe and the Powers who desire to retain individual freedom.8

 

Now Crowe’s reading is not necessarily Grey’s reading but Grey had assured Lichnow-

sky that Britain had no legal obligations to its Entente partners but he also warned the

German Ambassador on 29 July, without specic authority from the Cabinet beforehand,

that if Germany and France joined the war - and it was not the rst time that he had

made this warning - then Britain might nd it necessary to take precipitous action. Grey’s

actions and omissions revealed how deep the Entente thinking structured his view of the

unfolding crisis. This was in effect a new iteration of the Balkan inception scenario that

had become the animating logic of the FrancoRussian alliance and that Grey had intern-

alised in his warning to the German Ambassador in December 1912: There would be a

quarrel in the Balkans, it did not really matter who started it; pressured by outrage at

home Russia would pile in, pulling in Germany on the side of Austria; France would inevi-

tably intervene on the side of her ally; in that situation Britain could not stand aside and

watch France be crushed by Germany. This was precisely the script, not withstanding

momentary doubts and prevarications, that Grey followed in 1914. He did not inspect or

weigh up the Austrian case against Serbia. Indeed he showed no interest in it whatsoever.

Not because he believed the Serbian government was innocent of the charges against it -

he clearly did not - but because he acquiesced in the Franco-Russian view that the Aus-

trian threat to Serbia constituted a pretext, as Eyre Crowe put it, for activating the Alliance,

and dening the problem in this way naturally placed the onus on Germany whose inter-

vention in Austria’s defence must necessarily trigger French mobilisation and a Continen-

tal war....

...

 

 

On the afternoon of Saturday 1 August sensational news from London arrived in Berlin.

Just a few minutes after Berlin had issued the order for a general mobilisation a telegram

arrived from Lichnowsky describing a meeting that morning with the British Foreign Sec-

retary. It seemed that Grey was offering not just to stay out of the war if Germany

restrained from attacking France but to vouch for French neutrality as well. The text of the

cable was as follows:

Sir Edward Grey has just sent word to me by Sir W. Tyrrell that he hopes to be able this after-

noon … to make a statement to me which may prove helpful in preventing the great catastro-

phe … this seems to mean that in the event of our not attacking France, England, too, would

remain neutral and would guarantee France passivity. I shall learn the details this afternoon.

Sir Edward Grey has just called me upon the telephone and asked whether I thought I could

give an assurance that in the event of France remaining neutral in a war between Russia and

Germany we should not attack the French. I assured him that I could take the responsibility

for such a guarantee and he will use this assurance at today’s Cabinet meeting.9

Now I do not want to go into the detail of the confusion that followed this message in

Berlin and the further communication from Lichnowsky some hours later, or into the

high-speed back-pedalling that followed in London when Berlin got back in touch with

the British and said ‘Yes, thank you for this marvellous offer - we would like to accept.’

...

Incidentally this anxiety about who was appearing to be forced by whom, you nd

everywhere and it is not unique to Grey. You nd the same reasoning in St Petersburg, in

Berlin, in Vienna. Only in the light of this perspective on events could it seem to make

sense to propose a stand-off between Germany and France, whilst Russia, abandoned by

her Western ally France, faced Germany and Austria alone in the east. If France could not

take advantage of this offer, Grey told Cambon on the afternoon of 1 August, it was

because ‘she was bound by an alliance to which we were not parties, and of which we did

not know the terms’.12 When he wrote these words Grey was doing more than merely

cooling the temperature by withholding his support or buying time for military prepara-

tions: he was struggling with the automatism of a specic understanding of the Triple

Entente, an understanding he had himself at various moments reluctantly endorsed and

articulated. It clearly unnerved him, at least at this juncture, that a remote quarrel in

south-eastern Europe should be accepted as the trigger for a Continental war even

though none of the three Entente powers was under direct attack or direct threat of

attack. Grey ultimately remained true to the Entente line he had pursued since 1912; but

these moments of circumspection remind us of a complicating feature of the July Crisis:

namely that the bitter choices between opposed options divided not only parties and

Cabinets but also the minds of some of the key decision-makers; the complexity was in

the personalities not just in the events.

...

 

 

One last thought. It was to contain Germany, not Russia, that Britain went to war in 1914.

There has been controversy amongst historians about the respective impact, about what

appear to be two quite distinctive security paradigms. Whilst the oldest of these, and

some newer ones, stress the centrality of the Continental balance of power in British think-

ing and policy, some revisionist accounts have globalised the eld of vision, arguing that

Britain’s vulnerability as a world power obliged it to focus on Russia as the most funda-

mental threat. But both kinds of argument were presented by the makers of British foreign

policy in the Grey era, and this is where I completely agree with Thomas Otte. It is a false

opposition between Blue Water and Continental commitments. An example is the minute

appended by Eyre Crowe to a report from Buchanan in St Petersburg in which Crowe’s

view was, and always had been, that of a balance-of-power Continentalist focused on the

containment of Germany, yet he also made an explicit appeal to Britain’s imperial security:

‘Should the war come, and England stand aside, one of two things must happen: (a) either

Germany and Austria win, crush France and humiliate Russia … What will be the position

of a friendless England.’ It is a very good question. ‘(b) Or France and Russia win. What

would then be their attitude towards England? What about India and the Medi-

terranean?’13 There is no contradiction between these two arguments; they are conver-

gent. In short, the key British decision-makers were not forced to choose between

Continental and imperial options in 1914. Whether one identied Russia or Germany as

the chief threat, the outcome was the same since British intervention on the side of the

Entente offered a means of appeasing and tethering Russia, and of opposing and contain-

ing Germany. In the conditions of 1914 the logics of global and Continental security con-

verged in the British decision to support the Entente powers against Germany and Austria.

 

 

[Korki]

Октобар 1913, немачки Кајзер

 

[Prospero]

...

On Saturday evening, 25 July, the SPD leadership published a proclamation, issued in Berlin as a Vorwärts extra, calling for anti-war demonstrations

in Germany on Tuesday, 28 July.179 Right-wing newspapers asked the government to forbid the demonstrations, labelling the Social

Democratic activity “treasonous.”180 The government, however, rejected this request. Indeed, some Social Democrats had the impression that the

government seemed to find the demonstrations useful; at least they seemed to suggest as much in meetings with the SPD leaders Hugo

Haase and Otto Braun on 26 July,181 and in an article published in the semi-official Kölnische Zeitung: “when our Social Democrats stage antiwar

demonstrations in the next few days they will enjoy to a certain degree the support of the German bourgeoisie.”182 The government did,however,

prohibit street demonstrations. On Tuesday, the Berlin police chief, Jagow, published the following directive:

 

because of the special conditions of the last three days nothing has been done to

stop the patriotic parades on Unter den Linden, the Wilhelmstrasse, etc.,

although many traffic disturbances were caused by the parades. Beginning

tonight, however, the needs of traffic come first; no more parades will be

allowed.183

 

And outside of Berlin the local police often harassed the local SPD as it passed out pamphlets advertising the protests.

The largest demonstrations that Tuesday evening took place in greater Berlin, where the SPD staged thirty-two anti-war demonstrations (thirteen

within Berlin itself). Everywhere, especially in the working-class parts of the city in the north and the east, crowds of people filled the halls,

in many places overflowing into the streets. Well over 100,000 people attended these demonstrations, significantly more than had participated

in the “enthusiastic” patriotic parades of the last three days.184 At each of the meetings a party leader, in a short speech, blamed Austria for the

present trouble, saying “Austria wants war,” and Germany should not support her. The speakers also attacked the bourgeois press for working

to create a pro-war atmosphere with their support of Austria, and their claim that the patriotic, “enthusiastic” paraders represented Germany.

The working class, the speakers asserted, wanted peace. The speakers closed by asking the German government to do all it could to prevent war.

After the speech, the floor was opened for discussion, yet in almost all the meetings no one spoke. A long resolution – which many contemporaries

felt lacked punch – was then unanimously approved before the speakers asked people to march to the center of the city.185 The mood at these

meetings was quiet, subdued. What followed, however, was not.

 

At around 9.00 p.m. between ten and thirty “parades” – generally about 1,000 to 3,000 people, but sometimes as many as 10,000 people

(that is, as large as the largest parade on Saturday evening) – advanced from the working-class suburbs to the center of Berlin.186 These Social

Democratic parades aimed to desacralize and provoke; the paraders staged a counter-demonstration at exactly those “national” sites where

the pro-war crowds had staged theirs. Along the way, instead of singing patriotic songs and yelling patriotic phrases, the participants sang

working-class songs, such as the “Arbeitermarseillaise,” and yelled “down with war” and “long live Social Democracy.”

The police, out in full force, attempted to prevent the paraders from reaching the city center by setting up blockades. In the course of dispersing

the paraders as they approached the blockade the policemen rode into the crowd on horseback, sometimes even drawing their swords and,

in at least two cases, using them.187 Many Social Democrats, however, were able to avoid the police, and at approximately 10.00 p.m. about

1,000 to 2,000 Social Democrats marched up and down the middle of Unter den Linden, while on both sidewalks the bourgeoisie sang patriotic

songs.188

It was quite a moment. In the words of a Frankfurter Zeitung journalist:

in front of the cafés and restaurants there were masses of people. The “Wacht am

Rhein” and “Heil dir im Siegerkranz” sounded out of thousands of throats, but

one could also hear the “Arbeitermarseillaise” sung powerfully by closely organized

parades . . . It was an incredible confusion of heated calls, of demonstrations

for and against, which rose to a raging noise, and which increased ever more the

general excitement. The police were completely powerless at 10.00 against this

mass of people.189

Most accounts state that the Social Democrats were in the majority, although just barely, and only for a short time.190

The general mêlée lasted only an hour. Between 10.30 and 11.00 p.m., the police, on horseback, cleared the street. They had to do this

three times that evening, but by 12.00 p.m. all was quiet. Vorwärts noted that the police’s actions were accompanied “with stormy applause” from

the thickly populated balconies of Café Bauer and Café Kranzler . . . It is truly a wonderful picture of that mammoth bourgeois courage,

that with a cup of hot chocolate, from a secure balcony, one can preach class hatred.191

 

The police also broke up Social Democratic anti-war demonstrations outside the center of the city, such as a large crowd which gathered at

11.15 p.m. in front of the Vorwärts building. And the police arrested twenty-eight people for “public disturbances” such as yelling “down with

war,” “down with the warmongers” (Kriegshetzer), or “hurrah for Social Democracy.”192 In contrast, the police did nothing against a small group

of “students and young salesmen,” or against “Young Germany,” who staged a “counter-demonstration.”

There were similar anti-war protests throughout Germany on Tuesday and Wednesday.

...

 

 

 

 

Jeffrey Verhey, The Spirit of 1914 - Militarism, Myth and Mobilization in Germany, pp. 52-55

[Dr Arslanagić]

[MancMellow]

to kad nam pricaju kako su nas zajebali sa municijom (Francuzi doduše). Kako su na Somi sami sebe zajebali sa municijom to je tek za priču. 

Edited July 7, 2016 by MancMellow

[Dr Arslanagić]

btw, u bici na Somi je, među hiljadama nesretnika, poginuo i poručnik Rejmond Askvit, najstariji sin britanskog premijera Herberta Henrija Askvita.

[Prospero]

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fw_cqYCLZNI

[porucnik vasic]

[Korki]

Значи и чувени професор са Оксфорда и Краљевске академије, Доминик Ливен, који је стручњак за руску историју, небројано пута био у разним руским архивима, тврди да је Лењин убачен у Русију од стране Немаца.

 

А, што се тиче руске улоге, па није никаква тајна да су Руси полудели на Британце када су Немци послали генерала фон Сандерса у Константинопољ, да прави фортификације Бософора и обуку турске војске, немци су били уплашени због губитка образа јер су Турци катастрофално прошли у Балканском рату са њиховим оружјем и делимичном обуком. Када Британци нису хтели да подрже Русе да се то спречи, за разлику од Француза, а Бософор је био кључ за руски извоз пољопривреде, који је био у великом замаху, што је главни разлог зашто још код Балканских ратова није кренуо велики рат у Европи, Немци и Британци су водили преговоре. Те је мало смешно када говоре да су Бритнаци подржали руске захтеве око Босфора у Антанти, па није ни чудно климање царевине 1916/17 на челу са либералима блиским британцима, који су збацили цара и направили услове да Лењин уђе у Русију под немачком контролом, што нису хтели, про-британски либерали, у том тренутку, али показују сву глупост бритнаксе политике. Британија је само хтел да успори руску напредовање у Турској 1916 према Босфору.

 

Такође се зна да је немачка одлука, код кајзера и Молткеа, била вођена расним мотивима: теутонац противу словена. Такође страх од руског развоја, Молтке је јасно говорио да од 1916 Русија бива непобедива у војном смислу, то су биле процене немачке Врховне команде. Бетман Холвег се после пута у Русију, у годинама пре рата, уплашио економског развоја Русије итд.

Edited July 14, 2016 by Korki

[namenski]

Korki, uzmi vazduh jebote :D

[Korki]

Па нисам све завршио, могао бих како су британци обучавали, наоружавали Турке у годинама пре Великог рата, заједно са Немцима, да би им Турци показали знање на Галипољу.

Наставак о Лењину, можда читава тема о руском Грађанском рату, неки други пут.